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INTRODUCTION
It is a recurring image on our television screens: a young man-frequently
Black' and poor-is hustled from police car to courthouse door. As two burly
police officers grip him tightly by the arms, he tries to hide his face with his
hands. His efforts are futile. He succeeds only in exposing his handcuffs to the
bright television lights. In the background, a reporter's urgent voice describes
the despicable act which led to the young man's capture. His anguished face,
framed by gleaming handcuffs, is the garish image we remember.
When I was a public defender, I would watch episodes like this with dread.
"What if," I would wonder, "that young man was to become my client at the
next day's arraignment call? Could I be of any help to him? Or would I be
essentially useless, since he had already been tried and convicted on televi-
sion and in the hearts and minds of any potential jurors?" Certainly, I could
do something. I could ameliorate the onslaught of state power by holding the
government to its promises and making sure no shortcuts were taken.2
Occasionally, in an exceptional case, I might even win an acquittal. But, by
and large, in case after case, my presence has had little bearing on the
outcome. In the vast majority of cases, the conclusion was foregone, the
conviction assured, the case open and shut.3 I was a necessary, but irrel-
evant,4 player in a game with a predetermined outcome.
We Americans often speak of our criminal procedure as if it were one of
the main bulwarks of democracy. We like to consider the criminal trial, with
its adversarial process, as one of the great institutions of abstract justice. But
the American criminal justice system is a sham. The centerpiece of the
criminal justice system-the trial-is itself a sham. It is not, in the main, a
1. I use "Black" and "African-American" interchangeably throughout this Article to refer to
American citizens of African descent. "Black" denotes racial and cultural identity rather than mere
physical appearance and is therefore capitalized. See Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights Held Hostage: Race,
Ideology and the Peremptory Challenge, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 64 n.7 (1993).
2. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders,
106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1254-1260 (1993) (describing ways that public defenders can provide
"zealous advocacy" for their clients).
3. It may, of course, be argued that this is so because the defendants were guilty, but this misses my
point. The fact is that as soon as we believe all defendants are guilty the trial becomes an empty ritual.
We must then ask why we need a trial to validate the presumed guilt of these individuals. Is it to
assuage our societal discomfort for failing to alleviate the conditions that produced their crimes?
4. I note the contradiction between the terms "necessary" and "irrelevant," but it is a real
contradiction that is signified by their use. While my presence may have been necessary to provide
legitimacy to the proceedings, it was irrelevant to the outcome.
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mechanism for determining the truth.5 In the majority of criminal cases, the
truth is already assumed from the start. While belief in the presumption of
innocence is professed, the defendant is treated as if his guilt were assured.
In reality, it is up to the defendant to prove, if possible, his innocence and to
somehow show that he is an exception to the rule.
More concretely, the criminal trial is flawed because it is not adversarial
(or at least not as adversarial as it should be). Instead of two evenly matched
adversaries, the advantages are decidedly weighted in the prosecution's
favor.6 The prosecution has tremendous resources at its disposal that are
ordinarily not available to the defense: police investigators, government
laboratories, a professional legal staff, an endless supply of expert witnesses
and, most importantly, a far greater reserve of credibility.7 This imbalance is
even greater when the defendant is represented by a public defender. This is
doubly cruel because the defendants who are at greatest risk in the criminal
justice process-those with the least personal resources-are the ones most
likely to be represented by public defenders.
Of course, the defendant has the protections of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments-including the right to a fair trial, the right to effective
assistance of counsel, the right against self-incrimination, the right to compul-
sory process, the right of confrontation, and the requirement of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt-but these are, by and large, merely formal protections.
How defendants are treated in fact is what is important, not simply abstract
theory. To have any relevance, the formal protections afforded to defendants
must be appraised in the cultural context which gives them meaning.
Trials take place within a culture, a culture which gives us certain ideas
about the prosecution and certain opinions about the defendant. Every
culture produces its own belief system. This belief system is transmitted to
each member of society through such means as formal educational systems,
media, authoritative pronouncements and word of mouth. A cultural belief
system allows us to attach meaning to symbolic representations that appear
in culturally determined contexts. Thus, the imagery of the courtroom-the
"dignity" of the proceedings, the "impartiality" of the judge, the adversarial
posture of the litigants-and the juxtaposition of symbols of authority-the
flag, the judge's black robe, the police officer's badge-all communicate
5. 1 would not want to overstate my case here. Clearly, fact-finding is an attribute of a trial. It is not,
however, the central attribute and, indeed, it is one that may be sacrificed for other goals. See infra
Part V(D).
6. This article focuses on less financially endowed criminal defendants. Wealthy or white-collar
defendants have a far better chance of maintaining a level playing field with the prosecution.
7. The trial has been described as "a regulated storytelling contest." Gary Goodpaster, On the
Theory ofAmerican Adversary Criminal Law 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118, 120 (1987). If this is
so, then the storyteller with assured credibility will have a distinct advantage before the decision
maker.
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culturally determined meaning to prospective jurors. There should be no
mystery as to what meaning it is that the criminal justice system communi-
cates to the American public. Our society is one where jurors are taught
repeatedly, through both obvious and subtle means, that the preferred
outcome of any trial is the conviction of the accused. 8 In an environment such
as this, a requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is of little value.
The image of the accused presented in criminal procedure books-that of
an average citizen, who is merely "suspected" of crime, and who conse-
quently retains his rights and social status until the state meets a heavy
burden of proof-is a widespread fraud. Instead, the defendant plays the
mythical role of "criminal" in a broader morality play, the well-known script
of which allows the audience to boo and hiss as soon as the villain enters the
scene. The defendant in a criminal case is supposed to lose, just as a villain in
a Hollywood movie is also supposed to lose. More often than not, a criminal
trial consists merely of two groups of actors playing their appointed parts-
the prosecution in white hats, the defense in black.
The criminal trial, then, is an allegorical tale disclosing the way that society
would like to discover, expose and exorcise crime. As allegory, the trial does
more than merely determine the fate of the defendant standing trial,
although it does that too. The trial represents something deeper. The trial
expresses fundamental notions about justice and injustice, right and wrong,
law-abiding and crime, good and evil. Within the confines of this allegory, the
public defender's role is essentially symbolic. The public defender demon-
strates that justice is being done and that the trial is fair. Symbolically, it
matters little whether the public defender can actually assist the defendant
because, ats a mythical "criminal," the defendant is always guilty.
The allegorical nature of the trial is not apparent on the surface. It
becomes visible only when one is aware of underlying notions of justice and
attitudes about crime. Then one can trace the relationship of these notions
and attitudes to the adversarial process. In this article, I use semiotic theory9
to explain how the adversarial criminal trial is given substance and meaning
that belies its formal description. I situate the criminal justice system in its
broader societal context, and then employ critical media analysis to "read"
the trial and disclose its allegorical form. Semiotic analysis reveals how our
perceptions of guilt and innocence, of criminals and victims, of prosecutors
and defenders, are ordered to fit a profound and pre-existing structure.
8. Admittedly, popular television programs like Perry Mason and Matlock typically feature falsely
accused defendants whose innocence is only proved through maneuvering by an especially able and
clever defense attorney (and his staff) against staggering evidence and odds. These programs are,
however, atypical, and their perceptual impact is grossly outweighed by television news and other
primetime detective and police programming. See infra Part IV.
9. Semiotics is the science or study of signs and symbols. The term is defined and discussed
extensively infra Part II.
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I begin by describing what I call "the myth of criminal justice." In Part I, I
disclose the parameters of this myth by presenting the formal protections
that the right to counsel, along with the defendant's other trial rights, afford
to those accused of crime. In Part II, I explain semiotic theory and how it can
be used to determine the social construction of meaning. I point out that by
placing the defendant's trial rights in their cultural context, semiotics can
reveal the functional meaning of the adversarial process. Next, in Part III, I
employ semiotics to disclose how the criminal justice system is structured by a
broader discourse about crime and criminals. I show how ideas about crime
work to limit our conceptions of justice, so that defendants' rights may be
articulated, but not taken seriously. In Part IV, I view popular culture
through the medium of television. I employ the window of television to
illustrate how crime is represented in ways that separate criminals from
society and define them as "bad" and undeserving of rights.
I also examine how the cultural images represented on television play out
in the context of a criminal trial. In Part V, I point out how these latent
cultural images privilege the prosecution and disfavor the defense. I argue
that the discourse on crime skews the adversarial process and makes it
difficult for defendants to receive a fair trial. In Part VI, I demonstrate how
public defenders are especially handicapped in their ability to convince jurors
of the innocence of their clients, since they too lack credibility in the eyes of
the public. Finally, in Part VII, I suggest a way that the federal government
could use its persuasive power to make the adversarial process more meaning-
ful. I propose the establishment of a Federal Defender General in order to
improve the image and effectiveness of public defenders.
I. FORMAL RIGHTS AND THE PERSISTENCE OF MYTH
The adversary system' ° is a carry over from the English common law. The
system is not mentioned in the Constitution. Nor is it preserved, by and large,
by statute. Yet, the adversary process is the linchpin of our criminal justice
system. A person charged with a crime is not just the accused, but the
10. An adversarial criminal justice system is one that relies on: (1) the presentation of evidence by
the parties; (2) the use of "a highly structured forensic procedure"; and (3) a neutral and passive
fact-finder. STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 2 (1984). See also Goodpaster, supra note 7
(describing adversarial trial as "a regulated storytelling contest between champions of competing,
interpretive stories" before an "impartial and impassive" decision maker). An adversarial system
should be contrasted with the "inquisitorial" model prevalent in European countries. In inquisitorial
systems, the finder of fact takes an active role in the investigation and development of the case and the
parties play a far less central part in the conduct of the trial. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H.
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 35 (2d ed. 1992) (comparing the evidentiary barriers, fact finding,
precision, and fairness of inquisitorial and adversary systems); Mirjan Damaska, Evidentiary Barriers
to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506
(1973) (same).
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defendant-someone who retains the capacity to combat and contest the
government's accusations.
The adversary system receives praise from many quarters because, it is
argued, the self-interest of the parties will motivate them to more thoroughly
prepare their submissions to the fact finder than if a more dispassionate
investigator were charged with the responsibility."1 Also, it is assumed that a
disinterested fact finder is less likely to show bias because he or she has no
vested interest in the way that the investigation is conducted or how trial
preparations are made. 12 The adversarial system works on the assumption
that truth will prevail from the conflict between two opposing forces.13
Within the adversary system, the criminal defendant is entitled to an
impressive array of rights. The most important of these, from an adversarial
standpoint, is the right to counsel, 4 for it is through counsel that the
defendant is best able to exploit the adversarial process and champion his
cause. The right to counsel originates in the Constitution. In Gideon v.
Wainwright15 the Supreme Court read the Sixth Amendment to require that
counsel be provided to indigent criminal defendants in felony cases at state
expense. 6 Later, the Supreme Court interpreted the indigent's right to
appointed counsel to be applicable in all cases in which actual imprisonment
was imposed, 7 as well as to appeals as of right. 8 In other cases the Court
broadened the right to counsel to require state provision of expert wit-
11. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 10, at 36.
12. Id.
13. See LANDSMAN, supra note 10, at 2:
The central precept of the adversary process is that out of the sharp clash of proofs
presented by adversaries in a highly structured forensic setting is most likely to come the
information upon which a neutral and passive decision maker can base the resolution of
a litigated dispute acceptable to both the parties and society.
Thus, the adversarial process operates according to dialectical modes of reasoning. Goodpaster, supra
note 7, at 120.
14. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The due process clauses and the equal protection clause have also been
relied on by courts as sources for the right to counsel. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)
(establishing a due process right to counsel at parole and probation revocation proceedings); Douglas
v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (holding refusal to appoint appellate counsel without preliminary
showing of merit a denial of equal protection).
15. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
16. Id. at 342. Before Gideon, the Supreme Court held in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932),
that the due process clause required counsel to be appointed to state court defendants, but that ruling
was held to be limited to capital cases. The Court subsequently held in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458
(1938), that counsel was to be provided to indigent defendants in all criminal proceedings in the
federal courts, but state court defendants were not granted the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases
until much later. See infra note 17.
17. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
18. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (decided same term as Gideon).
[Vol. 32:743
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nesses,1 9 trial transcripts,2" and other "basic tools of an adequate defense."2
Finally, courts have made some effort to address the quality of legal services
provided to criminal defendants.22 On the surface, then, the obligation of the
19. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
20. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
21. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (citing Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226 (1971)). While some courts have
held Ake to be broad enough to permit defendants to request state funds for non-expert witness
assistance, such as investigators or interpreters, such requests rarely succeed, based on reasoning that
the defendants have failed to show a "particularized need" for the assistance. See, e.g., State v.
Hickey, 346 S.E.2d 646 (N.C. 1986); Castro v. State, 844 P.2d 159 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992). However
several jurisdictions have enacted statutes similar to 18 U.S.C. § 30006A(e)(1), which allows for the
provision of "investigative, expert, or other services" upon a showing that the service is "necessary for
an adequate defense." This statutory standard is usually easier for defendants to meet. LAFAvE &
ISRAEL, supra note 10, at 541 & n.44.
22. The Supreme Court has recognized that "a party whose counsel is unable to provide effective
representation is in no better position than one who has no counsel at all." Evitts v. Lucy, 469 U.S.
387, 396 (1985). While trumpeting the necessity for effective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court
has made it difficult for defendants to establish ineffectiveness. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984), the Court rejected a categorical or "per se" standard of ineffectiveness and instead held
that "the proper standard for [measuring] attorney performance is that of reasonably effective
assistance." Id. at 687. This ill-defined standard has turned out to be highly elastic. Additionally,
Strickland requires that there be a "reasonable probability" that the outcome of the case would have
been different in the absence of counsel's unprofessional errors. As a result, courts rarely grant any
but the most egregious claims of ineffectiveness. See, e.g., Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the
Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffectiveness of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.
J. 413, 414 nn. 10, 11 (1988) (reporting that since Strickland, the Supreme Court has "rejected
ineffectiveness claims in all four cases in which the issue was squarely presented" and that only 30 out
of 702 claims, or 4.3%, have been successful at the circuit court level). For more in depth discussions
and critiques of the Strickland standard, see generally, Alfredo Garcia, The Right to Counsel Under
Siege: Requiem for an Endangered Right?, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35, 85 (1991) (stating that "[t]he
Strickland court's concern with efficiency and the systemic impact of creating a meaningful standard
for effective assistance constricted the contours of th[e] fundamental right" to counsel); Bruce A.
Green, Legal Fiction: The Meaning of Counsel in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. REV. 433, 499-504
(1993) (arguing that "a death row prisoner who suffered at the hands of an unqualified advocate often
will be unable to satisfy the Strickland standard"); Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No
Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS
CONST. L. 0. 625 (1986) (proposing that Strickland's deference to attorneys and preoccupation with
ends rather than means undermines the adversary system); Calhoun, supra, at 427 (arguing that, while
"paying lip service" to the right to effective counsel, Strickland created a nearly insurmountable
hurdle for defendants claiming ineffective assistance); Richard L. Gabriel, Comment, The Strickland
Standard for Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Emasculating the Sixth Amendment in the Guise
of Due Process, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1259 (1986) (arguing that the Strickland test "undermines the goal
of the sixth amendment-a just result achieved through a proper adversarial proceeding"); Richard
P. Rhodes, Note, Strickland v. Washington: Safeguard of the Capital Defendant's Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel?, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 1212 (1992) (stating that Strickland disadvantaged
defendants asserting ineffective counsel by enabling the continued application of regional standards
and by increasing the burden of proof); Ivan K. Fong, Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at Capital
Sentencing, 39 STAN. L. REV. 461 (1987) (arguing that Strickland's application to both guilt and
sentencing phases of capital trials has failed to ensure the effective assistance of counsel for capital
defendants).
Where attorney representation creates a conflict of interest, courts have been more protective of
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state to provide legal assistance to those who are too poor to secure their own
defense seems quite extensive.
There are other rights that a defendant may claim to help bolster his or her
defense. A defendant has a right to be present at trial,23 the right to confront
the witnesses against him or her,24 and the right to cross-examine those
witnesses.2' The defendant also has the right to present a defense 26 and the
right to compulsory process in order to obtain witnesses27 or evidence. 21
Furthermore, the defendant has a right to testify29 and a right to remain
silent.3" Finally, the defendant has a general right to fairness in the prosecu-
tion of his or her case-i.e., the right to due process of law.3'
defendants' rights. Ineffectiveness is presumed when an "actual conflict" has been established and, in
such a case, prejudice is reviewed under the somewhat less stringent standard of whether the conflict
"adversely affected [the] lawyer's performance." Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980).
23. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). However, the right to be present may be waived. See id.
(holding unruly and disruptive defendant may be excluded from trial).
24. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). However, the defendant's right to confront witnesses is not
unrestricted. In Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), the Supreme Court held that a defendant's
right to confrontation must give way when a court finds that testifying in the presence of the defendant
would impair an alleged child abuse victim's ability to communicate.
25. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15 (1985).
26. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
27. See, e.g., id.
28. See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987).
29. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
31. "Due process" is a terribly broad and general idea. It has been described as " 'perhaps, the
least frozen concept in our law,' "one that concentrates on " 'the essence of fairness rather than the
familiarity of form.' " LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 10, at 53 (quoting Justice Frankfurter). Its
general function may be described as one which limits the power of government over individuals. See
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 664-65 (2d ed. 1988) ("due process functions
... to curb governmental abuse, unfairness, or oppression"). Due process takes both substantive and
procedural forms. Procedural due process provides for constitutional limits on the application or
enforcement of governmental decisions or policy. Id. at 664. At the very least, procedural due process
entails "the right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind." Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Substantive due process, on the other hand, imposes controls on the content or subject of governmen-
tal decisions or policy. TRIBE, supra, at 664 n.4.
In the criminal justice context, the procedural due process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments have been found to require: (1) notice and a hearing before loss of liberty or the
imposition of criminal sanctions, Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-87 (1972); (2) the provision
of counsel in capital and other special cases, see Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) (the due
process right to be heard "would be... of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by
counsel"); (3) the right to present evidence, Rock, 483 U.S. at 51; and (4) the right to confront and
cross-examine witnesses. See, e.g., Green v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 497 (1959). While these rights may
also be grounded in other constitutional provisions, some core criminal justice rights are to be found
in the due process clauses alone. See generally LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 10, at 71-72. Chief among
these is the requirement that the government prove each and every element of a crime by proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684
(1975). In addition, "[d]ue process serves as a primary grounding for the constitutional restraints
imposed upon the prosecutor; the prohibition against vindictive charging, the obligation to disclose
[Vol. 32:743
TRIAL AS TEXT
Many of the aforementioned rights would only make sense within an
adversarial process.32 For example, in a non-adversarial process a defendant
would need no right to present a defense, and a right to remain silent would
seem incongruous. The purpose of the defendant's trial rights is to place the
defendant on an even footing with the prosecution so that he or she might be
a more effective adversary to the prosecution.
The presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt are also central to the notion of an adversarial system of
justice and are considered to provide additional protection for the criminal
defendant.33 The presumption of innocence is implied by the accusatorial
structure of the criminal justice system. It holds that the burden of proof is on
the government and absent sufficient proof, the defendant must go free.34 In
the adversarial framework, the defendant has no obligation to produce
evidence of his or her innocence.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the burden the government is required
to meet in order to obtain a conviction. It is a "heavy" burden of proof, the
highest such standard in the criminal justice system. 36 The burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is intended to provide protection against errone-
ous convictions.37 In principle, a burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
moderates the adversary system and makes it more responsive to individual
rights.38
Taken together, the formal rights extended to criminal defendants, along
with the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, constitute a "myth" that permeates the criminal justice
system and defines how the system is envisioned.39 In short, the myth
material exculpatory evidence, and the bar against improper and prejudicial closing arguments all
flow from due process." LAFAVE & ISRAEL, Supra note 10, at 72.
32. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 10, at 37 ("[t]he structuring of an adversary system underlies
many of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights").
33. KAMISAR, LAFAVE & ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1358 (7th ed. 1990).
34. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 (1978). In Taylor, the Court subscribed to the following
definition of the presumption of innocence:
[The "presumption of innocence" is a] shorthand description of the right of the accused
to "remain inactive and secure, until the prosecution has taken up its burden and
produced evidence and effected persuasion; i.e., to say in this case, as in any other, that
the opponent of a claim or charge is presumed not to be guilty is to say in another form
that the proponent of the claim or charge must evidence it."
Id. (citing 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 407 (3d ed. 1940)).
35. Of course, the defendant may wish to produce evidence necessary to meet the government's
proof of guilt.
36. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 186 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 10, at 38.
38. See LANDSMAN, supra note 10, at 46 (discussing the checks that the adversary system places on
expanding governmental power).
39. A "myth" is a term that is frequently used and just as frequently defined. It can be used in the
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proceeds along these lines: A defendant who is presumed innocent must be
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt at an adversarial trial that is fair and
at which he or she has counsel. The basic assumptions behind the myth (that
is, the points that the myth seeks to validate) are: (1) the existence of formal
rights adequately protects the individual from the state and (2) because these
formal rights make it difficult for the state to secure convictions in an
adversarial context, those convictions that do occur are "hard won" and thus
more legitimate. The function of the myth, then, is to bestow peace of mind
by encouraging the belief that justice is being done in the criminal justice
system.
Of course, the "myth" that I have described here presumes that the parties
general sense as "a story or belief that attempts to explain a basic truth," or even more generally as "a
belief.., whose truth is accepted uncritically." THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (1990). Or, "myth" can be elaborated in numerous technical ways, ranging from Roland
Barthes' widely cited structuralist definition, see ROLAND BARTHES, MYTHOLOGIES 114-15 (Annette
Layers trans., 1972) (describing "myths" as widely disseminated stories investing first order represen-
tation of facts with second order, ideological significance) to Claude Levi-Strauss' anthropological
one. See CLAUDE LEVI-STRAUSS, THE JEALOUS POTTER 171-73 (1988) (depicting a "myth" as both
individualizing its subscribers and orientating them toward particular forms of action). Students of
myths frequently note their mutability, their role as transmitters of cultural values, and their relation
to the divine or sacred as their defining characteristics. See, e.g., HANS BLUMBERG, WORK ON MYTH 34
(Robert M. Wallace trans., 1985) ("Myths are stories" with a constant narrative core and "an equally
pronounced capacity for marginal variation."); MIRCEA ELIADE, MYTH AND REALITY 10-14 (Willard
Trask trans., 1963) (discussing the role of myths in the transmission of values); id. at 1 (describing
myths as sacred traditions); ALAN WATTS, MYTH AND RITUAL IN CHRISTIANITY 7 (1953) ("Myth is to
be defined as a complex of stories... which for various reasons, human beings regard as demonstra-
tion of the inner meaning of the universe and of human life."). No one summarized the jurispruden-
tial significance of myths as eloquently as the late Dwight L. Greene. He wrote:
Myths are a complex of narratives that dramatize and encapsulate the world visions and
historical sense of a people or culture. These narratives reduce centuries of experience
to "constellations of compelling metaphors." These metaphors can be so strong that
they provide coherence and direction in history, reducing both experience and vision to
paradigms. This phenomenon is essentially nonrational and religious in nature: "[M]yth
can be seen as an intellectual or artistic construct that bridges the gap between the world
of the mind and the world of affairs, between dream and reality ...."
One function of myth is socializing, that is, to enforce a moral order and to shape
individuals to the requirements of their social group. "Myth describes a process,
credible to its audience, by which knowledge is transformed into power; it provides a
scenario or prescription for action, defining and limiting the possibilities for human
response to the universe." "[I]t is in this moral, sociological sphere that authority and
coercion come into play .... A mythological canon is an organization of symbols,
ineffable in import, by which the energies of aspiration are evoked and gather toward a
focus." "Myth is essentially conservative, depending for its power on its ability to play on
conscious and unconscious memory, to invoke and relate all the narratives (historical
and personal) that we have inherited, and to reach back to the primal levels of individual
and collective psychology." The creation of new believable myths is part of the
socializing power of courts.
Dwight L. Greene, Justice Scalia and Tonto, Judicial Pluralistic Ignorance, and the Myth of Colorless
Individualism in Bostick v. Florida, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1979, 2016-17 (1993) (citations omitted).
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are more or less evenly matched, that no external values or interests influence
the fact-finder, and that the rules are enforced. It should go without question
that these are pretty broad assumptions to make. And yet, most analyses of
criminal procedure in general, and the right to counsel in particular, accept
the formalistic posture represented by the myth. n° In their formalistic ap-
proach, typical criminal procedure analyses reveal their commitment to
positivist assumptions. Under positivism,4" rules are viewed abstractly as
concrete principles with a definite meaning and effect. 2 Thus, like numerical
values, they may be ordered and reordered "scientifically. ' ' 43 This type of
formalism has been powerfully criticized by adherents to the legal realist
school." The realist critique argues that formal rules cannot be accepted
40. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: The Changing Vision
of the Right to Counsel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 670 (1992); Garcia, supra note 22, at 105-06 (asserting that
"[nleither the war on drugs nor the fight against ... crime in American society will be won by the
denudation of vital constitutional safeguards that undergird the criminal adversarial process"); James
J. Tomkovicz,An Adversary System Defense of the Right to CounselAgainst Informants: Truth, Fair Play,
and theMassiah Doctrine, 22 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 1 (1988) (arguing that right to counsel for statements
made under indictment best justified as means of ensuring "traditional functioning of trial counsel...
as a multi-faceted, complete assistant in the adversarial battle"); Goodpaster, supra note 7, at 118,
153 (noting that the adversary system is a "foundational feature of our legal system" which stems from
traditional American beliefs in the oppressive nature of government decisionmaking and the ability of
citizens to make wise community decisions and govern themselves); Barbara Babcock, Fair Play:
Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133 (1982)
(arguing that the "communicative function" of a trial makes the game-like, ritualistic aspects of the
adversary system valuable to the community). Even those analyses that offer some criticism of the
adversary system tend to accept the basic assumptions behind the myth. See, e.g., John Cratsley, The
Crime of the Courts, in WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: AN INDICTMENT OF THE LAW BY YOUNG ADVOCATES
190 (Bruce Wasserstein & Mark J. Green eds., 1970) (criticizing adversarial system for not being
adversarial enough).
41. For a definition of positivism, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 17-22 (1978)
("[Llegal positivism holds that the truth of legal propositions consists in facts about the rules that
have been adopted by specific social institutions, and in nothing else"). Works of influential positivists
include: JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY (1979); H.L.A. HART,
THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); and HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (1967).
42. See KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 58-61, 143-144 (1945) (arguing all laws are
reducible to "primary norms" stipulating conditional sanctions); Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity
to Law: A Reply to Professor Hart, in SOCIETY, LAW, AND MORALITY: READINGS IN SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY
471, 496 (Frederick A. Olafson ed., 1961) [hereinafter SOCIETY, LAW, AND MORALITY] (critiquing
Hart for arguing that even some laws may have a "core meaning").
43. For Weber, this formal legal rationality was compelled by the demands of capitalistic
enterprise. According to Weber:
"The modern capitalist concern is based inwardly above all on calculation. It requires
for its survival a system of justice ... whose workings can be rationally calculated, at least
in principle, according to fixed general laws, just as the probable performance of a
machine can be calculated."
GEORG LUKCS, HISTORY AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS 96 (Rodney Livingstone trans., 1971) (quoting
MAX WEBER, GESAMMELTE POLITISCHE SCHRIFTEN 142 (1921)).
44. The realist school was comprised of lawyers and legal scholars who came to prominence
between the two world wars. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., American Jurisprudence Between the Wars:
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blindly and taken for granted, but rather that rules must first be situated in
their appropriate context and then examined critically to determine whether
they actually function as purported.
Semiotic theory provides a useful tool to determine the actual functioning
of rules in context. Semiotics furthers the realist critique not only by helping
to disclose whether rules "say what they mean" (do the rules function as
claimed), but also by helping to discover whether rules "mean what they say"
(are there hidden meanings)."5 Semiotics does this by disclosing the frame-
work through which law takes its meaning. I am particularly interested in
observing how the adversary process functions when a criminal defendant is
represented by a public defender. 6 In the following sections of this article, I
employ semiotics to accomplish this task.
II. SEMIOTICS AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS
Semiotics is the study of signs and symbols.1 7 Semiotics arose from the
study of language problems and attempts to determine the structure of
language."' These early structuralist attempts sought to expose the internal
Legal Realism and the Crisis of Democratic Theory, in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDER 359 (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1988). The substance of the realist
critique was described this way in a famous Harvard Law Review article by H.L.A. Hart:
If a penumbra of uncertainty must surround all legal rules, then their application to
specific cases in the penumbral area cannot be a matter of logical deduction, and so
deductive reasoning, which for generations has been cherished as the very perfection of
human reasoning, cannot serve as a model for what judges, or indeed anyone, should do
in bringing particular cases under general rules.
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607-08 (1958),
reprinted in SOCIETY, LAW, AND MORALITY, supra note 42, at 451; see also Elizabeth Mensch, The
History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 28 (David
Kairys ed., 1982) ("[T]he realists claimed that .... [t]here was no such thing as an objective legal
methodology behind which judges could hide in order to evade responsibility for the social conse-
quences of legal decisionmaking.").
45. See BERNARD S. JACKSON, LAW, FACT AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE 180 (1988) (linking
semiotics to the realist tradition).
46. Although a defendant may be disadvantaged in the adversary system because of his race or class
or merely because he is already classified as a "criminal," I do not directly address those issues here.
Instead I am interested in whether public defenders can help criminal defendants exploit the
supposed benefits of the adversary process, given that those defendants may be disadvantaged in
important ways.
47. See Robin Paul Malloy, A Sign of the Times-Law and Semiotics, 65 TUL. L. REV. 211, 212 (1990)
(book review) (defining semiotics as "the study of signs" and as a "method of analyzing sign systems
and communicative interactions"). Semiotics, or semiology, has many permutations-it can be viewed
as philosophy, theory, method, etc-and a precise definition may not be possible. See generally Janet
Woollacoft, Messages and Meanings, in CULTURE, SOCIETY AND THE MEDIA 91, 94 (Michael Gurevitch
et al. eds., 1982) (noting the many "interpretations, debates and polemics" generated by the concept).
48. Woollacoft, supra note 47, at 94. Semiotics or semiology can be traced to the work of both
Ferdinand de Saussure, a Swiss linguist, and the American philosopher Charles Sanders Pierce. J.M.
Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1119, 1119 (1990) (While
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relationships that governed how language developed and how it was used.49
Later, semiotics was broadened to include not only languages but any
signifying system. 50 Semiotics assumes that "[a]ll communication is a process
of exchange of meaningful signs."51 Thus, it may be stated that semiotics
involves the study of systems of rules underlying messages, whether those
messages be contained in speech, film, literature, or the like.52 Semiotics
makes a distinction between the signifier, or the form that the sign takes, and
the signified, that is, the meaning associated with the sign. 3 The meaning of
any sign is always relational. It is contingent upon the values agreed to by
those who read the sign,54 which are in turn dependent on the relationship of
most Europeans, following Saussure, use the term "semiology," Pierce and his followers use
"semiotics.").
49. Woollacoft, supra note 47, at 94.
50. Id.
51. Malloy, supra note 47, at 212.
52. Woollacoft, supra note 47, at 94. This attempt to uncover "universal principles of signification"
is what Eco calls "general semiotics." UMBERTO Eco, SEMIOTICS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
7 (1984). According to Eco, a "general semiotics" would pose the following questions: "[W]hat does it
mean for human beings to say, to express meanings, to convey ideas, or to mention states of the world?
By which means do people perform this task? Only by words? And, if not, what do verbal activity and
other signifying or communicative activities have in common?" Id.
53. Woollacoft, supra note 47, at 94. Indeed, one of semiotic's most basic concepts is that the
relationship between the signifier and the thing signified is entirely arbitrary. Balkin, supra note 48, at
1121; see also FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 67-70 (Charles Bally and
Albert Sechehaye eds. & Wade Baskin trans., 1959). In the words of Shakespeare, "a rose by any
other name would smell as sweet." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MOST EXCELLENT AND LAMENTABLE
TRAGEDY OF ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 1, In. 85-86. See Balkin, supra note 48, at 1121 n.5 ("what we
call 'blue' could as easily be called 'blooff' "). Professor Balkin points out another significant aspect of
the arbitrariness of signification, which he attributes to Saussure: the categories that language creates
are also a matter of convention. This is true, for example, in regards to "the particular grouping of
shades of color among the various concepts denoted by English words.... In English, light blue and
dark blue are both 'blue'; in Russian they have distinct names and are different colors." Id.
54. This is an important point, for as Eco points out, the value of any activity can only be
determined by reference to a particular philosophical framework.
To walk, to make love, to sleep, to refrain from doing something, to give food to
someone else, to eat roast beef on Friday-each is either a physical event or the absence
of a physical event, or a relation between two or more physical events. However, each
becomes an instance of good, bad, or neutral behavior within a given philosophical
framework. Outside such a framework, to eat roast beef is radically different from
making love, and making love is always the same sort of activity independent of the legal
status of the partners. From a given philosophical point of view, both to eat roast beef on
Friday and to make love to x can become instances of 'sin', whereas both to give food to
someone and to make love to can become instances of virtuous action.
Eco, supra note 52, at 10. This means, of course, that readers are not entirely free to interpret a text as
they like. They must adhere to the philosophical framework of the communicator if there is to be any
meaningful communication at all. See Woollacoft, supra note 47, at 102 (noting that even "folpposi-
tional readings [of a text] are dependent upon an accurate decoding in the first place"). Foucault
makes the same point. See MICHEL FOUCAULT, LANGUAGE, COUNTER-MEMORY, PRACTICE 199
(Donald Bouchard ed. & trans. & Sherry Simon trans., 1977) (explaining how "discursive practices"
restrict what can be thought and said in discourse).
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the sign to other signs." A sign is communicated and read within a social
matrix that changes and evolves, thus the meaning of a sign changes and
evolves as well.56 Many scholars have recognized that law is itself a semiotic
process, since it involves the communication of a value system through its
rules, precepts, and principles. 57 For example, the doctrine of caveat emptor
may be used to demonstrate the semiotic essence of legal concepts.
This textual phrase, caveat emptor, is a sign-a representation of an idea
or concept-recognized and understood within the legal community. This
sign can be studied historically to discover the nature and circumstances
of its emergence or creation as a legal sign.... [J1n studying the creation,
evolution, and slow demise of caveat emptor, one undertakes a study of
the dynamic and creative dimensions of semiotics. One is called upon to
evaluate the process by which new ideas (signs) are created and validated
in legal discourse and practice.... In this sense, law is a fluid and
spontaneous system for the creation of new relationships and new ideas.
It is a system of evolving sign exchanges; thus, the law is a semiotic
process. 58
Kevelson argues that law and semiotics involves the study of both legal
discourse and legal practice. 59 This would suggest a broader interpretation of
the parameters of semiotic inquiry than that of those who would only, or
predominantly, apply semiology to investigate law's internal structure.60 It
55. In other words, "the relation between signifier and signified is mediated by the relationship of
signifiers to each other in a general system of signification." Balkin, supra note 48, at 1121. It should
be emphasized that the attribution of meaning to signs is not a dead, mechanical process, but a
dynamic one. In the words of British sociologist Stuart Hall, "things and events in the real world do
not contain or propose their own, integral, single and intrinsic meaning which is then merely
transferred through language. Meaning is a social production, a practice." Stuart Hall, The Rediscov-
ery of "Ideology": The Return of the Repressed in Media Studies, in CULTURE, SOCIETY AND THE MEDIA,
supra note 47, at 56, 67.
56. See ROBERTA KEVELSON, THE LAW AS A SYSTEM OF SIGNS 49-56 (1988) (describing interpreta-
tion of sign as a "map" of relationships undergoing constant change).
57. See, e.g., PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE: STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS (1987); BERNARD S. JACKSON, SEMIOTICS AND LEGAL THEORY (1985); JACKSON, supra note
45; KEVELSON, supra note 56; LAW AND SEMIOTICS (Roberta Kevelson ed., 1989); Balkin, supra note
48; J.M. Balkin, The Promise of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1831 (1991); J.M. Balkin, The
Crystalline Structure of Legal Thought, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 1 (1986); J.M. Balkin, Taking Ideology
Seriously: Ronald Dworkin and the CLS Critique, 55 UMKC L. REV. 392 (1987); J.M. Balkin, Nested
Oppositions, 99 YALE L.J. 1669 (1990); Peter Goodrich, Law and Language: An Historical and Critical
Introduction, 11 J. L. & Soc'Y. 173 (1984); Maarten Henket, Contracts, Promises and Meaning: The
Question of Intent, 1 INT'L J. FOR SEMIOTICS L. 51 (1988); Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal
Argument, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75 (1991); Malloy, supra note 47; Jeremy Paul, A Bedtime Story, 74
VA. L. REV. 915 (1988); Jeremy Paul, The Politics of Legal Semiotics, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1779 (1991).
58. Malloy, supra note 47, at 214.
59. KEVELSON, supra note 56, at 4.
60. Unlike the Europeans, who are heavily indebted to philosophical and psychoanalytic sources,
most American legal semioticians are predominately concerned with the internal structuring of the
law. See Roberta Kevelson, Introduction to the Third Round Table on Law and Semiotics: A Multifaceted
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should be obvious that semiotics is not only relevant to the investigation of
law's internal structure, but also is crucial to a critical understanding of law's
external context-i.e., its relationship to society. Others have also suggested
that legal semiotics could be used to connect juridical statements to their
place in the broader society, for example, the connection of laws to political
theory or ideology. 61 In my view, this connection has not been fully devel-
oped-at least, not within that legal scholarship that self-consciously identi-
fies itself as semiotic. 62 The majority of these efforts have stopped short of
exploring law as part of a larger structure which includes ideology as one of
its components-that is, viewing the law as a sign in a larger system of
signification, whose texts would contain both internal (or legal) and external
components.
It is precisely this sort of work that distinguishes the culturalist school of
critical theory in mass communication.63 Culturalist theorists borrowed
Representation of "Property" and of "Discovery" in Law, in 3 LAW AND SEMIOTICS 1, 4-5 (Roberta
Kevelson ed., 1989); JACKSON, supra note 45, at 187-88.
61. E.g. Balkin, supra note 48, at 1123 (discussing the mutually self-defining nature of rights and
their relationship to political and ideological thought); William E. Murnion, An EthicalAnalysis of the
Relationship Between Peace and Justice, in 3 LAW AND SEMIOTICS, supra note 60, at 279 (linking law to
broader views of social morality through semiotic theory); Paul, supra note 57, at 1794 (describing the
use of semiotics to link legal debates to differences in political theory).
62. There is, of course, a significant body of legal scholarship that does address the role of ideology
in the formation and application of law. E.g., MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
(1987); FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER (Katherine T. Bartlett & Rosanne
Kennedy eds., 1991); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated
Bibliography, 79 VA. L. REV. 461 (1993); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law
Movement: Moderation As a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REV. 707 (1991). Much of this
scholarship borrows freely from semiotic traditions, but traces its genealogy through critical theory
and deconstruction. See JACKSON, supra note 45, at 186 (noting that while semiotic models are often
used in critical discourse, they are not usually identified as such nor referenced to the literature of
semiotics).
63. The culturalist school consists of those scholars who view media production as a form of
"ideological labor and discursive practice." Simon Cottle, "Race," Racialization and the Media: A
Review and Update of Research, in SAGE RACE RELATIONS ABSTRACTS 3, 28 (1992). The culturalist
approach avoids the aimless relativism which has captured more radical treatments of poststructural-
ism/postmodernism, see, e.g., JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON
KNOWLEDGE (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984) (arguing there can be no social
relationships outside of discourse and thus denying the possibility of any historical consciousness at
all), by continuing to "incorporate a stress on experience as the 'authenticating' position and a
humanist emphasis on the creative." James Curran et al., The Study of the Media: Theoretical
Approaches, in CULTURE, SOCIETY AND THE MEDIA, supra note 47, at 11, 27; see also Tony Bennett,
Theories of the Media, Theories of Society, in CULTURE, SOCIETY AND THE MEDIA, supra note 47, at 30,
53 (culturalist studies tempered the deconstructionist theories of the Frankfurt School by situating
them in historical materialism). Steven Winter takes a similar position, arguing that legal concepts
should be grounded in ordinary experiences to avoid skepticism and promote reconstruction. Steven
L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 1105 (1989).
For other works that embrace the anti-instrumentalism, intertextuality and anti-universalism of
postmodernism, but reject the apolitical stance of its more relativist interpretations, see FREDRIC
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formal semiological analysis 64 to treat media messages as structured wholes
rather than as quantified fragmented parts.65 Mass media was approached as
a means of producing and articulating "messages within specific signifying
systems, the rules and meanings of which we tend to take for granted.,
66
From the culturalist perspective, media messages are both created and
interpreted pursuant to definable rules or codes. 67 Thus, artifacts of commu-
nication (such as films, books, letters, and speeches) are viewed as means of
discourse rather than as the sum total of the communication itself.68 As
discourse, an artifact is subject to the system of rules that governs that
discourse.6 9
In the culturalist vein, I approach the trial itself as a text, which may be
read within the context of a structure which includes ideological and cultural
attributes. Thus, criminal procedures gain their meaning not solely from legal
rules and juridical principles, but also from their relationship to themes or
codes established through the operation of culture.7 ° In other words, the
matrix that gives criminal procedures their meaning is broader than that of
the law. This matrix includes news reports and analysis, entertainment,
common sense knowledge,71 and other communicative or educative pro-
cesses.72 Like other artifacts of communication, the trial must be seen as
JAMESON, POSTMODERNISM, OR, THE CULTURAL LOGIC OF LATE CAPITALISM (1991); ANTHONY
Wooowiss, SOCIAL THEORY AFTER POST-MODERNISM (1990); Maureen Cain, Foucault, Feminism,
and Feeling: What Foucault Can and Cannot Contribute to Feminist Epistemology, in Up AGAINST
FOUCAULT (C. Ramazanoglu ed., 1993); Jerry Frug, Decentering Decentralization, 60 U. CHI. L. REV.
253 (1993); Robert J. Lipkin, Beyond Skepticism, Foundationalism and the New Fuzziness: The Role of
Wide Reflective Equilibrium in Legal Theory, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 811 (1990).
64. See Hall, supra note 55, at 66, 67 (linking the origins of the culturalist school to earlier work in
linguistic anthropology, semiology, and Marxist structuralism).
65. Woollacoft, supra note 47, at 93.
66. Id. at 92.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 93.
69. Id. at 93-94.
70. See Hall, supra note 55, at 73 (describing the creation of a "cultural inventory" of basic
premises and assumptions that could be drawn upon for the purpose of signifying new events).
71. According to Gramsci:
Every social stratum has its own 'common sense' and its own 'good sense', which are
basically the most widespread conception of life and of men .... Common sense is not
something rigid and immobile, but is continually transforming itself, enriching itself with
scientific ideas and with philosophical opinions which have entered ordinary life....
Common sense creates the folklore of the future, that is as a relatively rigid phase of
popular knowledge at a given place and time.
Id. at 73 (quoting Antonio Gramsci, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS 326 (1971)).
72. Insightful commentary on the many sources of legal meaning may be gleaned from Judge
Leventhal's opinion in United States v. Dougherty. In support of his argument that judges were under
no obligation to inform juries of their power to nullify the law, Judge Leventhal stated:
The jury gets its understanding as to the arrangements in the legal system from more
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discourse, 73 which can be interpreted only within the latitude of those codes 74
that govern communication about crime.
I do not want to look at criminal procedure as an abstraction or a
"fractured part" of the whole. 75 Instead, I envision communication about
crime as a cultural production, consisting of interconnecting structured
systems of which the criminal justice system and its attendant language and
procedure are only part.76 Discourse about crime, then, takes place within a
single, large system of signification made up of smaller systems that operate
in the areas of popular culture, media, criminology, law enforcement, juris-
prudence, and politics, to name just a few. It is this larger system that I will
investigate in the next section.
III. CRIME AND THE CREATION OF THE CONSENSUS
To comprehend the functioning of the criminal justice system within the
interconnected matrix of culture, we must first come to terms with what it
means to be a criminal defendant-a person who has been charged with
committing an offense against the social order. This requires an understand-
ing of "crime" as a social phenomenon. By investigating the meaning of
crime, we can uncover the codes that also order our perceptions of the
criminal trial process, the codes that in effect shape our notions of what
adversarial criminal justice is.
What we have come to call "crime" serves a variety of social functions.
First, as the "labelling" school of criminology has demonstrated, the concept
of crime allows a community to determine its norms and "label" other
than one voice. There is the formal communication from the judge. There is the informal
communication from the total culture-literature (novel, drama, film, and television);
current comment (newspapers, magazines and television); conversation; and, of course,
history and tradition.
United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1135 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (upholding refusal of trial court to
instruct jury on its power to nullify).
73. See id. ("Law is a system, and it is also a language, with secondary meanings that may be
unrecorded yet are part of its life.").
74. Codes do not rigidly determine how texts must be interpreted. Rather, codes provide
"frameworks" or "pathways" for interpretation. In Eco's view, a code is not correlation, but a "system
of inference." Eco, supra note 52, at 187. This "system of inference" contains "that which is already
known and already organized by a culture." Id.
75. This is the mistake of most commentators on criminal procedure-the failure to connect their
analyses to the external, "real" world. See Andrew E. Taslitz, Exorcising Langdell's Ghost: Structuring
a Criminal Procedure Casebookfor How Lawyers Really Think, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 143 (1991) (noting how
criminal procedure textbooks ignore the social sciences and foster the illusion that "law is a 'science'
distinct from other disciplines").
76. See KEVELSON, supra note 56, at 132 (describing economic, political, and legal systems as both
interconnected and "constituted of an infinite number of interlocking sign systems which influence
and contribute to the development of each").
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conduct as deviant. 7 This labelling power is not, however, shared equally.
What makes a dominant group "dominant" is its power to define a subordi-
nate group as deviant. Once conduct is labelled "deviant," it affects the
interaction of those so labelled and the majority in real, concrete ways.78 In
short, the majority has "the power to define the rules of the game to which
everyone [is] required to ascribe ....
The power to define rules has obvious consequences. It is axiomatic that
describing certain conduct as criminal permits the punishment and stigmati-
zation of those who step outside of the norm.80 That is, "the labelling process
serve[s] to mobilize moral censure and social sanction against [deviants]. ' 1
Establishing crime as a social category thus involves the critical function of
deciding who shall wield state power, against whom, and for what purposes.
Crime also serves the purpose of "reinforcing the internal solidarity of the
moral community." 2 As crime creates and excludes "them" it also creates
and strengthens "us." The focus on drug abuse over the past few years has
certainly enhanced the social position of those who have not used drugs.8 3
Thus, struggles to criminalize the conduct of others can also be seen as
struggles to validate one's own behavior.84
77. RICHARD QUINNEY, CRITIOUE OF LEGAL ORDER: CRIME CONTROL IN A CAPITALIST SOCIETY 27
(1973); see generally HOWARD S. BECKER, THE OUTSIDERS 177-212 (1963) (chapter 10 entitled
"Labelling Theory Reconsidered").
78. Hall, supra note 55, at 63.
79. Id.
80. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 4-5 (1968); H.L.A. Hart, The Aims of he
Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (1958); JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAW 1-2 (1987). In fact, the substantive criminal law does not recognize conduct as
"criminal" unless punishment is prescribed. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483 (1948)
(statute prohibiting concealment of aliens not criminal because penalty prescribed is too vague).
81. Hall, supra note 55, at 63; see also JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
OF ENGLAND 81-82 (1883) ("The criminal law thus proceeds upon the principle that it is morally right
to hate criminals, and it confirms and justifies that sentiment by inflicting upon criminals punishments
which express it .. ").
82. Hall, supra note 55, at 63.
83. In the 1960's and 1970's drug use was mainstream, fashionable behavior. Even President
Clinton smoked pot at the time. But, in order to retain some legitimacy in a changed social climate,
Clinton was later forced to assert that he never inhaled. See David Maraniss, Image Questions Bewilder
Clinton, Longtime Friends Allies Describe Candidate's "Constancy", WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1992, at Al.
84. We can see this as communities struggle over noise regulations or the selling of pornography. A
central part of the discourse is the desire to validate "family life" or "wholesome living" versus
"single life" or "partying." Joseph Gussfield portrays the debate over Prohibition as a struggle
between an increasingly Catholic, urban and immigrant working class and an "abstinent Protestant
middle class." Joseph Gussfield, On Legislating Morals: The Symbolic Process of Designating Deviancy,
56 CAL. L. REV. 54, 58-59 (1968). According to Gussfield, these are examples of the symbolic status or
power of the winning cultural group.
Affirmation through law and government acts expresses the public worth of one
subculture's norms relative to those of others, demonstrating which cultures have
legitimacy and public domination. Accordingly it enhances the social status of groups
TRIAL AS TEXT
A. The Consensus
This notion of crime as a creator of community is enhanced by Stuart Hall's
concept of the "consensus." The "consensus" is Hall's term for the prevailing
ideology subscribed to by the public at large.85 The "consensus" consists of
the accepted parameters of social conduct and the established view of the
purposes and functions of the institutions of society. 86 It may be said, then,
that the consensus consists of the intersection of those norms which are not
deemed criminal. But the consensus so formed is not simply an agreement to
accept majority rule, as it were, in the area of social order. It is a consensus to
"a particular kind of social order.",87
Crime engenders consent to the moral community of those with the power
to define. To the extent consensus works, then, it works in the interest of
those with power.88 Social order calls for "integration within and conformity
to the rules of a very definite set of social, economic and political struc-
tures."89 As Hall emphasizes, the social order that arises from the designa-
tion of crime "[is] articulated to that which exist[s]: to the given dispositions
of class, power and authority: to the established institutions of society." 90
Hall's "consensus," then, implies domination rather than freedom. In-
deed, "it is the complementary face of domination." 9 ' This comes as no
surprise because the mere existence of the law, whether criminal or other-
wise, has inherently coercive implications. The law relies on the ability of the
state to exercise force to exact compliance. But the law is merely "the
repressive and negative aspect of the entire positive, civilizing activity under-
taken by the State";92 that is, law is used by the state to accomplish certain
carrying the affirmed culture and degrades groups carrying that which is condemned as
deviant.
Id. at 58.
85. See generally Hall, supra note 55, at 61-65.
86. According to Hall, the core of the consensus is "a common system of values, goals and beliefs" which
unites an otherwise dispersed mass society. STUART HALL ET AL., POLICING THE CRISIS: MUGGING, THE STATE,
AND LAW AND ORDER 215 (1978) Thus, the consensus may be described as a "consensus on values." Id.
87. Hall, supra note 55, at 63.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. Thurmond Arnold understood this well. In a brilliant work outside of the critical tradition
that was first published over a half century ago, Arnold underscored the importance of the ritualistic
aspect of government. He argued that students of governmental institutions needed to take account of
more than just the surface or pragmatic aspect of their tasks. In this vein he stated: "The trouble with
[most social and economic reforms] is that they violate currently important symbolism. Therefore
even if the reform is accomplished it is apt to find itself twisted and warped by the contradictory ideas
that are still in the background in spite of the reform." THURMOND ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF
GOVERNMENT 9-10 (1962).
91. HALL, supra note 86, at 216.
92. ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS 247 (1971), quoted in HALL,
supra note 86, at 203.
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ends. These ends may just as readily be achieved by noncoercive means as by
force.93 Coercion, then, is the flip side of consent and consent is the flip side
of coercion.94 Power relies on the consensus to govern because without
consent it cannot govern efficiently. 95 But for power to govern in its own
interest, the consensus must allow it to do SO. 9 6 Thus, power seeks to shape
and direct the consensus.
Unlike social contract theories, Hall's consensus does not arise spontane-
ously from the formation of the body politic. Consensus, like other significa-
tions, is produced. The production of consent must be understood as a
semiotic process.97 The reality of the consensus is the "result of a particular
way of constructing reality."98 The parameters of the consensus must be
arrived at through the process of articulation, the work of selecting those
values which will become part of the consensus and excluding those which
will not. As Hall puts it, "[ljanguage and symbolization is the means by which
meaning is produced."9 9 Thus, the consensus is produced or given meaning
by the discourse of those who subscribe to the consensus. Clearly, within this
discourse, some themes predominate and others fall aside. This raises the
question of which meanings come to be those we view as regular or accepted.
Hall answers this question as follows:
Because meaning was not given but produced, it followed that different
kinds of meaning could be ascribed to the same events. Thus, in order for
one meaning to be regularly produced, it had to win a kind of credibility,
legitimacy or taken-for-grantedness for itself. That involved marginaliz-
ing, down-grading or de-legitimating alternative constructions.' 00
93. HALL, supra note 86, at 202. In this regard "the state [has] another, and crucial aspect or role
besides the legal or coercive one: the role of leadership, of direction, of education and tutelage ......
Id.
94. Recall that the consensus, broadly speaking, is located among those things that are not
criminal; but if we did not adhere to the consensus of our own volition we could be forced to do so by
the operation of the law.
95. Gramsci argued, notes Hall, that "the capitalist state functioned best when it operated
'normally' through leadership and consent, with coercion held, so to speak, as the 'armour of consent',
for then the state was free to undertake its more educative, 'ethical' and cultural roles .... HALL,
supra note 86, at 203.
96. It is Hall's view that "[t]he dominant and powerful interests are . . . 'democratic,' not because
they are directly governed in any sense by the 'will of the people,' but because they, too, must
ultimately refer themselves and be in some way bound by this 'consensus.' "Id. at 215.
97. This is where Hall's consensus differs from Gramsci's notion of hegemony. Gramsci described
his hegemony as a system of political alliances between the leading class and other segments of
society. See generally ROGER SIMON, GRAMSCI'S POLITICAL THOUGHT: AN INTRODUCTION (1982). To
Gramsci, the establishment of hegemony was occasioned through the conscious and instrumental
process of broadening and consolidating these alliances. Id. at 24. The consensus does not replace the
notion of hegemony. The consensus is a process that operates behind and gives rise to hegemony. Id. at 23-24.
98. Hall, supra note 55, at 64.




As I explained earlier, the consensus is determined by those who have the
power to define. Although the meaning of the consensus is produced
"democratically" through the process of signification, a process in which all
may participate, this process is controlled predominately by the state through
its control of educational and cultural institutions. The state, then, plays a
key role in the production of consent:
It organises ideologically, through the cultural sphere and the education
system [and]... through the means and media of communication and the
orchestration of public opinion. Increasingly, it organises the civil and
social life of society-especially of the family and the poor, through the
"mediated" structures of the Welfare State. Above all, it organises
through politics, the system of political parties and political representa-
tion: through the "maintenance of order in political class conflict."' 1)
Crime represents more than simply the opposite of the consensus. The
concept of crime can be enlisted by the state to aid in its production of
consent. Crime plays a crucial defining role in the construction of the
ideological representations of society. 10 2 Crime lies within a structured
discourse that places crime on one side and law abiding on the other.' °3
Crime is part of a dialogue about right and wrong, order and disorder,
violence and peace. This emotive power endows "crime as a public issue"
with a tremendous mobilizing force. 10 4 The support of the community "can
be rallied to a campaign against it, not by presenting it as an abstract issue,
but as a tangible force which threatens" home, family and stability.' °5 In this
way, crime "allows the construction of a false unity out of... very different
social conditions ....
Hall's concept of the consensus is useful because it exposes the cultural
and political supremacy of the elites. It shows how their views of reality come
to be the accepted views of reality and how accepted views of reality are
connected to the instrumentalities of domination and of force. Moreover, the
consensus demonstrates how the accepted view of reality itself operates as an
101. HALL, supra note 86, at 205-06; see also id. at 202-03 (describing role of the state as educator).
102. Id. at 150.
103. Id. at 149-50.
104. Id. at 150. The generation of meaning is most importantly a political process with concrete and
material effects. Thus, the way that crime is signified is of singular importance. In other words:
[Slignifications enter into controversial and conflicting social issues as a real and
positive social force, affecting their outcomes. The signification of events is part of what
has to be struggled over, for it is the means by which collective social understandings are
created-and thus the means by which consent for particular outcomes can be effec-
tively mobilized.
Hall, supra note 55, at 70.
105. HALL, supra note 86, at 150.
106. Id.
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instrument of control, limiting (although not eliminating) the ability of the
subordinated to challenge authority and power. In sum:
[W]hat the consensus really means is that a particular ruling-class alliance
has managed to secure through the state such a total social authority,
such decisive cultural and ideological leadership, over the subordinate
classes that it shapes the whole direction of social life in its image ....
But, because this domination has been secured by consent ... that
domination not only seems to be universal (what everybody wants) and
legitimate (not won by coercive force), but its basis in exploitation
actually disappears from view. 107
Furthermore, Hall's consensus makes this connection between the prevail-
ing ideology and the domination of the ruling class without the determin-
ism l 08 characteristic of Marxist theories of the state or conspiratorial views of
history. Hegemony is not imposed, as it were, by the authority and power of
the state.1 °9 The masses are not dupes. Hegemony results from the coales-
cence of a consensus, produced by the semiotic process of signification-a
process in which the state has distinct advantages, although no monopoly.110
B. The Definition of Crime
The commission of a crime marks one as a deviant. It places the criminal
outside of the consensus and identifies him as an enemy of the state.
However, because the criminal is outside the consensus, he also may be
described as an enemy of the people. Thus, crime as a category helps
determine the borders of the consensus and the consensus helps provide
legitimacy to the state's definition of crime. In this way, crime "provides
hegemonic services for the state." ' The extent of these hegemonic services,
however, is limited because the definition of crime is politically contested.
Crime is not just what the state wants it to be, but what it comes to be
signified as." 2
While there is general agreement that criminal acts are wrong, not
everyone agrees on what acts should be criminal. Traditional or mainstream
107. Id. at 216.
108. In his theory of the consensus, Hall tries to balance the autonomy of a system of signification
with its use as an ideological instrument by the state. See Woollacoft, supra note 47, at 109 (describing
Hall's determinism as muted by his culturalist view).
109. HALL, SUpra note 86, at 220.
110. See Woollacoft, supra note 47, at 109 (describing Hall's theory as one where the domination of
the state was challenged through ideological struggle in the media).
111. Drew Humphries, Report on the Conference of the European Group for the Study of Deviance and
Social Control, 1 CRIME & SOC. JUST. 11, 12 (1974).
112. Certainly, in a narrow positivistic sense, crime is exactly what the state says it is. But in the
broader sense, the sense that has effect on the consciousness of men, that has an impact on society and
the cultural reservoir, it is not.
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views of crime tend to focus almost exclusively on acts of individuals that
threaten violence to persons or property."l 3 This mainstream or state defini-
tion of crime is criticized by those who note that, under this view, harmful
conduct of the wealthy and powerful is either not conceived of as crime or, if
so, rarely prosecuted or punished." 4 These critics would propose an alterna-
tive definition of crime, one which would define a broad range of human
rights violations-e.g., racism, sexism, economic exploitation-as crime."5
Even within these two general camps there is wide disagreement over which
specific acts ought to be criminalized. This is true because in the most
fundamental respect the definition of crime is politically determined. Its
definition derives from the political give and take generated as various
interests compete for control of the state apparatus. The formal definition of
crime, then, will vary as different interests gain power or as groups in power
redefine their needs in response to changing social conditions.
Viewing crime as politically contingent only partially explains why the state
definition of crime is so prevalent. It prevails because the functional defini-
tion of crime (i.e., the definition used to determine the imposition of
punishment, whether from mainstream or alternative formulations) is built
from deeper, more fundamental concepts of criminality. The fundamental
definition of crime is not found in criminology courses or in criminal law
texts. When people talk about crime, they draw on social images from "the
available field of practical ideologies."" 6 These images provide the structure
for any discourse about crime.
When the journalist, or the judge, or the members of the ordinary public
have to respond to, or explain, troubling events, like "mugging", they tend
to draw, often in a piecemeal and unreflexive manner, on the social
images, the "ideas of society", the sources of moral anxiety, the scattered
meanings which frame their everyday experience in order to construct,
out of them, social accounts which carry credibility.! 7
These fundamental images build up slowly over time, accruing from
society's total experience with crime and its ideological reaction to it. These
images are the result of politically contingent, functional definitions of crime
percolating in the public consciousness until they reach the level of "truism."
When definitions of crime enter into the social reservoir of ideas, they retain
113. Mark Kelman, The Origins of Crime and Criminal Violence, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE, supra note 44, at 214, 215.
114. Id. at 218.
115. Tony Platt, Prospects fora Radical Criminology in the United States, 1 CRIME & Soc. JUST. 2, 5-6
(1974).
116. HALL, supra note 86, at 166; see also Hall, supra note 55, at 73 (describing a reservoir of themes
and premises accumulated from discourse over time).
117. HALL, supra note 86, at 165-66.
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their political and ideological character. 1 8 Thus, the limited range of explana-
tory paradigms within which we structure our thinking about crime is greatly
influenced by those who inject ideas about crime into the public conscious-
ness, or those whom Hall refers to as the "definers" of crime.
Hall distinguishes between primary and secondary definers of crime.
"Primary definers" are authority figures in powerful and high status posi-
tions.19 They are considered to have greater expertise and to have "access to
more accurate or more speciali[z]ed information on particular topics than
the majority of the population."'120 As a consequence, it is primary definers
who are able to provide the primary definition or the most widely accepted
"take" on crime.
"Secondary definers" are those who reproduce as secondary sources the
definitions established by primary definers.121 In industrialized countries,
these are primarily the media. Hall points out that the media are forced into
heavy dependence on the statements of primary definers by their desire to
produce an "impartial" and "objective" product under constant deadline
pressure, since primary definers provide a readily accessible source of
authoritative opinions.
The realities of news production, then, work to create "a systematically
structured over-accessing to the media of those in powerful and privileged
institutional positions." 1 22 This means that the opinions and viewpoints of
primary definers are much more likely to be widely disseminated than those
of others. They will be credited as authoritative by the media, and ultimately
accepted by the majority of the public. Over time, as these opinions work
themselves into the social reservoir of ideas, they will exert a greater and
greater influence over all signification about crime that takes place within
that culture.
I do not mean to suggest that alternative perspectives on crime cannot be
expressed. Indeed, there are alternatives to the mainstream view of crime
both at the functional and the fundamental level. But these alternative views
generally lack credibility. 23 "Counter-definers," or those who produce alter-
118. Noting first that "[ijdeology is a system of coding reality and not a predetermined set of coded
messages," Hall states: "[P]articular discursive formulations would then, be ideological, not because
of their manifest bias or distortions of their surface contents, but because they were generated out of,
or were transformations based on, a limited ideological matrix or set." Hall, supra note 55, at 72.
119. People become primary definers because of their "institutional power and position," or
because they represent an important constituency, or because as "experts" they can claim a degree of




123. See Hall, supra note 55, at 81 (noting difficulty of mounting counter-arguments to privileged




native definitions of crime,"' are severely handicapped in their ability to
influence the production of meaning. It is difficult for most counter-definers
to gain access to the media and thereby participate in the defining process. 125
Those that can, by reason of the fact that they have won some degree of
legitimacy from the system (such as law professors or criminal defense
attorneys), "must respond in terms pre-established by the primary definers
and the privileged definitions, and have a better chance of securing a hearing
and influencing the process precisely if they cast their case within the limits of
that consensus." '26 Counter-definers who fail to respond in the familiar
framework established by the primary definers run the risk of having their
opinions de-authenticated and dismissed as "radical" or "extreme.27
Thus, it comes as no surprise that a close inspection of the way that crime is
reported reveals a heavy reliance on the statements of police, prosecutors,
government officials, and other spokespersons of the established institutions
of criminal justice.' 2 8 To the extent that lay opinion is represented at all in
this field, it is represented by the advocates of victims. Rarely are the
opinions of those perceived as criminals solicited, 129 unless they are the views
of reformed lawbreakers, employed now as consultants to crime control
organizations. The alternative perspective is offered, if offered at all, by a
small coterie of criminal defense attorneys and civil libertarians, whose
opinions are made to seem more and more nonsensical, even though they are
always careful never to challenge the fundamental assumptions of the
criminal justice system.
In this section, I have shown how the meaning of crime is produced
through a semiotic process of signification. Crime determines the consensus,
but the consensus also determines crime. At the raw functional level, the
meaning of crime is determined through a process of articulation as compet-
ing interests vie to establish their own self-interested definitions of crime.
Thus, the working definition of crime is politically contingent and therefore
relational.
The meaning of crime is also relational in the sense that the working, or
functional, definition of crime is constructed from deeper, foundational
notions that have been cloaked in the veneer of common sense. These
common sense notions are themselves the result of a semiotic process at
work. They are but distilled and refined versions of politically contingent,
124. HALL, supra note 86, at 64.
125. Id.
126. Id. (emphasis omitted). Indeed, "[clhanging the terms of an argument is exceedingly difficult,
since the dominant definition of the problem acquires by repetition, and by the weight and credibility
of those who propose or subscribe it, the warrant of 'common sense.' " Hall, supra note 55, at 81.
127. HALL, supra note 86, at 59, 64.
128. Id. at 68.
129. Id. at 69.
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functional definitions of crime that have been worked and reworked through
an extended process, of signification. These fundamental views of crime
comprise a cultural inventory of basic assumptions that structure all dis-
course on crime.
In the next Part, I examine the way that crime is signified in popular culture
in order to reveal the basic assumptions about crime and criminals that are at
work.
IV, MAKING MEANING: THE DEPICTION OF CRIME IN POPULAR CULTURE
Investigating the way that crime is signified in popular culture can show
how ~ ~ ~ o th mg fcipei InkA ito the- -- ~, -1 .rc. ~ un 130
ing popular culture, then, can expose the codes that govern the way that
significations about crime take their meaning, since it is from this deep level
that all subsequent discourse about crime is structured. The popular culture
serves as a window into the shaping of the consensus. It is the means through
which the consensus expresses itself, as well as the means via which key
definers can shape the consensus.
The term "popular culture" can cover a lot of ground. For my purposes, I
am concerned mainly with television as a representative of popular culture. I
choose television because television is the primary means through which we
learn about and make sense of our world. 3 t Whether offered as "fact" or
"fiction," representations of crime invade all aspects of television program-
ming. For convenience, I divide my comments into (1) observations about
dramatized accounts of crime and (2) non-fiction reporting of incidents of
crime.
130. See Anthony Chase, Toward a Legal Theory of Popular Culture, 1986 Wis. L. REV. 527 (1986)
(arguing that legal scholars should recognize the importance of popular culture as a field for the
replication of legal thought).
131. Television's place in our culture has been summarized in this way:
People are now born into the symbolic environment of television and live with its
repetitive lessons throughout life. Television cultivates from the outset the very predis-
positions that affect future cultural selections and uses. Transcending historic barriers
of literacy and mobility, television has become the primary common source of everyday
culture of an otherwise heterogeneous population.
George Gerbner et al., Charting the Mainstream: Television's Contributions to Political Orientations 32
J. COMM. 100, 102 (Spring 1982). The source of television's importance may be its sheer omnipres-
ence. One student commentator has aptly described this aspect of television in the following terms:
"Television has become the most influential mass medium in the United States. Its images permeate
public and private spaces. Television sets are found in virtually every home and they crowd airports,
bus and train stations, hospitals, lobbies, restaurants, nightclubs, and even parks and beaches."
Patrick M. Fahey, Advocacy Group Boycotting of Network Television Advertisers and its Effect on
Programming Content, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (1991) (citations omitted).
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A. Crime on Prime Time Television
Crime is a staple of prime time132 television. A 1985 survey revealed that
more than forty percent of prime time hours during the 1985-86 television
season were devoted to shows featuring police officers, detectives, private
investigators or other law enforcement agents.1 33 There is substantially more
crime on the nation's television screens than on the nation's streets. The
principal investigator in a two decade-long survey of prime time television
claims ten times more crime is depicted on television shows than occurs in
real life.1 ' The average viewer watches six violent crimes during each hour of
prime time viewing135 and two-thirds of all major dramatic characters are
involved in some violence,' 36 typically brought about by the commission of or
the consequences of a criminal act. As a result, television viewers are immersed,
hour after hour, in a world where crime takes on exaggerated importance.
Not only is the amount of crime on television dramas exaggerated, but also
the types of crime depicted are exaggerated. Television crime is bloodier and
more violent than crime is in reality. As flawed as known indicators of crime
are,137 it is clear that the vast majority of serious crime is directed at
property.1 38 Yet, the type of crime most frequently depicted on television
dramas is murder. 139 On television, the bulk of crime depicted is crime
against the person, and the victims of crime are disproportionately white 4 °
and female.' 4 1
132. "Prime time" may be described as the most highly watched periods of television programming
and typically refers to "those programs shown between 8:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. each evening, and
starting at 7:00 p.m. on Sunday." Fahey, supra note 131, at 647-48 n.6. Approximately 56 million
households, or 60% of the country's total potential television audience, watch television during prime
time hours. See Erik Larson, Watching Americans Watch TV, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1992, at 66.
133. Chase, supra note 130, at 549 n.81 (citing Winston, Prime Time's Copycat Creativity, IN THESE
TIMES, Nov. 6-12, 1985, at 16).
134. George Gerbner, Trial by Television:Are We at the Point of No Return?, 63 JUDICATURE 416, 419
(1980).
135. JAMES M. CARLSON, PRIME TIME LAW ENFORCEMENT: CRIME SHOW VIEWING AND ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 48 (1985).
136. Gerbner, supra note 134, at 418. Carlson's figures are slightly more conservative. He found
that 54% of television's leading characters were involved in violence, but also found that 70% of prime
time television programs contained violence. CARLSON, supra note 135, at 29.
137. Most statisticians believe the main sources for information on crime vastly underestimate the
incidence of crime. RAYMOND J. MICHALOWSKI, ORDER, LAW, AND CRIME: AN INTRODUCTION TO
CRIMINOLOGY 268-74 (1985) (describing reliability problems with police statistics); CORAMAE
RICHEY MANN, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: A QUESTION OF COLOR 25-36 (1993) (discussing limitations of
crime statistics and highlighting inherent bias against poor and minorities).
138. MICHALOWSKI, supra note 137, at 296.
139. Nearly 41% of television crimes are murders. Gerbner, supra note 134, at 419.
140. Id,
141. CARLSON, supra note 135, at 50. In real life, victims are disproportionately Black and male.
Gerbner, supra note 134, at 419; see also MICHALOWSKI, supra note 137, at 268, 296 (in 1978, Black
male seven times more likely to be victim of armed robbery committed by stranger than white female).
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The perpetrators of crimes are also portrayed unrealistically. Surprisingly,
criminal characters on prime time shows are frequently played by white
middle-class males.1 42 While real criminals are disproportionately poor,
television criminals are often rich and greedy. Such a stereotype makes little
sense, as white collar or victimless crimes are seldom the focus of television
dramas.1 43 Criminals are generally presented unsympathetically. Rarely are
they depicted as victims of circumstance or motivated by concerns or needs,
other than greed, with which the average viewer can empathize.'" In the
world of television crime, there are only two acceptable motivations for
criminal behavior: greed and insanity."a When crime cannot be explained by
these two factors, it is presented as just senseless-the consequence of an
uncontrollable ev-i will. 146 In short, instead of real people with histories,
personalties, and relationships that frame and explain their conduct, crimi-
nals are represented as one-dimensional demons to be feared and destroyed.
Viewing crime presented in a manner that suggests that it cannot be
explained discourages us from looking for its causes.1
4 7
The structure of television drama does not allow for the accurate represen-
tation of criminal defense attorneys, nor does it permit an adequate explana-
tion of their function and/or necessity. Since most crime dramas end with an
arrest, "[a]rraignments, pretrial hearings, jury selection, bonding, plea bar-
gaining, trials, sentencing, and other postarrest processes are rarely shown."14
Furthermore, since we typically see the perpetrators as they commit their
crimes, television criminals are, of course, almost always guilty.' 49 Conse-
quently, criminal defense attorneys are either superfluous or corrupt. Accord-
ing to legal ethics scholar Steven Stark, " 'criminal defense lawyers are
usually depicted [on crime shows] as figures of derision and betrayers of the
142. CARLSON, supra note 135, at 33. Carlson speculates that the reason for this is to avoid
offending ethnic groups. Id. Notwithstanding the representation of criminals on television, a 1977
survey found that most respondents viewed crime largely as the work of young Black males or young
males of other minority races. DORIS A. GRABER, CRIME NEWS AND THE PUBLIC 55 (1980); cf. Richard
Delgado, Rodrigo's Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, White Fears--On the Social Construction of Threat,
80 VA. L. REV. 503, 510-11 (1994) (arguing that white identification of crime with Blacks can be traced
to sociocultural developments of 1960's).
143. Berkeley Rice, The Unreality of Prime-Time Crime, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Aug. 1980, at 26,
reprinted in TELEVISION AND AMERICAN CULTURE 43 (Carl Lowe ed., 1981).
144. CARLSON, supra note 135, at 33.
145. Rice, supra note 143, at 43. Rice notes, however, that the rate of insanity among criminals is
not significantly greater than the rate among the general population. Id.
146. For example, unemployment is connected to criminal activity in less than 5% of shows. Id. at
43-44.
147. Id. at 44; Craig Haney & John Manzolati, Television Criminology: Network Illusions of Criminal
Justice Realities, in READINGS ABOUT THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 125, 128 (Elliot Aronson ed., 3d ed. 1981)
(noting how television crime diverts attention away from criminogeneticism).
148. CARLSON, supra note 135, at 35.
149. Rice, supra note 143, at 44.
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public trust.' ,150
Contrasting sharply with the image of the criminal and the criminal
defense attorney is the image of the television "crime-fighter." Law enforce-
ment agents are central heroic figures in prime time crime dramas. 51
Whether police officers, detectives, private investigators, federal agents
(FBI, DEA, Treasury) or even medical examiners or attorneys, 15 2 the com-
mon characteristic shared by crime-fighters is their archetypical role as
instruments of crime detection and enforcers of the established order. Police
officers are represented in particularly glamorous, but unrealistic ways. Their
role as fighters of crime is exaggerated and other mundane, but more
common aspects of the police officer's role are diminished. 153 The life of a
television crime-fighter is exciting. 54 He rarely makes mistakes, and seldom
makes a false arrest.
155
150. David S. Machlowitz, Lawyers on T.V., 74 A.B.A. J. 52, 54 (1988) (quoting Steven Stark).
There is, of course, a counterimage to the shady television lawyer, represented by the "Perry
Mason" genre. See Steven D. Stark, Perry Mason Meets Sonny Crockett: The History of Lawyers and the
Police as Television Heroes, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 229 (1987) (discussing how crime-oriented television
shows have impacted public's perception of lawyers, police and the criminal justice system). But these
lawyers, typified by Perry Mason and Matlock, differ so much from the usual television defense
attorney as to deserve categorization in a separate genus. These lawyers are, more often than not,
wealthy or upper middle-class and they rarely defend professional criminals. See id. at 250 ("In the
world of Perry Mason, fighting crime was not only heroic, it was respectable work for the upper middle
class. It apparently paid well too, though money was rarely mentioned: Mason had a secretary, drove a
Cadillac, and his well-furnished offices were in downtown Los Angeles."). Perry Mason's client was
always a wrongfully accused middle-class white person. Id. at 249. On those rare occasions when
television's successful defenders do represent suspects more in line with the statistical profile of the
average arrestee, the criminals always lose. Gerbner, supra note 134, at 420.
The Perry Mason genre goes a long way toward explaining the success of attorneys such as F. Lee
Bailey, Richard "Racehorse" Haynes, Alan Dershowitz or even William Kunstler. These attorneys
are "gentleman lawyers," prosperous upper middle-class heroes with much the same authority and
legitimacy as Perry Mason himself. Their existence proves there is a place for the defense attorney as
champion of the oppressed, the advocate of lost causes, in the popular imagination. This is the nature
of the mythology that surrounds Clarence Darrow, for example. But this counter-image of the
criminal defense attorney seems to be the exception, not the rule. Although there are many positives
about the way that "Rosie O'Neill" was represented on television (Abbe Smith describes her as a
"new age" feminist and committed public defender), in the end the show was cancelled for poor
ratings. See Abbe Smith, Rosie O'Neill Goes to Law School: The Clinical Education of the Sensitive New
Age Public Defender, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 2 (1993).
151. One-third of the jobs on television deal with law enforcement. Chase, supra note 130, at 548.
In addition, there are almost twice as many cops as criminals in the average week of television, and
three times more cops than lawyers and judges. CARLSON, supra note 135, at 29.
152. Crime-fighters can take a lot of exotic forms-Quincy, Perry Mason, Charlie's Angels, the
A-Team (a rag tag collection of ex-VietNam War vets)-although most crime-fighters are white
males. CARLSON, supra note 135, at 44.
153. Patrol officers do a lot of social work, and arrests for routine drunkenness and other victimless
crimes make up about one-third of the typical officer's total arrests. Rice, supra note 143, at 44.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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Crime dramas rarely focus on complaints of police brutality.156 When they
do, the complainant is belittled and the brutality characterized as neces-
sary.157 Studies have repeatedly disclosed that the constitutional rights of
those suspected of crime are routinely violated on television crime shows.
1 58
Not only are witnesses assaulted, but homes and offices are routinely broken
into without warrants, highly suggestive identifications are solicited, and
confessions are flagrantly coerced.159
Notwithstanding the blatant illegality of fictional police conduct, the
television representation of crime-fighters is generally positive 6 ' and presum-
ably perceived as such by much of the audience. Several studies indicate that
police officers are held in high regard by members of the general public.
16 1
The illegal conduct of television cops is accepted, even encouraged, in large
part because in the context of such shows, illegal conduct is framed as
pragmatic and necessary. In the words of one researcher:
In most crime shows the audience sees the crime committed, so they know
who committed the crime, a position the television police do not enjoy. So
when the police violate the Fourth Amendment and conduct an illegal
search, it seems acceptable because guilt has already been established as
far as the audience is concerned.
16 2
Police violence and illegal conduct are presented on television as an
effective, quick, and simplistic solution to society's crime problem. Constitu-
tional guarantees are presented as obstacles to effective law enforcement,
causing more harm to citizens if taken too seriously. Police officers are
frequently portrayed in a highly romanticized manner as macho individual-
ists, who are not afraid to do whatever it takes to get the job done. Since on
television, the real threat to a prosperous life comes from criminals and not
from a faceless government, the viewing public is encouraged to place their
trust in the hands of violent, but effective, law enforcement types.163
156. Id.
157. Haney & Manzolati, supra note 147, at 133.
158. Id. at 133-34 (two to three constitutional violations per hour-long program); CARLSON, supra
note 135, at 42-43; Stephen Arons & Ethan Katsh, How TV Cops Flout the Law, 4 SAT. REv., Mar. 19,
1974, at 11, 12-13 (15 crime shows contained 43 scenes of illegal police conduct); Rice, supra note 143,
at 44.
159. Arons & Katsh, supra note 158.
160. CARLSON, supra note 135, at 46.
161. Id. at 65.
162. Id. at 42.
163. This tendency is best illustrated by a snippet of dialogue from the 1970's television series,
"Bert D'Angelo-Superstar":
D'ANGELO: "What do I know about the law? I'm not a lawyer, I'm a cop."
INSPECTOR KELLER: "It's your job to enforce it."
D'ANGELO: "It's my job to protect people from the mugger, the rapist, the armed
[Vol. 32:743
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The ideological impact of the way crime is signified on television dramas
was pointed out by George Gerbner over twenty years ago, in a study
prepared for the Surgeon General's Scientific Advisory Committee on Tele-
vision and Social Behavior.' 64 Gerbner's research disclosed that the vast
majority of dramatic themes represented on television "revolve[d] around
threats to and the preservation of the moral, social and global order."' 65
Violence, including crime, is used in these contexts because it is an inexpen-
sive and emotionally charged way to communicate messages about appropri-
ate and inappropriate social behavior and the consequences of each. "The
typical plot," notes Gerbner, "ends by reaching a reassuring and usually
foregone conclusion about who is the better man."'
166
Violence operates symbolically to show us how it may be used to advance
our causes and to avoid being hurt. Violence demonstrates who is heroic or
empowered and what values should triumph over others. 167 In this way,
"[s]ymbolic violence is one of society's chief instruments for achieving the
aims of real violence without having to commit any."
1 6
Gerbner found that "[the lion's share of representation went to types that
dominate the social order. ,,169Not surprisingly, "[1]ess. . representation
was allocated to those lower in the domestic and global power hierarchy
.... ""' This uneven representation of character types, combined with their
placement in television's matrix of violence and crime, encourages the
reproduction of dominance and rigid social order. Gerbner concluded:
The pattern [of allocation of violence] appears to project the fears, biases,
privileges, and wishful thinking of dominant institutions onto a cosmic
canvas....
The fundamental function and social role of ritualized dramatic violence is,
then, the maintenance of power. The collective lessons [taught by drama] tend
to cultivate a sense of hierarchical values and forces. Their conflicts expose the
danger of crossing the lines, and induce fear of subverting them. 171
robber, and the killer. People like Joey, like my partner Mickey, did the law help them?
Did the law stop that killer? All the laws in the world won't stop one man with a gun. Its
going to take me or somebody like me and you know what? I'll do it any way I can."
INSPECTOR KELLER: "You're a dangerous man, Bert."
D'ANGELO: "That's right. You better be damn glad I'm on your side."
Bert D'Angelo-Superstar (ABC, 1976), cited in Arons & Katsh, supra note 158, at 11.
164. GEORGE GERBNER, VIOLENCE IN TELEVISION DRAMA: A STUDY OF TRENDS AND SYMBOLIC
FUNCTIONS (1970).




169. Id. at 37.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 76.
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B. More Crime at Eleven: Television News and the Signification of Crime
Because television news ostensibly deals with the portrayal of reality, one
might think that the representation of crime in the news would differ
significantly from that offered in the fantasy world of entertainment televi-
sion. But the distinction between television news and television entertain-
ment is not sharp. The "reality" of television news broadcasts is highly
selective. 172 In fact, television news "is much closer to definitions of narrative
construction than unmediated experiences or conceptions of real life." '73 In
this way, its reality mirrors the reality of television drama. Both real and
dramatic television are significations produced by an external and active will.
Both reproduce the conventional cultural pressures of the existing social
order.'74 Consequently, both "compliment and reinforce each other as they
repeat the same propositions about life and society."' 75
Television's selective eye makes it all the more persuasive. Television has
the power to concentrate its attention on one or two themes and strengthen
its message through repetition. Crime reporting is a major feature of televi-
sion news programs.' 76 This constant focus on crime, its frequency and its
danger, reinforces the perspective on crime generated by television crime
dramas. 77 The news media does not create its discourse about crime from
172. Just how selective can be gathered from the following account:
The ability to cover stories depends on the availability of camera crews in certain
locations. The overwhelming majority of national television network news is produced
by a few dozen film crews based in half a dozen major cities. The assignment editor
makes choices, the correspondent makes choices, the cameraperson and sound techni-
cian make choices, and the writer and editor make choices.
JAMES SCHWOCH ET AL., MEDIA KNOWLEDGE: READINGS IN POPULAR CULTURE, PEDAGOGY, AND
CRITICAL CITIZENSHIP 41 (1992). Moreover, some newsmagazine shows have a film-to-air editing ratio
of ten-to-one. Peter Funt, Seeing Isn't Believing, 7 SAT. REV. 30, Nov. 1980, reprinted in TELEVISION
AND AMERICAN CULTURE, supra note 143, at 89, 91.
173. SCHWOCH ET AL., supra, note 172, at 41.
174. Gerbner, supra note 134, at 417. A number of studies reviewing the content of newsprograms
have demonstrated how their structure results in certain definitions of reality prevailing over others.
Graham Knight & Tony Dean, Myth and the Structure of News, 32 J. COMM. 144, 144-61 (Spring 1982).
175. Gerbner, supra note 134, at 418.
176. This is especially true of local news programs. See ELAYNE RAPPING, THE LOOKING GLASS
WORLD OF NONFICTION TV 48-49 (1987) (local news stations prefer to report on "disasters and
tragedies," including crimes, because they "allow for sympathy and a chance to show our local fire
fighters and law enforcers on the job, being heroic, making our neighborhoods safe and happy").
There is strong evidence that television's audience is reached by the repeated messages about crime.
Ninety-five percent of the people surveyed in a 1977 study identified the mass media as their primary
source of information about crime. GRABER, supra note 142, at 49. By comparison, only 14% stated
they had any personal involvement with crime through the victimization of self, family members, or
friends. Id. at 49-50.
177. Consequently, the public views criminals as nonwhite, lower class people who are flawed in
character, emotionally disturbed, and hooked on drugs. GRABER, supra note 142, at 57, 68.
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whole cloth. It recycles concepts and terms already in the cultural lexicon. 178
Thus, while a newscast may be furnishing information cast as facts, it is also
constructing a tale that either "fits" or contradicts broader and deeper
concepts of crime that operate as "myths.
179
Most news accounts of crime (whether reports of specific incidents of
crime or more general accounts of crime statistics and trends) come from
official government sources. News reporters and editors work closely with the
police. Television stations routinely report bulletins, lookouts and warnings
about criminal activities.180 While such activities lend an aura of respectabil-
ity to television newscasts, they also reinforce the credibility and authoritative-
ness of the official sources upon which they rely. Media reliance on official-
sources, in the end, permits police officials to shape the nature of news
coverage of crime.181 It gives government authorities input into the decision
of which stories will be covered and which will not. Ultimately, the offenders
and victims selected as newsworthy will tend to be those fitting established
preconceptions.182
Television news reinforces the perception that we are living in a "mean
and dangerous world. 1 83 A prominent place in each evening newscast is
reserved for reporting some serious and violent crime-a shooting, robbery,
carjacking, abduction, or rape-or the efforts of some law enforcement
agency to control crime-a drug bust, increased street patrols, or a similarly
newsworthy event. 84 Those who are arrested, accused or convicted of crime
are represented as malevolent and incorrigible outcasts. Unlike the wealthy
criminals depicted on prime time shows, criminals shown on the news are,
more often than not, poor members of racial or ethnic minority groups
178. See Knight & Dean, supra note 174, at 145 (noting that news media rely on raw materials
already fashioned in the wider ideology).
179. Id. at 146. Knight and Dean describe a myth as" a 'second-order' system of signification whose
method for establishing meaning is suggestive and evocative rather than declarative." Id. Knight and
Dean emphasize that a myth is an uncritical way of knowing rather than an untrue body of knowledge.
Id.
180. See ERICSON ET AL., REPRESENTING ORDER: CRIME, LAW AND JUSTICE IN THE NEWS MEDIA 12
(1991).
181. See supra Part III.
182. Gerbner, supra note 134, at 418. This is as much a factor of the influence of prevailing norms
on the opinions of news editors as it is the result of excessive reliance on the authorities of the state.
See Knight & Dean, supra note 174, at 145 (arguing that crime newsreporting is ideological); Hall,
supra note 55, at 87.
183. Gerbner et al., supra note 131, at 107.
184. See RAPPING, supra note 176, at 47-49 (describing placement of crime news in format of typical
local television news broadcast); see also ERICSON ET AL., supra note 180, at 242 (finding that 54% of
all television news items related to elements of deviance and control); GRABER, supra note 142, at
28-32 (study concluding that "crime-related subjects ranked above average in frequency of mention"
and received preferential display on some news sources).
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arrested for crimes of violence.185 Newsreporting can thus interact with and
feed on racial stereotypes, promoting a further deterioration in already
strained race relations.
1 8 6
The exploitation of stereotypes is even more exaggerated on so-called
"reality" programming such as Fox Network's "COPS" or NBC's "Rescue
911.187 These shows present a highly emotional and sensational product that
is even more objectionable because the shows exploit a format that has
become associated with objective reporting. Shows such as these blur the
distinction between entertainment and news even further. 1
88
Television news influences society's concepts of order and normality in a
manner which often goes unnoticed. 89 Through its coverage and presenta-
tion of crime, television news signifies that violent crime is increasingly the
norm and that greater imposition of state control and police intervention are
necessary to maintain some semblance of order. The end result is that
television news coverage encourages the impression that we are living in a
society that is under siege by the forces of crime and that it is only through the
efforts of our local police forces that civilization as we know it endures.
Through television news, crime works to reintegrate society, to reinforce
notions of who is inside the "thin blue line" and who should be cast outside it.
Media coverage, then, provides a vehicle for communicating "the necessity
for strong social control."' 90 In this way, the news media have assumed the
functions of ideological reproduction previously performed by public punish-
185. This may be true because the kinds of crime television cameras focus on tend to be the types of
crime for which minority group members are most often arrested. The greater incidence of arrests and
the resulting impression that minority group members-particularly Blacks and Latinos-are more
prone to violent crime than whites may also be a function of racial stereotypes. See MANN, supra note
137, at 70 (noting that while arrest rates differ significantly between Blacks and Whites, patterns of
criminal behavior are remarkably similar).
186. See Linda S. Lichter et al., The New York News Media and the Central Park Rape (Center for
Media and Public Affairs, 1989) (monograph) (noting how exaggerated coverage of interracial crime
played to pre-existing racial fears).
187. See Wendy M. Rogovin, The Regulation of Television in the Public Interest: On Creating a
Parallel Universe in Which Minorities Speak and Are Heard, 42 CATH. U.L. REV. 51, 55 (1992) (noting
that Blacks are depicted as the people who get arrested most often on police "reality" television
shows).
188. Cable television's Court TV provides another medium that distorts the distinction between
entertainment and news, although to a lesser extent than "reality" shows. Court TV's relatively
unedited presentations of trials "present[] a more accurate and comprehensive picture of what
happens at a criminal trial than does other television news and entertainment programming." David
A. Harris, The Appearance of Justice: Court TV, Conventional Television, and Public Understanding of
the Criminal Justice System, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 785, 788 (1993). However, since the cases selected for
coverage on Court TV typically contain "a larger than normal dose of weighty, topical issues, involve
celebrities, lascivious detail, or grotesque or macabre trivia," Court TV still presents a distorted
image of crime and the criminal justice system. Id.
189. Knight & Dean, supra note 174, at 145.
190. Gerbner, supra note 134, at 422.
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ment.' 9' Where once public hangings were necessary to develop a sense of
community and obeisance to authority,192 now nightly broadcasts of crime
serve much the same role.
1 93
C. The Attitudinal Effects of Television Crime
Attempts to measure the effects of television viewing on attitudinal change
have always been controversial.' 94 Given the pervasiveness of the medium of
television and the difficulty of controlling for other influences that might
interact with watching scenes or shows, opinion research based on exposure
to television has always been qualified.' 95 Nonetheless, an impressive number
of studies suggest that not only are the effects of television viewing measur-
able, but that television plays a tremendous role in the socialization process
and in the formation of attitudes and opinions.196
Several studies have concluded that exposure to television fosters the
belief that we are living in an increasingly dangerous and violent world.' 97
Heavy television viewers tend to believe there is a greater incidence of crime
than light viewers do.' 98 Heavy viewers are also more likely to fear victimiza-
191. Knight & Dean, supra note 174, at 144-45.
192. See Elizabeth D. Purdum and J. Anthony Paredes, Rituals of Death: Capital Punishment &
Human Sacrifice, in FACING THE DEATH PENALTY 139 (Michael L. Radelet ed., 1989) (discussing
capital punishment as a social means to assure people that society is not out of control).
193. See Gerbner, supra note 134, at 421 (television show trials help "reaffirm the legitimacy of
contemporary values"). Television news polices the community and creates order by fragmenting
social problems and focusing on their individual and personal aspects. According to one analysis:
A lot of news consists of moral-character portraits: of demon criminals, of responsible
authorities, of crooked politicians and so on. The emphasis on individual morality is not
only a dramatic technique for presenting news stories as serial narratives involving
leading actors but also a political means of allocating responsibility for actions and
attributing accountability.
ERICSON ET AL., supra note 180, at 8.
194. For a discussion of the controversy, see ROBERT M. LIEBERT ET AL., THE EARLY WINDOW:
EFFECTS OF TELEVISION ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH (1982).
195. See Rice, supra note 143, at 44 ("variables of age, sex, education, income, or neighborhood
may be as influential in shaping attitudes toward crime as is TV watching"); see also SALLY JACKSON,
MESSAGE EFFECTS RESEARCH: PRINCIPLES OF DESIGN AND ANALYSIS 18-23 (1992) (cautioning that
media messages under study may be too abstract or not representative enough for purposes of
generalization); len Ang, The Nature of the Audience, in QUESTIONING THE MEDIA: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION 155 (John Downing et al. eds., 1990) (noting difficulty of generalizing about media
audience reactions given diversity of audiences).
196. See PERSPECTIVES ON MEDIA EFFECTS (Jennings Bryant & Dolf Zillman eds., 1986) (collecting
16 studies); see generally Gerbner et al., supra note 131, at 102 ("People are now born into the symbolic
environment of television and live with its repetitive lessons throughout life .....
197. Gerbner, supra note 134, at 422; Haney & Manzolati, supra note 147.
198. CARLSON, supra note 135, at 171-80; George Gerbner et al., TV Violence Profile No. 8: The
Highlights, 27 J. CoMM. 171 (Spring 1977); Haney & Manzolati, supra note 147; Rice, supra note 143, at
44.
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tion as a result of crime than are light viewers. 199 Consequently, heavy
viewing of television contributes to the development of a sense of distrust
towards others,2 0 0 a factor which may make it difficult for a criminal defen-
dant to convince jurors of the sincerity of a defense.
Another disturbing consequence of television's portrayal of crime is its
tendency to undermine the rights of criminal defendants. Heavy television
viewers are more likely to think that a person who has been arrested of a
crime is guilty of something.2 °1 Several studies have demonstrated that, on
the whole, viewing television crime shows discourages support for civil
liberties. 202 Carlson concluded that "[while] crime show viewing does not
explain a large proportion of the variance in attitudes toward civil liberties,
... its contribution is significant and greater than many other factors which
presumably are important in the socialization of democratic values such as
social status, achievement in school, and family structure.
2 0 3
Findings such as these support Gerbner's conclusion that "television
profoundly affects the social and political climate and the institutional setting
in which courts work.",20 4 While most empirical studies have focused on crime
drama viewing, the viewing of news programs, "reality" shows, and televised
trials can only exacerbate the effect. Because the media tends to report only
the most dramatic and spectacular crimes, news (and pseudo-news) coverage
of criminal trials can only "warp[] public understanding of the judicial
process."20
5
Furthermore, the depiction of crime on television encourages the wide-
spread belief that Blacks and other people of color are the source of crime. 0 6
Adeno Addis makes this point about the effects of the "media's daily
narrative about crime":
The media paints a picture of the black criminal threatening the inno-
cence of white America. Indeed, "crime" has virtually become a meta-
phor to describe young black men. Not only does the mainstream media
present news stories about African Americans that "are more often
negative, focusing on crime or other negative attributes than are stories
199. CARLSON, supra note 135, at 171. See Gerbner et al., Cultural Indicators: Violence Profile No. 9,
28 J. CoMM. 176, 196 (Summer 1978) (heavy viewers are more likely to fear walking alone at night).
200. CARLSON, supra note 135, at 172.
201. Rice, supra note 143, at 44-45.
202. CARLSON, supra note 135, at 149; Gerbner et al,, supra note 131, at 107, 126; Haney &
Manzolati, supra note 147.
203. CARLSON, supra note 135, at 149.
204. Gerbner, supra note 134, at 417.
205. Id.
206. See GRABER, supra note 142, at 55 (1977 survey identified Blacks or other minority races as
cause of crime); Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians and
Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REv. 781, 787 (1994) (citing 1990 University of Chicago study
which found that over 56% of Americans believe Blacks to be more violence prone than others).
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about whites," but also quite often the media, especially television, uses
the picture of young black men to illustrate a point about the pervasive-
ness of crime and drug abuse in the society.
20 7
Television's linkage of crime with race may lessen any public concern over
racial abuses in the criminal justice system, 208 and make it more difficult for
people of color to receive a fair trial.20 9
Consequently, all television's offerings having to do with crime, whether
designed for purposes of entertainment or information, are both creatures
and creators of the consensus. Operating through the consensus, television
contributes to the "exploitation of popular prejudices and the cultivation of
public support for the suppression of threats and challenges to the social
order., 210 Television works, then, to extend hegemony and to create a
populace that is more respectful of authority and power.211 Thus, heavy television
viewers, while subject to varying ideological influences, tend to take unmistakably
conservative positions on issues. 212 Insofar as crime is concerned, television
viewing "can ... be expected to contribute to receptivity to repressive measures
and to apparently simple, tough, hard-line posturings and 'solutions.' ,213
207. Adeno Addis, Recycling in Hell, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2253, 2263 (1993) (citations omitted); see also
Jane W. Gibson-Carpenter & James E. Carpenter, Race, Poverty, and Justice: Looking Where the
Streetlight Shines, 3-SPG KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 99, 106 (1994).
208. See MELVIN P. SIKES, THE ADMINISTRATION OF INJUSTICE 22-23 (1975) (arguing that in the
criminal justice system, and especially in the area of police community relations, the "unequal
protection of minorities is ... to be accepted and even expected"); see also ANDREW HACKER, Two
NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEOUAL 50, 64 (1992) (describing how white
conservatives, and in more complex ways, white liberals as well, "tend to disclaim responsibility for
issues and tensions associated with race"); cf. Adeno Addis, "HellMan, They Did Invent Us": The Mass
Media, Law, and African Americans, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 523, 554-55 (1993) (using incident of racial
violence to demonstrate how "white America ... often acts in response to the image of African
Americans constructed in large measure by the media").
209. See Nunn, supra note 1, at 107-10 (describing ways that juror racial bias can result in unfair
conviction); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial Imagery in Criminal Cases, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1739, 1760-66
(1993) (describing frequent use of blatant and subtle racial imagery in criminal cases and suggesting
that such appeals to racism survive because they are often successful).
210. Gerbner, supra note 134, at 421; see also Michael Corbett, Public Support for 'Law and Order':
Interrelationships with System Affirmation and Attitudes Toward Minorities, 19 CRIMINOLOGY 328, 339
(1981) (examining the relationship between system affirmation, intolerance for minorities, and
advocacy of a strong role for police).
211. Based on his survey of over 600 elementary and high school students, Carlson determined that
heavy crime show viewing contributed to support of the legal system and compliance to authority.
CARLSON, supra note 135, at 134; see also Knight & Dean, supra note 174, at 146 ("Ideology 'works'
hegemonically to legitimize and universalize as common sense the interests, perspectives, and
practices of the dominant, such that alternatives challenging these dominant views tend to be expelled
from normal reality as dangerous, bizarre, comical, and so on.").
212. Gerbner et al., supra note 131, at 126. While television does have a moderating influence on
ideological extremes, on the whole, the television mainstream tends toward conservativism. Id. at
120-21.
213. Id. at 107; Gerbner, supra note 134, at 422.
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Television draws its images from a cultural reservoir stocked by and large
with images of dangerous criminals, shady defense attorneys, and virtuous
prosecutors and police. What television takes from the cultural reservoir, it
also replenishes through the process of signification. Thus, as television is
influenced by the consensus, television also influences it. Television teaches
that a particular type of social order is appropriate and normal, a social order
that is conservative, dominant, racially-biased, and rigid.2 14 Television repre-
sents a social order that excludes and vilifies not only criminals, but also those
who are merely charged with crime. Television teaches us that these people
are already guilty. They have only yet to be provided with the formality of a trial.
In the next section I discuss how the images of crime and justice repre-
sented on television, structured as they are in conservative notions of law and
order, are replicated and reinforced in the criminal trial.
V. THE TRIAL AS TEXT
The trial is a highly ritualized formal narrative that is the culmination of
the adversarial process. Like the image of the criminal, the trial too is socially
constructed. Our ideas of what rights are fundamental, what procedures are
fair, indeed the very notion of fairness itself, all spring from the same cultural
reservoir as do the images that are represented on television. The consensus-
influences and is influenced by the trial just as it influences and is influenced




The ostensible purpose of the trial is to determine the guilt or innocence of
214. While this conclusion vastly oversimplifies the complexity of television's messages, it is fair to
say that television is conservative insofar as civil liberties and opposition to authority are concerned.
See Gerbner et al., supra note 131, at 120-21 (noting that television's mainstream views shift political
attitudes to conservatism). Of course, lessons taught are not necessarily lessons learned. This is
particularly true when messages are reproduced through a semiotic process. See supra Part II.
Although popular culture leaves room for counter-messages, the prevalence of law and order ideology
would seem to suggest that the lessons taught by television are indeed being learned.
215. The text is the medium through which meaning is produced and where meaning is signified. By
text, I mean more than just a document or object. The text is aprocess. "Texts generate, or are capable
of generating, multiple (and ultimately infinite) readings and interpretations." Eco, supra note 52, at
24. According to Eco, "[a] text is not simply a communicational apparatus. It is a device which
questions the previous signifying systems, often renews them, and sometimes destroys them." Id. at
25. This sense of the text is encapsulated in the following quotation from Hal Foster:
I use [the term]... "work" to suggest an aesthetic, symbolic whole sealed by an origin
(i.e., the author), and an end (i.e., a represented reality or transcendent meaning), and
"text" to suggest an a-aesthetic, "multidimensional space in which a variety of writings,
none of them original, blend and clash." The difference between the two rests finally on
this: for the work the sign is a stable unit of signifier and signified (with the referent
assured or, in abstraction, bracketed), whereas the text reflects on the contemporary
dissolution of the sign and on the released play of the signifiers.
HAL FOSTER, RECODINGS: ART, SPECTACLE, CULTURAL POLITICS 129 (1985) (citing Roland Barthes,
The Death of the Author, in IMAGE/ MUSIC/TExT (Stephan Heath trans., 1977)).
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the accused. This determination is reached by a jury made up of lay persons drawn
from the community and is based on highly abstracted and formulaic presentations
of evidence made by the state and the accused.21 6 From these highly abstracted
presentations it is the job of the jury to ascertain the facts. Indeed, there are no
facts before evidence is presented to the jury; it is the job of the jury to find them. t 7
The trial, and as a result the jury's verdict, function "as if legalproof, which
is largely a matter of formal procedure, and knowledge, which is largely a
matter of the substance of the facts, are the same thing., 2 18 Consequently,
the verdict is treated as realistic: not as just one version of the truth, but as
"the whole truth., 2 9 But legal proof is not knowledge and verdicts can never
embrace the whole truth.22 0 The realism of the verdict is, at best, "belief'
masquerading as "truth." "As realism, the [trial] does not embody real social
relationships but cultural mythologies about those relationships. '2 2'  The
verdict of the trial is as constructed as the trial itself.
222
The consensus on crime reaches its ultimate expression in the device of the
trial. The trial is where society both assesses and responds to behavior it
marks as deviant. The cultural mythologies that work to produce the verdict
are forged in an environment that can best be described as a "metaphorical
morality play., 2 2' 3 As a morality play, the trial has its own stage or setting,
216. See Goodpaster, supra note 7, at 120 ("The parties... control and manage the presentation of
evidence-the materials from which 'facts' are constructed.").
217. See United States v. White Horse, 807 F.2d 1426, 1430 (8th Cir. 1986) (jury determines fact
while role of judge is to instruct jury on law); United States v. Johnson, 718 F.2d 1317, 1325 (5th Cir.
1983) (same); United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 1973) (same).
218. ERICSON ET AL., supra note 180, at 10 (emphasis supplied).
219. This belief helps explain why judges often justify harsh sentences on the basis that juries have
found a particular set of facts. See Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 204, 211-19 (1966).
220. See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE ANTHROPOL-
OGY 173 (1983) (claiming legal facts are closely edited, socially constructed versions of reality and that
laws themselves are "but part of a distinctive manner of imagining the real").
221. ERICSON ET AL., supra note 180, at 10.
222. See Goodpaster, supra note 7, at 133:
Jury verdicts are a composite of influenced "fact" determinations and associated value
judgments. These determinations and judgments are mediated by the jurors' own
conceptions of how the world and people operate and are filtered through the mental
templates that the law imposes on the interpretation of conduct. In this sense, there is
no truth regarding criminal liability independent of the truth determined at trial, and
trials are more truth-producing than truth-finding events. In other words, trials produce
what we are willing to accept as truth.
223. This term is mine. Thurman Arnold also described a trial as a morality play. In his words:
Trials are like the miracle or morality plays of ancient times. They dramatically present
the conflicting moral values of a community in a way that could not be done by logical
formalization. Civil trials perform this function as well as do criminal trials, but the more
important emotional impact upon a society occurs in a criminal trial.
Thurman Arnold, The Criminal Trial as a Symbol of Public Morality, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN OUR TIME
143-44 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1965); see also ARNOLD, supra note 90, at 127.
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players, and conventions as to how the script is to unfold.224
As in any morality play, the actors in the criminal trial play symbolic
roles. 225 The adversarial posture of the parties symbolizes the clash of good
and evil. But in the allegory that is the trial, good is supposed to triumph over
evil. The adversary nature of the criminal trial must be reexamined in this
light. If good is to win over evil, good must be more powerful then evil. For
the trial to play out its symbolic mission, the prosecution and defense cannot
be two evenly matched adversaries. The prosecution must have the upper
hand. The criminal trial can only be adversarial in the sense that the
prosecution and defense oppose each other as the symbolic representatives
of good and evil.
Here we have a departure from the typical notion of what the adversarial
process is all about. The common view depicts the adversarial process as a
contest waged between two opponents who have a roughly equal chance of
convincing the fact finder that their version of events is true. While the trial
does proceed in this way on its surface, at a deeper level, the notion of "trial
as morality play" works at cross purposes to the "trial as fair contest" ideal.
In the remaining sections of this Part, I review those attributes of the trial
that make it resemble a morality play. My analysis of the setting, participants,
and staging of the trial226 reveal the working of the same ideology that
pervades popular culture and that is made manifest in television's represen-
tation of crime.
A. The Setting
Trials typically take place in buildings with imposing architectural designs.
It is not uncommon for courthouses to evoke associations with glorious
empires of the past.227 The courthouse is represented as a place where justice
224. Goodpaster makes this observation as well. Goodpaster, supra note 7, at 148. He compares the
courtroom to a church, and goes on to examine what he calls the "agonic resonances" of a trial, or
those features that most closely resemble drama or spectacle and that can be used to invoke a trial's
ritualistic functions. Id. at 146-52. While Goodpaster makes some of the same observations I do here,
his ultimate view of the criminal trial is laudatory. In his view, "American beliefs and attitudes... are
structurally and symbolically realized in criminal trials through the defendant's trial rights." Goodpas-
ter accepts these trial rights uncritically. Id. at 153; see also Milner S. Ball, The Play's the Thing: An
Unscientific Reflection on Courts Under the Rubric of Theatre, 28 STAN. L. REV. 81 (1975) (describing
theatrical and ritualistic nature of trial as a positive aspect of the legal system).
225. Ball notes that "the dramatis personae of morality plays were symbols or personified abstrac-
tions like Everyman, Goods, Fellowship, and Beauty." Ball, supra note 224, at 98. However, Ball
rejects any comparison of trials to morality plays as such, because he believes that trials, unlike
morality plays, do not always reach the same conclusion and are not primarily didactic in purpose. Id.
226. Much of the following description of the trial behavior, perceptions, demeanor, dress, etc. of
judges, prosecutors, and public defenders is based on my experience as a trial attorney over a five year
period in two separate jurisdictions.
227. See CHARLES T. GOODSELL, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF CIVIC SPACE: STUDYING POLITICAL
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in the philosophical sense is done. To underscore this projection, quotations
from great moralists, esteemed jurists, or classical works of morality or law
are frequently inscribed on courthouse walls.
The courtroom, where the trial actually takes place, is a familiar venue to
most as a result of its frequent appearance on screen and description in print.
A courtroom is formal space. Stately and ceremonial, the design of a
courtroom is intended to provide a dignified setting for the trial. Adding to
the courtroom's sense of decorum are emblems and symbols of state author-
ity and power.228 Through items such as these, the courtroom and all that
occurs in it are stamped with the mark of officialdom, evoking all the prestige
and supremacy of the state.22 9
The typical courtroom shares much in common with a playhouse, further
accentuating the trial's relationship to theater. The well of the courtroom
serves as the stage. On this stage are the props around which the drama will
revolve: tables and chairs for the prosecution and defense and, often, a podium.
In many courtrooms, the table closest to the jury is reserved for the
prosecution. 3 ° The judge sits on a podium overlooking the well of the court,
as if to direct the drama that is to unfold on the stage below. The immediate
audience for the story is the jury, which is seated in a bleacher-like jury box to
the side of the well of the court. More removed is an area of auditorium-style
seating for the general public. These seats are normally separated from the
rest of the courtroom by a barrier or "bar," which emphasizes to those that sit
behind it that they are spectators, not participants.
The setting of the trial not only suggests the presence of theater, but it also
sets up a commanding "environmental resonance," or atmosphere, of author-
ity and power.231 Within this space the state is on home turf. All others are
AUTHORITY THROUGH ARCHITECTURE 20-24 (1988) (noting how American public buildings were
consciously patterned after classical or European grand styles).
228. These include items such as the state and national flags, the court or state seal, and the judge's
gavel. See Peter Gabel & Paul Harris, Building Power & Breaking Images: Critical Legal Theory and the
Practice of Law, 11 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 369, 372 (1982-83) (describing symbols of ritual
and authoritarianism).
229. See id. (arguing that "[w]hen disseminated throughout the culture (through, for example, the
schools and the media), these symbols help to generate a belief not only in the authority of the law,
but in authority in general").
230. This arrangement, often justified as a matter of security, can be interpreted to enhance the
image of the prosecution at the expense of the defense. See Jeffrey S. Wolfe, The Effect of Location in
Courtroom on Jury Perception of Lawyer Performance, 21 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 731, 769-71 (1994) (study
finding jurors consistently rated attorneys who were located in greater proximity to the jury higher on
such factors as ability to communicate and rapport with jury). It gives the jury the opportunity to
become more intimate with the prosecution and underscores the perception of the defendant as
outcast. On the other hand, it may be to the defendant's benefit that the jury not scrutinize him too
closely.
231. See Ball, supra note 224, at 83 (noting that the "design and appointment of the courtroom...
create a dramatic aura").
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made to feel uncomfortable and out of place. The defendant is not the
beneficiary of the courtroom's formality and sterility. Instead, the defendant
stands out as an object to be regarded and examined. The very structure and
design of the courtroom works to legitimate the prosecution and delegitimate
the defense.232
B. The Players
There are many participants in a trial.233 However, the defining characters
in any criminal trial are the judge, the prosecutor, and the defense attorney
or public defender.2 34 They are the ones who will ultimately determine how
the story is told.
1. The Judge
The judge is the representative of the state's judicial power. The judge
serves as the ultimate legal authority, decisionmaker, and referee over the
adversarial contest that takes place during the trial.235 During the course of
the trial, the judge is responsible for governing the conduct of the trial. In this
sense she is like the director of a play.236 At the conclusion of the trial, the
232. See RICHEY MANN, supra note 137, at 215 (discussing how the ecology of the courtroom works
against the defense). Referring to a 1979 study of trial court structure, Richey Mann points out five
ways that the arrangement of the courtroom " 'weights in favor of the prosecution' and suggests that
'the adversarial process may be contaminated from the start by the physical structure and social
organization of the courtroom.' " Id. (citing W.T. Austin, Portrait of a Courtroom: Social and
Ecological Impressions of the Adversary Process (1979) (paper presented at the American Society of
Criminologists annual meeting)). The five critical areas are:
(1) advantageous proximity to the jury; (2) location in a favorable direction of informa-
tion flow; (3) greater strength in the number of assisting persons, including police
officers and other criminal justice agents; (4) more "familiarity with the turf"; and (5)
more opportunity to prompt or exert control over witnesses.
Id. (footnote omitted).
233. Bailiffs, clerks, stenographers, and interpreters are just some of the bureaucratic functionaries
that may have some role to play in a trial. In addition, anywhere from a few to hundreds of witnesses
may appear to testify in a given trial.
234. 1 omit here the defendant. Though the defendant is an important character (in many ways the
central character), as a practical matter, the defendant has little input into how his story is presented
to the jury. Even if the defendant testifies, his testimony will usually be crafted by the defense
attorney.
235. The judge resolves evidentiary issues and points of substantive law and determines how the
jury will ultimately be instructed. The judge may serve as the finder of fact. Even in cases that are tried
before a jury, the judge may serve as fact finder for a variety of collateral and preliminary matters such
as motions to suppress evidence, motions in limine, and discovery claims. It is the judge that determines the
relevancy of testimony and in this vein determines who testifies and the subject of their testimony.
236. Thus, the judge controls how long each witness testifies and the manner in which witnesses
testify. The judge also polices the courtroom to make sure that each witness, litigant, and litigator
complies with accepted standards of decorum and repose.
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judge instructs the jury as to the law they should apply during their delibera-
tions."'
The judge is treated with utmost dignity and respect.238 Her demeanor is
authoritarian and aristocratic. 239 Like any other autocrat, the judge com-
mands an entourage of aides and assistants. 240 Indeed, the judge personifies
hierarchical power. 24 ' The judge's authority comes from a number of ancient
and well-entrenched sources: 24 2 the prestige and prominence of the clan
leader (from whom the role of the judge evolved); 243 the special authority
traditionally afforded to the landed gentry and/or aristocracy in European
cultures;244 the might and supremacy of the state; and the stature and
distinction of the judge's age and social status. The judge carries all of this
elite-based power and privilege into the courtroom to aid her in her func-
tions. Of the trial's three key participants, the judge is by far the most
237. This gives the judge tremendous power to sway the outcome of a verdict, as does the judge's
attitude and demeanor toward the litigants. See ANNE STRICK, INJUSTICE FOR ALL: How OUR
ADVERSARY SYSTEM OF LAW VICTIMIZES US AND SUBVERTS JUSTICE 196 (1978) (describing how judge
may subtly influence a jury through instructions, comments and general attitude); JAMES LERAY
LEGRANDE & BARBARA LEGRAND, THE BASIC PROCESSES OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 161 (2d ed. 1984)
(pointing out how judge may influence jury by "general conduct, facial expressions, and the inflections
and deflection of voice").
238. See STRICK, supra note 237, at 152 (noting obsequious behavior shown to the bench, such as
requesting permission to approach); Gresham M. Sikes, Cases, Courts, and Congestion, in LAW IN
CULTURE AND SOCIETY 331-32 (Laura Nader ed., 1969) (describing judges as "lord[s] of [a]
quasi-feudal system," whose prestige places them "near the top of the occupational hierarchy").
239. One judicial observer described the judge's courtroom presence in the following terms:
The judge is clearly the most imposing and intimidating figure in the courtroom,
particularly in his relationship to the other members of his workgroup [prosecutors,
defenders, clerks and staff]. The style of judicial interaction can take various forms from
aloofness to extreme gregariousness, but the judge is clearly the one who sets the tone of
the relationship.
PAUL B. WICE, CHAOS IN THE COURTHOUSE: THE INNER WORKINGS OF THE URBAN CRIMINAL COURTS
49 (1985); see also JOHN PAUL RYAN ET AL., AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGES: THEIR WORK STYLES AND
PERFORMANCE 211 (1980) (describing Los Angeles trial judges as an aloof, elite group who see
themselves as "separate from-and perhaps better than-the world of practicing lawyers").
240. A trial judge's staff typically includes a law clerk to aid with legal research, a court clerk to
handle bureaucratic matters, a secretary for clerical support, and a bailiff or sheriff's deputy for
security. See RYAN ET AL., supra note 239, at 102.
241. See WICE, supra note 239, at 49 ("Each judge resembles the patriarchal head of the village or
ruling family, possessing virtually dictatorial powers over all who enter his domain.. .. Regardless of
the status or prominence of any visitor to the courtroom, once within the judge's domain, unques-
tioned obedience is demanded.").
242. See generally STRICK, supra note 237, at 141-45, 151-52 (describing authority of judge as
deriving from divine law); cf. S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW
(1969) (reporting that early English lawsuits were decided by reference to supernatural forces).
243. Cf. Henry Spelman, Of the Ancient Government of England, in THE ENGLISH WORKS OF SIR
HENRY SPELMAN 74 (1723) (noting that in ancient times Britons "judged all Controversies by their
Priests the Druides [sic]").
244. See generally ROBERT S. LOPEZ, THE BIRTH OF EUROPE 161 (1967) (portraying the dispensing
of "low and high justice" as one of the rights and responsibilities of the feudal lord).
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prestigious. 245
The judge can use her power and prestige to influence the course of the
adversarial process. 246 Akin to a sports umpire, the judge is in a position to
ensure a fair contest or throw the game in favor of one party or another.247 As
creatures of the consensus, judges are more likely than not to favor the
prosecution.248 Although the trial is itself weighted in favor of the prosecu-
tion, the judge polices this imbalance and works to insure that the outcome of
the trial comports with commonsense notions of justice-i.e., that the
symbolic function of the morality play is realized.
2. The Prosecutor
The prosecutor represents the state as a legal entity before the court and is
the proponent of the state's case against the defendant. Prior to trial, the
prosecutor decides what charges to bring and what penalties to seek. The
prosecutor's power in this regard is enormous; although the decision to
charge is subject to review in most states by grand jury or preliminary hearing,
the meaningfulness of this review is limited since "a prosecutor seldom has
245. See JAMES EISENSTEIN ET AL., THE CONTOURS OF JUSTICE: COMMUNITIES AND THEIR COURTS 37
(1988) ("Judges clearly rank at the top of the hierarchy of status in court communities.").
246. Judges cannot determine the outcome of cases at will, but the statements of judges are bound
to receive greater weight from the jury than are statements made by any other person in the
courtroom.
247. See supra note 237.
248. One defendant, when asked to define the job of the judge, responded: "The judge's job is to sit
on his ass and do what the prosecutor tells him to do." GEORGE F. COLE, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 421 (5th ed. 1989) (quoting unidentified prisoner). While this comment may be
more notable for its cynicism than for its accuracy, it does contain a grain of truth. The author of a
nationwide survey of trial level courts concluded that "most... judges within the criminal courts have
prosecutorial inclinations" and may be criticized for being too "hard" on defendants. WICE, supra
note 239, at 20.
The judiciary's pro-prosecution bias is not surprising. As I discuss below, the prosecution
represents the very state that the judge is pledged to uphold. In addition, it is likely that the judge
shares the same notions of order that are central to the consensus. Otherwise, the judge would not
have successfully negotiated the political process that is necessary to become a judge. (By "political
process" I mean forging the right connections and projecting the appropriate image that would allow
one to be perceived as judicial material, not just the confirmation process.) See JAMES EISENSTEIN &
HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS 111 (1977)
(discussing how judicial recruitment process "produced few maverick judges" and how judicial
attitudes were "conventional and probably on the conservative side"). Finally, it should be noted that
far more former prosecutors are appointed to the bench than are former public defenders. Wice
reports that "[tihe most common legal experience among judges [surveyed in his 15 city study], aside
from the general category of working in a law firm, was a former position with the local district
attorney's office." WICE, supra note 239, at 96. According to Wice, 25% of the trial court judges he
surveyed entered the bench directly from the prosecutor's office and almost one-third had some prior
training as a prosecutor. Id. In Philadelphia, 50% of the sample had prior experience as prosecutors
and only 15% had served as public defenders. Id. at 110. Those judges that do not come from the
prosecutorial ranks typically come from other generally conservative areas of legal practice, such as
large downtown law firms. -d. at 97.
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any difficulty in making a prima facie case against a defendant." '249 When trial
commences, the prosecutor is responsible for presenting the government's
case-in-chief. That is, the prosecutor tells a story that he urges the jury to
accept as the preferred version of the facts.25°
After judges, prosecutors are the most important state government offi-
cials in the criminal justice system. 251 Prosecutors have prestige not only
because they are attorneys but also because they are representatives of the
state. Prosecutors trade on the authority of the state. They are cautioned in
trial manuals not to refer to themselves as "the prosecution" but rather as
"the state," "the government," or, in the most extreme version of this
practice, "the people. 2 52 Thus, to the eyes and ears of the jury, it is "the
state" that rests, "the government" that alleges, or "the people" that object.
The prosecutor, then, is not just some employee of the government; the
prosecutor is the alter ego of the state-the government personified. To the
extent that the state engenders authority, power, and respect, so too then
does the prosecutor.
Prosecutors consciously position themselves in the mainstream. On the
whole, prosecutors are cleancut and wholesome, representing the image of
efficiency and professionalism.253 The image and appearance of the prosecu-
tor is not happenstance. It is partially a function of seeking to reflect
majoritarianism and to avoid identification with any "special interest group."
But the prosecutor's grooming, dress, and demeanor are also intended to
demonstrate an identification with generally conservative (or "moderate")
249. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 11 (1967). In fact, as the Commission points out:
The prosecutor wields almost undisputed sway over the pretrial progress of most cases.
He decides whether to press a case or to drop it. He determines the specific charge
against a defendant. When the charge is reduced, as it is in as many as two-thirds of all
cases in some cities, the prosecutor is usually the official who reduces it.
Id.
250. The prosecutor weaves this tale from the testimony of witnesses, the presentation of physical
evidence, and argument to the jury about the significance of the evidence. The prosecutor also works
to defend the integrity of his version of events by vigorously cross examining defense witnesses. This is
done to undermine defense witnesses' credibility by showing inconsistencies in their testimonies or
simply by demonstrating the prosecutor's disdain for them.
251. The prosecutor also shapes the contours of the government's case through the legal arguments
that he or she raises on the state's behalf. In a large prosecution office, these arguments may be
determined by superior officials or by established office policy, but the individual skill and expertise of
the trial prosecutor will have significant impact on the way that legal rulings are ultimately made by
the court. In this way, combined with the prosecution's ability to determine who and when to
prosecute, the prosecutor perhaps has more impact on how laws are interpreted than any other
government official.
252. E.g., IRVING GOLDSTEIN & FRED LANE, 1 GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE § 10.59 (2d ed. 1969).
253. Most prosecuting attorneys groom and dress conservatively. Male prosecutors do not adorn
themselves in flashy ties and ponytails. Female prosecutors likewise dress in business-like suits and
dresses. Personal observations of the Author.
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political ideology. The image that the prosecutor projects embraces and
endorses the mainstream, and thereby, embraces and endorses hierarchy and
power.
As the judge can use the authority and prestige of her office to influence
the conduct and outcome of a trial, so too can the prosecutor. By determining
whom to charge with crime, prosecutors engage in the labelling function that
crime in its social role permits. More importantly, prosecutors draw on the
moral superiority that is theirs as representatives of the consensus. Their role
as definers of crime allows them to speak to the jury as one in a shared
community. This permits a prosecutor to position himself and the jury as "us"
and the defendant and his attorney as "them."
3. The Public Defender
The public defender is most often a state or county employee retained or
appointed for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to criminally
charged indigents. Public defenders act as ombudsmen for their clients as
they confront a hostile criminal justice system. Public defenders must employ
a variety of skills to advance their clients' interests, including negotiation,
bureaucratic maneuvering, and legal challenge. Although it is the most
visible, representing his clients at trial is only one aspect of the public
defender's job." 4 It is, however, the most important in terms of the allegori-
cal nature of the criminal justice process.
At trial, the public defender directly opposes the prosecutor. The public
defender works to counter the government's case by offering the jury an
alternative story, one that may conflict with the government's version of
events, or one that may agree with the state's account but raises an affirma-
tive defense. But, no matter which approach the public defender takes, the
public defender is hampered by the restrictive discourse regarding crime that
is produced by the consensus.
While public defenders have the prestige of being members of the bar-
they are respected to that degree by court officials, witnesses, and laypeople-
that prestige is tempered by two factors: they represent "criminals," and they
are the opponents of the state. 5 All defense attorneys oppose the state and
thus oppose, in the minds of the public, all that the state stands for-security,
254. In addition to providing representation at trial, public defenders can assist their clients in a
variety of other ways. Prior to trial, the public defender may intervene on the defendant's behalf to
obtain bail, reduce charges, or have charges dropped. See generally CRIMINAL PRACTICE INSTITUTE, 1
TRIAL MANUAL (1992) The public defender also provides representation at any pretrial proceedings
that may be involved in the case. Id. He or she may negotiate with either the prosecution or the court
to reach a plea bargain agreement, and, in the event of a plea, the public defender works to ensure
that as light a sentence as possible is imposed. Id.
255. 1 discuss these factors in greater detail in the next section. See infra Part VI.
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order, justice, and consensus. Retained attorneys may compensate for this
negative identification by the positive force of their own public image or that
of their comparatively well-to-do clients. The public defender cannot. Further-
more, the public defender's clients are the epitome of the class of individuals
that the public is convinced is the cause of crime. Public defender clients are
uniformly poor, mostly Black, and routinely perceived as social outcasts.
Unlike the case with prosecutors, it is not unusual to find flamboyant and
eccentric personalities among the ranks of public defenders. Many take pride
in maintaining an appearance that is out of the ordinary and a little risky.256
Rather than embrace the status quo, the public defender purports to stand
somewhere outside of the mainstream. The public defender projects the
image of the anti-establishmentarian rebel more so than that of the efficient
and professional public servant.
C. Staging the Trial
The trial begins, appropriately enough, with opening statements from the
prosecution and the defense. In these, the parties outline their respective
cases to the jury by summarizing what they expect the evidence to be.
Through their opening statements, the attorneys inform the jury of their
theory of the case and explain how they expect to prove it. Although it is
important that the jury receive a "roadmap" of what to expect when the
evidentiary portion of the trial commences, it is equally, if not more,
important for the attorneys to use this opportunity to establish rapport with
the jurors.
"First impressions," so the saying goes, "are lasting impressions." As a
result, it is significant that the prosecution gives its opening statement first.
The prosecution gets the first opportunity to make a lasting impression in the
minds of the jurors. The prosecution's theory of the case and "take" on the
evidence will be the yardstick against which all others' will be measured.
After all, the government can make a compelling case. The prosecutor
represents the state-the state that we all expect to protect us from crime.
And it is the state that accuses the defendant, the state that tells us all of its
resources have identified this defendant as the perpetrator, and the state that
tells us, in its disciplined and professional way, how it will prove the
defendant's guilt. From the very beginning of the trial, the government is able
to bring into play all of the myths and symbolism that the jurors have already
learned about crime. The defendant, especially, appears dangerous and
antisocial. Thus, the government's accusations seem reasonable, even com-
256. While public defenders wear dresses or suits and ties in the courtroom, their attire tends to be
a little bit nattier, funkier, or trendier than that worn by their prosecution counterparts. Personal
observation of the Author.
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mon-sensical.257
The prosecution starts with much more legitimacy and credibility than
does the defense.25 ' To the jury, every word the prosecution utters is
suspended in a web of meaning that has been spun and re-spun every day of
their lives. Every teacher's mention of "Officer Friendly," every parent's
caution not to trust strangers, every book, every television show, every
newspaper report of crime, collectively work to suggest a guilty defendant
and an earnest prosecutor committed to justice.219
The prosecution draws on its credibility to strengthen and mobilize the
consensus. The jury can be addressed as a community of law-abiding citizens
who share, along with the prosecution, a common interest in eradicating
crime. This legitimates the prosecution's narrative and invests it with a
persuasive power that the defense cannot muster. As a consequence, "guilt"
and "innocence" are determined more by the definitional work of the
consensus than by the arguments of either the prosecution or the defense. 60
The public defender has a tremendous hurdle to overcome, even before he
or she utters a word about the defense's case to the jury. The public defender
must work to overcome the jurors' natural biases and suspicions against his
client, which have just been reinforced by the prosecutor's opening remarks.
Somehow, the public defender must counter the prosecution's advantage and
establish a rapport with the jurors. The first task of the public defender is to
quickly raise some doubt in the minds of the jurors about the tightness of the
government's case. Then, the public defender must go further and attack the
jury's tendency to stereotype his or her client as a "criminal." The public
defender must personalize the defendant, establish him or her as a human
being, separate him from the demonic image that the jurors carry ready-
made in their heads. This can be done, and it often is, but it is a decidedly
257. This is especially true if the defendant is Black or of some other non-white racial group. In
such cases the prosecutor not only represents the state but also white privilege and power. It does not
matter if the prosecutor is herself a member of a non-white racial group. Before a predominately
white jury, the prosecutor is seen as the one who will use the resources of the state to protect the
status quo of racial hierarchy (us) from those who need to be controlled or prevented from getting
revenge (them).
258. David Luban points out that the prosecution's case gains legitimacy from two sources: (1) the
inherent legitimacy of the state; and (2) the procedural legitimacy the case acquires as it works its way
through succeeding layers of review. David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L.
REv. 1729, 1740-43 (1993). As to procedural legitimacy, or what Luban calls "legitimation through
process," Luban argues that trial jurors will assume there must be some substance to the govern-
ment's case or it would not have made it as far along in the process as it did. Id. at 1741.
259. Although the image of the unjustly accused person is also part of the cultural lexicon, it is
overshadowed by the ideological force of the signification of crime and the constant parade of guilty
defendants represented in the popular media. See supra Part III.A.
260. See Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal
Case, 47 STAN. L. REV. 39, 49-51 (1994) (arguing that criminal cases must follow tried and true
"schemata" and "scripts" in order to make sense to jurors).
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uphill battle. Despite the supposed level playing field, it is the government
that claims the jurors' allegiance and has every opportunity to keep it.
After the opening statements, the trial proceeds to the presentation of
evidence stage. As with opening statements, the prosecutor goes first. The
prosecutor is not content to just let his or her witnesses tell their stories. Like
any trial attorney, the prosecutor meticulously prepares the witnesses he or
she intends to call. What is recounted at trial is not "reality," but rather a
rigidly structured narrative, the telling of which is accomplished through
question and answer.
By the time a witness testifies at trial, every question and every answer has
been crafted and practiced to bring the utmost advantage to the prosecution.
The skillful prosecutor uses this opportunity to rework each witness's testi-
mony so it "fits" the expectations created by the consensus. For the prosecu-
tion this is a relatively easy task. The fit is natural because jurors have already
been educated to place each element of the trial, whether symbolic or real,
into its proper place.
Not only is the content of a witness's testimony scrutinized, but much
energy is expended on its presentation as well. Witnesses are primed to look
good and to be believable. It is important that witnesses appear sensible and
sympathetic. Attorneys intuitively know that aesthetic factors such as these
greatly influence a juror's decisions at trial.261 Prosecution witnesses are
generally respectable police officers, doctors, ballistic and forensic experts,
and average citizens.2 62 A defense attorney attempting to cross examine
witnesses such as these may find it difficult to undermine their credibility with
the jury. This is especially true when the attorney is an anti-establishmentar-
ian public defender, who lacks the authority of the prosecutor and represents
a suspected criminal.
261. Several research surveys support this view. See, e.g., Francis C. Dane & Lawrence S.
Wrightsman, Effects of Defendants' and Victims' Characteristics on Jurors' Verdicts, in THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF THE COURTROOM 83, 84-111 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982). It has been noted that:
[T]he jury often fails to give the benefit of the doubt in close cases, if it does not like the
behavior of the defendant-such as use of offensive language or style of dress in court.
These "little things" can and do make a difference. In the 1983 federal Brink's
conspiracy case (not to be confused with New York State's Brink's cases tried the same
year for armed robbery and murder), courtroom watchers believe that the behavior of
one defendant in court-in particular, her falling asleep during the trial and badgering
witnesses as they testified-helped the jury convict her.
PAULA DIPERNA, JURIES ON TRIAL: FACES OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 59 (1984). Results such as these are,
in the words of jury researchers Valerie Hans and Neil Vidmar, "consistent with psychological
research on interpersonal attraction which has demonstrated that we are attracted to people who are
beautiful or who hold attitudes and beliefs that are similar to our own; and we are sometimes repelled
by people who are ugly or dissimilar." VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 133 (1986).
262. A prosecutor does not want to call drug dealers and prostitutes as witnesses, and, when a
prosecutor does, it is not uncommon for him or her to apologize to the jury for the quality of the
prosecution's witnesses.
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Notwithstanding the fact that the state has brought the charges and bears
the burden of persuasion, permitting the prosecution to present its case first,
like permitting the prosecution to deliver its opening statement first, allows
the government to establish its story as the story. Within the context of the
adversarial trial, the prosecution determines which account becomes the
preferred version of events, a version which, once accepted as the status quo,
can shape the remainder of the jury's deliberations and limit the way in which
the defense can respond.263 If the jurors were to have any doubts about the
importance of the evidence to be relied on by the state, the fact that it is
presented by the prosecutor organizes it in a way that makes it more believable.
The prosecution's story is invariably conservative.264 In its telling, the
prosecutor focuses on the "facts," which are presented as "objective" and
"immutable."2 65 By so doing, the prosecutor shifts the contest from the
courtroom to the consensus where the prosecution is more apt to win out.
This strategy can be observed in the prosecution's constant appeal to the
"common-sense" of the jurors.266 By asking the jurors to trust their common-
sense, the prosecutor is telling them to rely on that which they already have
accepted as true via the operation of the consensus.
263. On the other hand, the defendant would be at an even greater disadvantage if he or she were
required to defend charges without knowing the nature of the government's allegations. Perhaps the
way to resolve this dilemma would be to permit the defense to open first, thus allowing the defense to
establish credibility with the jury, but then still require the prosecution to present its case first,
allowing the defense to respond. Or, the defense could be given the choice of proceeding first with a
defense, then getting rebuttal, or waiting to see what the government's case is, then responding. In
any event, even if there is no other logical way to proceed with the trial, it should be acknowledged
that the defendant is systematically disadvantaged when the prosecution is allowed to present its case
first.
264. See generally Anthony G. Amsterdam & Randy Hertz, An Analysis of Closing Arguments to a
Jury, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 55 (1992/1993) (reviewing the different narrative and rhetorical
strategies employed by the prosecution and defense in a criminal trial). Professors Amsterdam and
Hertz show how the prosecution tends to rely on a conventional, unimaginative narrative. Id. at 75-76.
This type of story line allows the prosecution to trade on its authority as the presenter of "the facts"
and prevents the construction of new versions of the truth from those facts. Id.
265. Richard Sherwin explains this preference for the "straightforward, logic-driven" story as a
matter of pragmatics. As he states:
Prosecutors in criminal cases can be quite fond of the logico-scientific story form. It
comports nicely with their burden of proof, namely to demonstrate guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. And it carries a solid psychological insight. Cast into a world of
objective truth, where deductive and inductive knowledge dictates concrete results,
jurors may more readily accept their fate: to confirm what has already occurred, and to
apply the rules that govern legal outcomes in such situations. Passivity before truth and
law, letting the judgment that must come come, is a classic (although by no means
exclusive) formula for prosecutorial success.
Richard K. Sherwin, The Narrative Construction of Legal Reality, 18 VT. L. REV. 681, 689 (1994)
(footnote omitted).
266. Amsterdam & Hertz, supra note 264, at 88 & n.87; see also id. at 81 & n.67 (discussing how
"prosecution defines the jury's role as bringing common sense to the task of judging evidence").
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At the close of the prosecution's case the defense has two choices: the
defense may present evidence of its own, or the defense may present no
evidence and argue that the government failed to meet its burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. 67 Typically, the defense will present evidence at
the close of the prosecution's case. The defense can cast doubt on the
government's case-in-chief by seeking to undermine the credibility of the
government's witnesses or by attacking the prosecution's logic. On the other
hand, the defense may bypass a direct assault on the validity of the govern-
ment's version of events and, instead, attempt to establish an affirmative
defense.26 Whatever course the defense chooses, it is of equal importance
that the defense construct its case in a manner that will humanize, as well as
generate sympathy for, the defendant.269 Given the way the defendant is
constructed in popular culture, this is not an easy task.
Like the prosecution's case, the defense's case is also a highly stylized and
structured narrative.270 Witnesses for the defense are also carefully selected,
and their testimonies are painstakingly rehearsed. But this preparation does
not endow defense witnesses with the kind of credibility that prosecution
witnesses have by virtue of association. Instead of working with the consen-
sus, the defense must work against it. While public defenders would like to
present attractive and sympathetic witnesses, this rarely occurs. Public
defenders are constrained by the class position of their clients.
271
Furthermore, police officials will not ordinarily be available to testify in
favor of a criminal defendant, or they will be reluctant to do so. Rarely will
267. Deciding to present no evidence is always a risky decision. In the absence of a defense case,
the jury is allowed to retire with a fresh and uncontested view of the government's highly selective
evidence of guilt. In addition, the government, merely because it is the government, can create a
powerful presumption of guilt in the minds of most jurors. The defense may concede this presumption
of guilt by failing to present a case. Sometimes the defense chooses to present no evidence and argues
reasonable doubt because they have no evidence to present. Juries often believe this is the case
whether it is true or not. Consequently, deciding to rely on the government's failure to reach the
standard of proof can actually enhance the credibility of the government's evidence rather than
encourage the jury to question it.
268. An affirmative defense is one where the defendant offers new evidence and has the burden of
proof. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 987-88 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
269. See F. LEE BAILEY & HENRY B. ROTHBLATF, SUCCESSFUL TECHNIQUES FOR CRIMINAL TRIALS
460-63 (2d ed. 1985) (describing importance of and listing techniques for humanizing defendant).
270. In contrast to the prosecution's story, the defense narrative welcomes uncertainty. See
Sherwin, supra note 265, at 689 (defense attorneys want jurors to "enter a world of possibility and
openness"). Instead of "facts," the defense emphasizes contingencies or "reasonable doubts." The
defense attorney must convince the jury that they have "an active role to play in the creation of fact."
Amsterdam & Hertz, supra note 264, at 76. The rhetorical strategy of the public defender, then, is to
"draw the jurors into an imaginative dialogue" without opening himself to the charge that he is asking
the jury to speculate. Id.
271. See HANS & VIOMAR, supra note 261, at 134 (citing some studies finding socio-economic
position of defendant affected jury verdict). However, Hans and Vidmar caution against overestimat-
ing the degree to which juries may be swayed by nonevidentiary factors, noting defendants are the
victims of extralegal bias in only a small percentage of cases. !d. at 134, 136-37.
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witnesses with equivalent high status, such as professionals and members of
the clergy, be among a criminal defendant's social contacts. It is more likely
that the defendant's witnesses will be like the defendant-poor people,
working class people, racial minorities, or members of the defendant's family.
If the defendant is involved in criminal activity (which is often the case in
criminal trials), or has been so in the past, then the defendant's witnesses will
more often than not be tainted with a criminal past. This makes it all the
easier for the prosecutor to impeach their testimonies.
The most unattractive witness in the defendant's case may be the defen-
dant himself. Of course, the defendant need not testify, but that is a course
that is itself fraught with danger.272 Jurors frequently wish to hear the
defendant testify, if only to hear the defendant's denial of the charges from
his own mouth. But whether the defendant testifies or not, the jury will
silently evaluate his demeanor and appearance. The defendant, the jurors
will often be reminded, looks the way they would expect a criminal to look. It
is the congruence of the defendant's image with the socially constructed
image of the criminal that ultimately convicts.273 If the defendant is a
"criminal," then, so the reasoning goes, he cannot be trusted,274 his defense
is merely a scheme to evade justice, and he is certainly capable of all that
which the prosecution accuses him. Thus, as the defense presents its evi-
dence, it must attend to the double duty of both contradicting the estab-
lished, official story of the prosecution and lessening the negative socially
constructed conceptions that jurors may already have of the defendant or of
defendants in general.
At the close of the defendant's case the prosecution has an opportunity for
rebuttal.275 Thus, the prosecution has the opportunity for the last word at the
presentation of evidence stage, as it does when opening statements are
delivered to the jury. While the opportunity for surrebuttal is available to the
defense, as a practical matter it is rarely invoked.276
272. See id. at 144 ("many laypersons infer guilt when a defendant remains silent").
273. Cf DIPERNA, supra note 261, at 59 (discussing influences on jurors' verdicts).
274. Cf. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 261, at 143-44 (discussing perceptions of defendants'
trustworthiness).
275. That is, the prosecution may introduce evidence at this stage to contradict new issues raised by
the defense which went unaddressed in the prosecution's case-in-chief. The purpose of rebuttal is to
prevent the defense from "sandbagging" the government by failing to raise an issue until it is too late
for the government to respond. The defense is also given an opportunity to rebut the government's
rebuttal case (this is called surrebuttal), and this alternating presentation of evidence can theoreti-
cally continue until no new issues are raised by either side. See generally Donald P. Lay, Mapping the
Trial-Order of Proof, in 5 AM. JUR. TRIALS 505, 527 (1966) (distinguishing rebuttal from surrebuttal).
276. Only infrequently will prosecutors raise issues that are truly new during their rebuttal case,
and, if they do, judges tend to resist defense efforts to present additional evidence on the ground that
this would unnecessarily extend the length of the trial. A judge may rightly conclude that the defense
had its opportunity to contradict the government's case during the main defense case.
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The prosecution also gets the last word at the argument stage of the trial.
At argument, the parties may give their opinions of the evidence and attempt
to persuade the jury as to how it should vote. The usual procedure at closing
is for the prosecution to go first, followed by the defense, leaving the
prosecution an opportunity for rebuttal.277
Closing arguments are critical to the outcome of the trial. Often, at the
conclusion of a trial, jurors are left with a mass of conflicting testimony and
confusing instructions from the judge. Closing arguments can help the jury
place this evidence in perspective and can supply common sense interpreta-
tions of arcane legal rules. A good closing argument should tell a jury why it
should vote a particular way and how it can do so. While a closing argument is
not likely to persuade a jury to convict or acquit in the face of overwhelming
evidence to the contrary, a closing argument may provide the margin of
victory in a close case.278
In a close case the prosecution has a distinct advantage. If confronted with
two equally plausible stories, the jury will naturally gravitate toward 'the
prosecution's version of events."' The prosecution has the upper hand
277. Surrebuttal by the defense is even rarer at this stage.
278. Amsterdam & Hertz, supra note 264, at 57; cf. DIPERNA, supra note 261, at 58 ("[W]hen there
was doubt about the facts in the jurors' minds, they made room for sentiment to enter into the
resolution of the dispute. Strong sentiment might even stimulate a juror to look for weaknesses in the
facts or perhaps even oppose the law.").
279. Most claims that juries are overly lenient toward defendants are based on the landmark 1966
study by Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel, which found that "[ihe jury acquits in 33 per cent, the
judge in only 17 per cent of all trials." HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 59
n.5 (1966). This interpretation of their findings is unwarranted because Kalven and Zeisel only
compared jury verdicts to those that would have been reached by even more conservative judges. See
DIPERNA, supra note 261, at 58. In fact, Kalven and Zeisel concluded that juries are likely to be more
biased in favor of defendants than judges in only 4% of cases. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 261, at 135.
Juror disagreement with the preferences of judges in these 4% of cases can be based on a variety of
factors. Id. at 118. Noting that defendants who believe their cases are more likely to result in acquittal
from a judge waive their right to a jury trial, two scholars of the jury process conclude "the leniency
Kalven and Zeisel discovered may be more a function of the types of cases brought before juries
rather than the jury's greatheartedness." Id.
Jury bias, to the extent that it can be credibly ascertained, appears to weigh against the defendant
instead of in the defendant's favor. See DIPERNA, supra note 261, at 59 (jury more susceptible than
judge of being swayed by a strong prosecutorial case). Two British researchers found that in 5-10% of
the cases they reviewed, juries returned verdicts of guilt that judges found questionable. JOHN
BALDWIN & MICHAEL MCCONVILLE, JURY TRIALS 50 (1979). This finding led them to conclude "that
the questionable conviction of those charged with serious offenses, resulting in devastating social
consequences for the defendant and his family, in circumstances which effectively pre-empt any
review, is sufficient to raise doubts about the very basis of trial by jury." Id. at 87.
Of course, the role of the consensus in shaping the consciousness of the typical juror cannot be
ignored. One would expect that most members of jury panels would have absorbed the dominant
viewpoints of society with respect to crime. Thus, the truth of the following observation: "Given its
power, what keeps the jury from being a 'wildcat' operation ... is the legal system itself. As Kalven
and Zeisel noted, there is little gap between what the law prescribes and what the average juror
believes." DtPERNA, supra note 261, at 60.
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because its version is the one stamped with the authority of the state, and the
jury has simply heard the prosecution's story earlier and with greater
frequency than it has heard the point of view of the defense. The closing
argument is opinion, and the prosecutor's opinion is apt to have greater
weight with the jury than the defense's opinion. To a jury, the prosecutor's
argument is likely to appear more attractive. It implies that the system works,
that the right suspect is in custody, and that the government is taking steps to
reduce the threat that crime poses to the community at large. The defense,
on the other hand, must rely on the discomforting contention that the system
cannot be trusted to do anything about crime, and that, in this case, the
government has arrested and prosecuted the wrong person.
Following closing arguments, the court instructs the jury on its delibera-
tions about the case. 8 ° The instructions tend to be worded in a technical and
archaic prose that is hard for the uninitiated to comprehend or under-
stand.2 8 ' Because jurors do not understand the very instructions that are
supposed to guide them in carrying out their responsibilities, it is difficult for
a defendant to receive the theoretical benefits of a trial by jury. Instead,
jurors are more likely to fall back on common sense notions of crime-
common sense notions that unavoidably favor the state.
Even when jurors do understand them, instructions are often slanted in
favor of the prosecution. Sometimes this bias results from the legal rule or
element that is addressed by the instruction which may itself favor the
prosecution. 282 On other occasions, however, bias occurs as a matter of
emphasis-either in the words chosen to express the legal principle or how
those words are delivered by the judge.283 As representatives of state
authority, judges are more likely to sympathize with the prosecution, and
their instructions to the jury are apt to reflect their pro-prosecution orienta-
tion. Rarely are judges pro-defense.2 84
280. The instructions are of two kinds: (1) general instructions about the jury's role in the case and
how it should deliberate and (2) specific instructions concerning the crimes and defenses at issue in
the case. Walter W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to
Communicate 67 N.C. L. REV. 77 (1988). Which instructions will be given in a particular case is usually
determined in advance by the judge and attorneys in conference. The attorneys may request
particular instructions, but the final decision as to which instructions will ultimately be given and how
they should be worded is, of course, up to thc judge. The court may draft its own instructions or adopt all or part of
the instructions submitted by one of the parties. More frequently, however, the court will select its instructions
from a collection of pre-approved, "pattern" jury instructions. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 10, § 23.6.
281. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 261, at 121-23 (discussing research studies of juror
comprehension of pattern or standard instructions).
282. For example, the instruction that intent may be inferred from the logical consequences of
one's act arguably favors the prosecution.
283. See supra note 237.
284. See supra note 248; cf. ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM, AM. LAW INST.-AM. BAR ASS'N, 3 TRIAL
MANUAL 5 FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES 9 (5th ed. 1989) (discussing the reputation of judges
as unsympathetic to some defense evidence as a factor influencing election or waiver of jury trial).
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The requirement that the state prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt is
often viewed as a heavy burden for the state to meet and a rigorous line of
defense for the accused. In reality, it is neither. First of all, it is notoriously
difficult to arrive at a precise definition of what proof beyond a reasonable
doubt is. 185 Absent any meaningful direction from the court, jurors are at
liberty to apply their own idiosyncratic views of the matter, which are likely to
be at variance with the defendant's expectations.286 Moreover, no matter how
the standard of proof might be interpreted, a number of evidentiary presump-
tions help the prosecution meet its burden of proof.287 Finally, and most
importantly, jurors are generally reluctant to acquit defendants whom they
believe to be guilty, although the state's evidence may be insufficient to erase
all reasonable doubts.28 8
Thus, from the beginning to the end of the trial, the advantages lie
285. See Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1242 (1994) ("[a]lthough [the reasonable doubt]
standard is an ancient and honored aspect of our criminal justice system, it defies easy explication").
The reasonable doubt instruction given in Sandoval v. California, a case joined for decision with
Victor, is typical of the type of guidance that state courts have given juries on the meaning of
"reasonable doubt":
Reasonable doubt is defined as follows: It is not a mere possible doubt; because
everything relating to human affairs, and depending on moral evidence, is open to some
possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case which, after the entire
comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the minds of the jurors in that
condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of
the truth of the charge.
Id. at 1244. While the Court criticized the use of the archaic term "moral certainty," it approved the
instruction nonetheless, holding that "the Constitution does not require that any particular form of
words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof." Id. at 1243, 1247.
Some lower federal courts, fearing confusion, refuse to instruct juries on the definition of
reasonable doubt at all. See, e.g., United States v. Adkins, 937 F.2d 947, 950 (4th Cir. 1991) ("This
circuit has repeatedly warned against giving the jury definitions of reasonable doubt, because
definitions tend to impermissibly lessen the burden of proof.... The only exception to our categorical
disdain for definition is when the jury specifically requests it."); United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036,
1039 (7th Cir. 1988) (upholding district court's refusal to provide definition, although requested by
jury, because "at best, definitions of reasonable doubt are unhelpful to a jury .... An attempt to
define reasonable doubt presents a risk without any real benefit.").
286. See Henry A. Diamond, Reasonable Doubt: To Define or Not to Define, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1716,
1723 (1990) (citing study showing 23% of jurors believed defendant should be found guilty when
weight of circumstantial evidence was equally balanced between guilt or innocence).
287. Most presumptions run in favor of the government. See 21 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH
W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: EVIDENCE § 5144, at 717-18 (1977) (noting
that "presumptions that favor the accused have rarely been created by statute").
288. The Reginald Denny case (in which black rioters were prosecuted, based on eyewitness
video evidence, with assaulting a white man in the aftermath of the Rodney King verdict and acquitted
of the more serious charges), for all its publicity, was a rarity. Mostly, it is only when police officers or
other attractive defendants are on trial that juries are willing to acquit the defendant based on a
reasonable doubt. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 261, at 143 (discussing instances where juror
anti-defendant sympathies due to unattractive or immoral character of defendant led to harsher
conviction than judge would have rendered). Consequently, it is dangerous for a defendant to rely on
reasonable doubt for his defense.
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decidedly in favor of the prosecution. The jurors come to the courthouse
already biased in favor of the government. The prosecution gets the first
opportunity to confront the jurors with its "official" view of reality. Through-
out the trial, the defense must labor to contradict this established version of
events, a version cloaked with the credibility of the state. The prosecution has
better resources at its disposal-more thorough investigation, more attrac-
tive witnesses, greater respect and deference from the judge. The trial even
takes place in a venue that reinforces the state's prestige at the expense of the
defendant. 289 In the face of such concrete inequities, physical as well as
psychological, the advantages supposedly conferred on the defendant by a
mostly theoretical presumption of innocence and a seemingly high, but
ephemeral, burden of proof are quickly overwhelmed.
D. The Trial in (Con)text
The adversarial criminal trial, when examined in isolation, presents a
majestic facade. Justice is served, it appears, because the state's accusation
of crime is not taken for granted. The government is first required to prove its
case beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury of the defendant's peers. The
defendant is given an opportunity to contest the government's charges and is
provided with an attorney, if he cannot afford his own, to help make his case.
In addition, the defendant is provided with a panoply of rights that regulate
the trial process in a fair manner and protect the defendant from government
overreaching.29 °
But it is misleading to analyze the trial as a free-standing institution. A
more revealing way to approach the trial is as it actually functions in its social
context. That is, the trial must be viewed as the result of a semiotic
process-a text-a medium through which the reader can signify, drawing on
a long chain of significations that reach deep into the recesses of culture.2 91
As text, the trial is the property of no one. All are free to signify through it.2 92
289. Other disadvantages could be added to the ones I have listed. Legal ethics professor David
Luban points out that prosecutors generally have access to more expansive discovery options than
does the defense. Luban, supra note 258, at 1737-38. More significantly, Luban argues that one of the
most important disadvantages to the defense lies in "an institutionalized tolerance of ruthless
abusiveness." Luban bases this conclusion on the apparent willingness of more and more prosecutors
to resort to improper conduct (such as manipulation of grand juries, intimidation of witnesses, and
failures to disclose evidence) and the reluctance of judges to sanction them when they get caught. Id.
at 1747-48.
290. See supra Part I.
291. See supra note 215 and accompanying text.
292. This is in fact what the jury does. The jury signifies about crime through the medium of the
trial. The jury determines the meaning of the defendant's conduct, assigns blame, and determines
guilt or innocence. The jury makes meaning out of the evidence that is produced at trial. However,
that evidence is highly ordered and filtered through the consensus, which makes some aspects of it
relevant and others invisible.
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But all significations, all attempts to make meaning manifest, are constrained
by the significations that have been produced before.293 Thus, the genealogy
of significations-of things, ideas, and institutions-can be traced.
The criminal trial cannot stand apart from the images of crime that are at
work in the popular culture.294 The very same process of signification that
produces these images also produces the notions of justice, conceptions of
rights, and patterns of rituals that make up the criminal trial. That is, the trial
is linked to a specific system of signification that is governed by particular
themes and codes.295 These themes and codes structure all discourse, includ-
ing the adversarial criminal trial, in ways that make some interpretations of
meaning appear more appropriate and others less so. 2 9 6 A general ideology
or "consensus" arises from this interplay of structured meaning.297 Since the
process of signification is dominated by powerful elites who can give their
articulations wider circulation, a consensus is produced that vilifies the
defendant while it glorifies social order.298
The adversarial criminal trial is a social construction and, like any other
social construction, it is made out of bits and pieces produced through the
consensus. The consensus on crime structures the trial in ways that favor the
prosecution. No matter what formal rights the defendant may have, in
practice, procedures are adopted, rights interpreted, judgments made, and
meaning determined in ways that disadvantage the defendant in the criminal
trial. Consequently, both judge and jury perceive the defendant negatively;
jury instructions and court procedures are biased in the prosecution's favor;
the legitimacy of the prosecution's case is reinforced by the authority of the
state; and the prosecution's case is strengthened through repetition and
strategic positioning at the beginning and end of the presentation of both
argument and evidence. Through the working of the consensus, these disad-
vantages, and others, are made to seem "fair."
Consequently, the trial as "text" follows a tried and true formula. Upon
reading the text, one can see that the criminal trial is not constructed in such
a way as to match its formal signification as an institution of even-handed
justice. The "rights" of the criminal defendant are not fully enforced, and as
a result, the adversarial system is not all that adversarial. More importantly,
no matter how secure a defendant's rights may be, the entire criminal justice
system is permeated by an ideology that frustrates their realization. Within
the structure that culture provides and the consensus shapes, the moral of the




297. See supra Part III.A.
298. See supra Part III.B.
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story told in the criminal courtroom-and the meaning of the allegory of the
trial-is that the defendant is guilty and deserves to be punished.
The foregoing is not meant to suggest that the defehdant is never capable
of winning at trial. Instead, it is offered as a realistic assessment of the
obstacles that stand in the way of acquittal and that create imbalance in the
adversarial process. The possibility exists, of course, that an especially
competent defense attorney may be able to overcome these obstacles, or that
an inept prosecutor may fritter away the advantages that flow from represent-
ing the state. That defendants are disadvantaged by the adversarial trial
process would be of little significance if their attorneys were in a position to
reasonably compensate for the imbalance.
In the next section, I ask whether public defenders are prepared to handle
the extra burdens that the ideology of crime places on them in the adversarial
process.
VI. PUBLIC DEFENDERS: CREATURES OF THE CONSENSUS
The myth of criminal justice suggests that the state acts as a civilizing
influence on the expression of public outrage about crime. It is assumed that
the state, through its ordered system of criminal justice, prevents vigilante
behavior and mass tyranny. Justice is supposedly above culture and popular
sentiments. Although culture may influence the criminal justice system, the
state compensates for this by providing counsel and a protective regime of
rights. Thus, whether the myth of criminal justice is truly a myth depends to a
large extent on the effectiveness of counsel. Good legal representation may
be able to help ameliorate the influence of negative cultural attitudes toward
the defendant.
In this section, I concentrate my analysis on the type of representation that
the state provides to criminally charged indigents: public defenders. I focus
on public defenders for a variety of reasons. First, they serve a vast majority
of the nation's population.299 Second, in most cases they are professionals,
devoting full-time service to indigent defense. Finally, as governmental agencies,
public defender offices may be readily compared to prosecutor's offices.
Public defender agencies are a relatively recent addition to the criminal
justice system. A public defender system may be defined as an organization
"in which salaried lawyers devote all or a substantial part of their time to the
specialized practice of representing indigent defendants. 3 0 The first pub-
299. See infra note 307.
300. LEE SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS 39
(1965). Technically, a public defender organization differs from a "private defender" agency, in that a
public defender is created by statute or local ordinance and financed by public funds. A private
defender, on the other hand, is normally established by a non-profit organization and supported by
private donations. These differences are not significant for the purposes of this article and much of
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licly supported, indigent defense program was established by the city of Los
Angeles in 1914.3° t Public defenders did not become commonplace, however,
until several decades later, in the 1940's and 1950's.
312
There is a great deal of diversity in the way that public defender offices are
organized and structured. Most are organized at the local level and depend
on local finances.3 °3 In 1982, only 13 states operated public defender systems
organized exclusively at the state level.30 4 Several states provide some
support to local budgets, but the vast majority of public defender offices in
the country are either part of county government or are organized by local
trial courts. 3
5
Public defender systems should be distinguished from the two other major
means of providing for the defense of indigents: assigned counsel systems
and contract systems. Assigned counsel systems utilize private counsel, who
are appointed as needed from a list of available attorneys.3 °6 Assigned
counsel programs are the most widely used form of indigent defense ser-
vices.3 °1 Contract systems rely on one or more private attorneys to provide
indigent defense services, but these attorneys are not appointed on a
case-by-case basis by the court. Instead, they provide representation pursu-
ant to contractual arrangements with the appropriate state or local govern-
mental entity.3"8
Many public defenders are hard-working professionals who are committed
to their work and concerned about their clients. This is not to say, however,
that the typical public defender agency is sufficiently equipped to carry out its
formal role as worthy adversary of the prosecution. Indeed, most public
defender offices are vastly outgunned by the prosecution, in terms of both the
tangible and intangible resources at their disposal.
what I say about public defenders will apply to private defenders as well. For the sake of convenience,
I will use the term "public defender" here to refer to both types of indigent defense organizations.
301. Id. at 41.
302. Id. One study reasoned that the 1929 depression may have led to the institutionalization of
public defender systems. NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE
ACCUSED 46 (1959) ("The fear of violent social change may have reinforced the humane desire to see
that justice is done to all.").
303. Roy B. Flemming, If You Pay the Piper, Do You Call the Tune? Public Defenders in America's
Criminal Courts, 14 LAW & SoC. INQUIRY, 393, 395 (1989) (book review).
304. ROBERT L. SPANGENBERG ET AL., NATIONAL CRIMINAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS STUDY: FINAL
REPORT 9 (U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1986). This study includes the most
recent data reported by the Department of Justice on provision of public defender services.
305. Flemming, supra note 303, at 395.
306. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 300, at 39.
307. More jurisdictions use this type of defense arrangement, most in combination with other
delivery services, see SPANGENBERG ET AL., supra note 304, at 10-11, but more cases are handled by
public defender programs. See id. at 14 (figure 1, showing approximately 70% of national population
in areas served by public defender agencies).
308. Contract systems are far less common. Id. at 13. However, in an era of growing budgetary
concerns, this type of delivery system has been growing in popularity.
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A. Material Disparities
In comparison with other governmental expenditures, very little is spent on
criminal justice programs, whether for prosecution, defense, police protec-
tion or the courts. No matter how inadequate support for criminal justice
programs may be generally, funding for indigent defense is abysmally low.3"9
There is a great disparity between the level of support provided for indigent
defense and that provided for the prosecution of crimes. In 1990, only slightly
more than two percent of all criminal justice expenditures nationwide was
spent on indigent defense.31 0 By comparison, prosecution agencies received
more than three times this amount. 311 Virtually every public defender office
in the country is vastly underfunded.312 Numerous studies have concluded
that the level of support for indigent defense is entirely too lOW.
31 3
This low level of financial support translates into lower salaries, higher
caseloads, and less secretarial and other basic support for public defenders
than their prosecutorial counterparts receive. Because of low funding, public
defenders may not be able to adequately prepare their cases for trial due to
nonexistent or overburdened investigative services, inadequate libraries or
insufficient office space. Dean Norman Lefstein spoke to the importance of
the funding issue in a 1982 study he conducted for the American Bar
309. See id. at 1 ("many believe the defense function is the most overlooked and underfunded of all
the components of the criminal justice system"); SILVERSTEIN, supra note 300, at 149 ("far too many
defender offices are treated like stepchildren").
310. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1993 at 2
(table 1.2) (Kathleen Maguire et al. eds., 20th Ann. ed. 1994) [hereinafter 1993 SOURCEBOOK].
311. Id. The disparity in funding is particularly appalling at the state and local level, where most
criminal justice activities are financed. In 1990, local governments spent, on average, two percent of
their total criminal justice expenditures on criminal defense, while spending 6.8% on prosecution,
11.6% on courts and 58.4% on police. Id. In some states the situation was substantially worse.
Louisiana, for example, only spent 11 cents per citizen on defense services, but spent almost $12 on
prosecution and over $90 on the police. Id. at 5 (table 1.5). In 1990, state governments spent $111.17
per citizen on police, $31.18 on courts, $16.01 on prosecution of crimes, and only $5.37 on criminal
defense. Id.
312. One early study reported that "half or more of the defender offices lack adequate financing or
need additional staff members." SILVERSTEIN, supra note 300, at 43.
313. See, e.g., SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE SOCIETY, A.B.A. CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SECTION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS: A REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE AMERICAN BAR
ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE UNITED STATES: SOME MYTHS, SOME REALITIES, AND SOME QUESTIONS
FOR THE FUTURE (1988) (a.k.a. the Dash Committee Report) [hereinafter DASH COMM. REPORT];
A.B.A. & NAT'L. LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS'N., GIDEON UNDONE: THE CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE
FUNDING (J. Morgan ed., 1983); L. BENNER AND B. LYNCH-NEARY, THE OTHER FACE OF JUSTICE: A
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL DEFENDER SURVEY (Nat'l. Legal Aid and Def. Ass'n., 1973); NORMAN
LEFSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVICES FOR THE POOR (A.B.A. Standing Committee on Legal Aid
and Indigent Defendants, 1982); SILVERSTEIN, supra note 300; SPANGENBERG ET AL., supra note 304;
NEW YORK CITY BAR ASS'N. & NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS'N., EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED
(1959); George Yuhas, Note, Statewide Public Defender Organizations: An Appealing Alternative, 29
STAN. L. REV. 157 (1976).
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Association. As Dean Lefstein succinctly put it:
[C]riminal defense services for the poor must be adequately funded in
order for comprehensive and effective representation to be provided.
Experience teaches that when funding is insufficient, some defendants
are not represented at all, despite having a constitutional right to counsel.
If representation is by public defenders, their numbers must be adequate
to avoid excessive caseloads, and they must be paid salaries that are
competitive with those earned by prosecutors and by lawyers in private
314practice.
Unfortunately, few jurisdictions have heeded Dean Lefstein's admonition.
Salaries remain low, caseloads remain high, and, consequently, many clients
of public defenders continue to receive less than adequate representation.
Generally, there is a considerable gap between the typical public defend-
er's salary and that of the average prosecutor.3 15 For example, in Gainesville,
Florida, the entry level salary for public defenders is $23,000.316 Entry level
prosecutors earn $25,000. 3 11 Prosecutorial duties in the District of Columbia
are the responsibility of the U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia. The
starting salaries for beginning Assistant U.S. Attorneys is $47,670.3"8 By
comparison, attorneys at the Washington D.C. Public Defender Service with
comparable experience earn only $39,048.319 Why these differences? Is the
rationale that prosecuting is that much harder than defending, or that there
is a need to attract better talent to prosecution offices, or that the market for
prosecutors demands that they be paid more? These assumptions can be
justified only if one thinks that defense work is somehow less important than
prosecutorial work.
There is little reason why public defender salaries should be so much lower
than prosecutors'. The responsibilities of the individual line prosecutor are
314. LEFSTEIN, supra note 313, at 11 (footnote omitted).
315. See SPANGENBERG ET AL., supra note 304, at 1516 (noting that most chief public defenders
earn less than most chief prosecutors); cf. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE-PROVIDING
DEFENSE SERVICES 5-4.1 (3d. ed. 1992) (defender salaries should be comparable to prosecution
counterpart); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-582 (1964) (only requiring salary of public defenders to be
at least 70% of that of prosecutors).
316. Telephone interview with Rick Parker, Public Defender for the Eighth Judicial Circuit,
Gainesville, Florida (July 28, 1994). By comparison, the national average salary for entry level police
officers is $25,128. 1993 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 310, at 61.
317. Telephone interview with Personnel Office, State Attorney for the Eighth Judicial Circuit,
Gainesville, Florida (July 28, 1994).
318. The U.S. Attorney's Office typically requires two years' prior legal experience for entry-level
hires. Telephone interview with Larry Davidson, Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, Washington,
D.C. (July 28, 1994).
319. Telephone interview with Frieda Carr, Personnel Officer, Public Defender Service, Washing-
ton, D.C. (July 28, 1994).
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not substantially different from those of trial attorneys employed by public
defender offices. For every investigative, research, or litigation task per-
formed by prosecutors there is a substantially parallel task that must be
performed by public defenders. The practical effect of the salary disparity
between these positions is that it becomes more difficult for defender
programs to attract talent. Thus, indigent defense is left to those who cannot
find other employment or to those ideologically committed individuals who
can afford to forego the economic considerations of maintaining a middle-
class lifestyle or supporting a family.320 It is not uncommon for many students
who are interested in criminal litigation to choose to begin their careers at
the state or district attorney's office rather than the public defender's office
because the salaries offered by the public defender are too low.
32 1
Another problem with low salaries is that they make it difficult for the
public defender to retain employees for the period of time necessary to
develop expertise. Consequently:
[w~here the salary is low the staff attorney is likely to be a young lawyer
who will leave for a better job within two or three years, for example to
join the staff of the prosecuting attorney. Like any other lawyer, the
defender will usually do a better job of representation as he gains
experience. But if the experienced lawyer is replaced by a beginner within
a fairly short time, the quality of representation afforded the indigent is
bound to be different from one year to the next.
322
After reviewing the low salaries present in the mid 1960's at the time of his
report, Silverstein concluded that a large proportion of the reported salaries
320. Public defender agencies often rely on the ideological commitment of their candidates as a
recruiting tool. Many public defenders will readily admit that they do not do the job for the money,
but rather because of the importance they attach to the task of providing effective defense for indigent
citizens accused of crime. LISA J. MCINTYRE, THE PUBLIC DEFENDER: THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THE
SHADOWS OF REPUTE 83-86 (1987). However, it seems unlikely that there are enough ideologically
motivated attorneys to staff the needs of every public defender office in the country.
321. It could be argued that the ideological commitment of these candidates is tenuous, but that is
exactly the point. In the absence of the ideological factor, the public defender would be hard-pressed
to find good lawyers. Why should this be so? Do we rely on the ideological factor to such a degree to
insure sufficient staffing for our prosecution offices, police departments, or medical facilities? After
all, as Dean Lefstein points out, "[I]awyers ... are human, and many respond in very human ways,
with a keen awareness of the economics of law practice. Studies conducted in other areas of
employment support the proposition that performance and productivity are directly related to the
adequacy of compensation." LEFSTEIN, supra note 313, at 20; see also EDWARD E. LAWLER, III, PAY
AND ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS 124 (1971) (finding financial compensation most important
variable for determining increases in productivity); EDWARD E. LAWLER, III, PAY AND ORGANIZA-
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT 3-4 (1981) (greater productivity increases found to result from pay increases
than from other incentives); Richard M. Fenker, The Incentive Structure of a University, 48 J. HIGHER
EDUC. 453 (1977) (showing monetary incentives such as promotions and salary increases outweigh
importance of nonmonetary incentives to university faculty).
322. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 300, at 44.
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were not "career" salaries, "[e]ven if one allows for differences in the cost of
living and in a lawyer's income in communities of different sizes ....
If an insufficient number of attorneys is hired, then those present in the
office will naturally have to labor under heavy caseloads. An excessive
caseload is a frequently cited problem for public defenders; nonetheless, it
remains pandemic in the defense of indigents.
324
Low funding also restricts the number of cases that receive pretrial
investigation and the degree of investigation provided to those cases that are
lucky enough to receive any investigation at all. Misdemeanor cases suffer
especially, but felony cases are also vulnerable, particularly if other, more
complex or more serious cases are being tried at or around the same time.
Inadequate investigation is a common occurrence for criminal trials.325 It is
at this level that defenders and their clients are most at a disadvantage in
comparison with the prosecution. The prosecution is usually able to avail
itself of the comparatively well-funded and extensive investigative resources
of the police.326
Poor funding can also be made manifest in other, less dramatic ways.
Often, public defenders are unable to obtain decent secretarial support. This
means that, instead of concentrating on providing legal assistance to their
clients, many public defenders must spend their time typing motions or
handling other clerical duties. As a general rule, this of course means that the
unsupported public defender will ultimately file fewer motions and less
vigorously represent his or her client. In many offices, it is not uncommon for
public defenders to have to furnish their own office supplies. Frequently,
public defenders are forced to work in cramped, run-down quarters that
make it difficult to interview clients in privacy or store files or other needed
materials. 32
7
323. Id. at 45; see also LEFSTEIN, supra note 313, at 12. In many jurisdictions this same conclusion
would be reasonable today.
324. See e.g., State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993) (finding New Orleans public defender
caseloads excessive). In Pearl, the defendant's attorney was forced to represent 418 defendants during
an eight-month period and it was not uncommon for incarcerated defendants to have to wait as long as
70 days before meeting with their assigned public defender. While stopping short of declaring the
entire New Orleans public defender program unconstitutional, the Louisiana Supreme Court did
conclude that "because of the excessive caseloads and the insufficient support with which attorneys
must work, indigent defendants in [New Orleans] are generally not provided with the effective
assistance of counsel the constitution requires." Id. at 790.
325. A 1980 study found that the San Francisco Public Defender had only two investigators
available to work approximately 350-400 pending felony cases. LEFSTEIN, supra note 313, at 37; see also
id. at 41, 48 (detailing inadequate investigative services in Macon County, Alabama and Prince
Georges County, Maryland). More recently, the New Orleans public defender office attempted to
cover over 7,000 cases a year with just three investigators. See Peart, 621 So. 2d at 784.
326. Police agencies receive the largest slice of the criminal justice dollar. See supra note 311.
327. See LEFSTEIN, supra note 313, at 33 (describing the then-quarters of San Francisco Public
Defender as "inadequate and appalling").
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B. Systemic Disparities
To the extent public defenders lack independent and adequate funding,
they -remain subject to the whims of the funding sources they do have:
typically county governments and courts of general jurisdiction. One of the
most frequently raised critiques of public defender programs, from their
proponents and detractors alike, is their lack of autonomy. This lack of
autonomy can manifest itself in two ways. First, lack of funding independence
can have a chilling effect on the public defender agency's interest in providing
vigorous representation. Public defenders may be reluctant to undertake
unpopular forms of representation that might jeopardize funding sources.328
After studying the operation of public defender offices in three jurisdictions,
sociologists James Eisenstein and Herbert Jacob concluded:
Public defenders become adept at modifying office policy in anticipation
of possible consequences and reactions of their governing boards....
They cannot forget that actions which disrupt the felony disposition
process may generate opposition from the governing board and appropri-
ating agencies. A public defender office that demands jury trials in all of
its cases is likely to experience swift budget cuts and attacks on its
personnel .329
Second, outside funding sources may acquire direct or indirect control
over a public defender's practices or policies by virtue of their control over
finances. For example, if the court oversees the public defender's expert
witness funds, then the court can exert influence over litigation strategy and
policies by simply agreeing or not agreeing to allow expert witnesses to be
used in certain cases. 330 In a case that addressed whether public defenders
328. See SILVERSTEIN, supra note 300, at 50 (noting criticism that public defender cannot be
independent if he must seek funds from court or county more sympathetic to the prosecution); DASH
COMM. REPORT, supra note 313, at 42 (citing judge's observation that public defender did not cap
number of cases the office would undertake or ask for more attorneys for "political reasons").
States Attorney's Offices are subject to this type of control as well. According to criminal justice
scholars Nardulli, Eisenstein and Flemming, criminal courts and their constituent agencies are
foremost political institutions-both because they allocate resources and values and because they are
subject to outside political influence. PETER F. NARDULLI Et AL., THE TENOR OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL
COURTS AND THE GUILTY PLEA PROCESS 18-20 (1988). On the one hand, nothing can be as political in
the criminal justice system as the decision to prosecute or not to prosecute. But the effect of outside
influences is not as problematic in the prosecutorial context because, as a general rule, the proper
functioning of the prosecutor's office is not at odds with prevailing political norms.
329. EISENSTEIN & JACOB, supra note 248, at 49. But see MCINTYRE, supra note 320, at 55-61 (using
personal struggle between chief public defender and judge as example of autonomy of office).
330. This is in fact what happened in San Francisco during the early 1980's. Although applicable
case law established a defendant's right to funds for expert witnesses upon a showing of necessity,
such requests were frequently denied. Often, the controlling factor in considering whether an
application was granted or denied was not the defendant's need, but "the court's budgetary
situation." LEFSTEIN, supra note 313, at 37-38.
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acted "under color of law" for purposes of permitting suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, Justice Blackmun noted:
The county's control over the size of and funding for the public
defender's office, as well as over the number of potential clients, effec-
tively dictates the size of an individual attorney's caseload and influences
substantially the amount of time the attorney is able to devote to each case.
The public defender's discretion in handling individual cases-and therefore
his ability to provide effective assistance to his clients-is circumscribed... 331
The lack of autonomy observed in the operation of most public defender
offices implies a lack of adversariness or a failure on the part of the public
defender agency to vigorously advance the interests of its clients. The more
extreme version of this theory would condemn the public defender as a
"police state" tactic simply because it is not believed possible for the state to
both prosecute and purport to defend the accused at the same time.332
A more widely held belief is that the institution of the public defender is a
poor method for insuring the vigorous representation of the rights of
indigents because the public defender's office cannot help but settle into a
form of institutional entropy with the prosecuting agency that is its regular
opponent.333 Because of the close cooperation between prosecutor's offices
and public defender agencies, the reasoning goes, public defenders are
conditioned to not make an issue of the morality of the police, the criminal
justice process, or the courts.334 In exchange, the defendant's guilt is treated
in a matter-of-fact fashion.335 What results is a criminal justice system that
does not operate along ideological lines-such as due process ideals or
retributionism-but instead functions as "a system of 'bureaucratic jus-
tice'-a system in which discretionary actions are governed by fairly rigid
adherence to informal means and procedures designed to pigeonhole defen-
dants into a few rough groupings with as few exceptions as possible.,
33 6
Many observers have noted this tendency, 337 but whether the alleged
nonadversariness of public defenders actually harms their clients is a point of
331. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 333 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
332. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 300, at 50 (citing Dimock, The PD: A Step Toward A Police State?, 42
A.B.A. J. 219 (1956)).
333. See id. (analogizing regular public defender and prosecutor offices to two professional
wrestlers who wish to be combative enough to put on a show, but have no desire to harm their fellow
showman); see generally Flemming,supra note 303, at 397-400 (reviewing various co-optation theories).
334. David Sudnow makes this claim in, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code in a
Public Defender Office, 12 Soc. PROBS. 255, 273 (1965).
335. Id.
336. NARDULLI ET AL., supra note 328, at 377-78.
337. See, e.g., Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game: Organizational
Cooptation of a Profession 1 L. & Soc'v REV. 15, 22 (1967) (describing criminal process as a
"depersonalized, instrumental, bureaucratic version of due process of law, ... [which pays but]
perfunctory obeisance to the ideology of due process").
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view that has been challenged. 38 Most of the researchers who have studied
the problem have failed to find any relationship between the fact that a
defendant was represented by a public defender and the ultimate outcome of
the case. 339 But this could very well result from the fact that excellence in the
provision of defense services is hard to quantify and that case outcomes may
not provide the best measure of the quality of representation.340
These findings may also be skewed by the fact that public defenders, by
virtue of the numbers of cases they handle, may "lock in" all other practitio-
ners. As Peter Nardulli described it, public defenders and other courtroom
regulars (or "insiders") act "as creators and protectors of the status quo. In
this view... insiders play a crucial role in the formulation and evaluation of
norms which govern particular types of cases. Once established they affect
cases involving both insiders and outsiders on a routine and systematic
basis., 341 The sad fact may be that-except for that rare criminal attorney
who brings outside clout-the type of representation provided by the public
defender, although deficient, may be typical.342
Finally, although much insight may be gained from quantitative analyses of
criminal justice processes, one should not expect too much from statistical
depictions of reality. The limits of quantitative inquiry have been widely
338. According to a survey of judges, prosecutors, and public defenders, "it seems fair to conclude
that there is nothing inherent in the public defender system to impair the independence and the
zealousness of the defender. At most it can be said that a few individual defenders lack this quality."
SILVERSTEIN, supra note 300, at 52. In the course of his research, Jerome Skolnick found that some
public defenders were combative and adversarial, as were some private lawyers. Jerome Skolnick,
Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 52, 60 (1967). Skolnick questioned
whether this adversarial posture was necessarily effective, noting that while these attorneys won cases
that others would not try, they also had more losses. Id.; see also MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA
BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 89-90 (1977)
(finding cooperation a reasonable approach for representing a client's interest); MCINTYRE, supra
note 320, at 88 (plublic defender remarking in interview that "if I'm taking myself too seriously, I've got
a client who is going to suffer").
339. See generally DASH COMM. REPORT, supra note 313, at 37; MCINTYRE, supra note 320, at 46-47
(citing studies that "failed to find any evidence that clients represented in court by public defenders
fared worse (at least in terms of case outcomes) than defendants who had private lawyers");
Flemming, supra note 303, at 403 ("The absence of systematic disparities, of course, is not an
indication of effective counsel, nor for that matter of ineffective counsel."). For citations to both
qualitative and quantitative studies comparing the performances of public and private criminal
defense attorneys, see id. at 404-05 (Table I and accompanying notes).
340. After reviewing virtually every quantitatively oriented study of the differences between public
defenders and other attorneys, Flemming concluded that "[t]he literature offers no clear operational
criteria of performance." Flemming, supra note 303, at 403.
341. Peter F. Nardulli, "Insider's" Justice: Defense Attorneys and the Handling of Felony Cases, 77 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 379, 415 (1986).
342. Even if public defenders do not act as the creators of the status quo in the way envisioned by
Nardulli, the same result is possible. The provision of defense services is notoriously uneven. While
the average public defender might be as good as the average private defense counsel, this may be so
because the efforts of a few highly competent private attorneys are diluted by the behavior of a greater
number of marginally competent ones.
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debated in the social sciences.343 Particularly in the case of criminal court
research, one should be wary of focusing on case outcomes. 3 4 Researchers,
such as McIntyre,345 who conclude that social science research has discred-
ited the claim that public defender clients receive less effective representa-
tion greatly overstate their case. The burdens that the typical public defender
must labor under do have an effect, although one that may not be easily
quantified.346 They would do well to remember that:
discussions with criminal court veterans who have watched these changes
unfold over the years reveal the salience of environmental factors for
courthouse communities. Students of criminal courts who ignore them
because they fail to have a "statistically significant effect" upon case
outcomes do so at great peril and at great cost.
3 47
When we look at the criminal trial process in its larger context, the fact that
there are glaring disparities between the public defender and the prosecution
is inescapable. There are disparities in funding, salaries, resources, training,
and physical facilities. These disparities cause or contribute to the way that
public defender clients are disadvantaged vis-a-vis other criminal defendants
and the state. While statistical evidence suggests that the claim that public
defenders lack adversariness and autonomy is false, at best these data simply
show that public defender clients do not fare any worse than do criminal
defendants generally. Comparisons of case outcomes alone, then, cannot
measure the ways that criminal defendants as a class are handicapped in their
ability to contest the state's accusation of guilt.
C. The Symbolic Importance of Material and Systemic Disparities
To expose the way that defendants in general-and public defender clients
in particular-are poorly equipped to compete for the hearts and minds of
343. See FRED INGLIS, MEDIA THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 44-50 (1990); see also Michael L. Seigel,
A Pragmatic Critique of Modern Evidence Scholarship, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 995, 1034-39 (1994)
(discussing the limitations of empirical science and reviewing the difficulties that the adoption of
social science research poses for evidence scholarship).
344. As one group of researchers put it, one "[n]eeds to cast a broader net in the study of these
courts," since "limiting research on criminal courts to case outcomes is like limiting research on
Congress to votes." NARDULLI ET AL., supra note 328, at 368.
345. MCINTYRE, supra note 320, at 46-47.
346. One sees this problem in the difficulty courts have in defining attorney ineffectiveness.
Although the Supreme Court has held that counsel must provide "reasonably effective assistance" to
their clients, the Court discouraged quantification of its standard by refusing to adopt specific
guidelines to determine whether conduct of counsel was reasonable or not. The Court rejected any
"checklist" approach to judicial evaluation of attorney performance, mainly because of the majority's
view that "[n]o particular set of detailed rules for counsel's conduct can satisfactorily take account of
the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of legitimate decisions regarding
how best to represent a criminal defendant." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1984).
347. NARDULLI ET AL., supra note 328, at 369.
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jurors in the adversarial arena of the criminal trial, it is helpful to consider
how the material and systemic disparities discussed above work symbolically.
What cultural values are implicit in the ways that criminal defendants are
treated and what meaning can be extracted from the way that the role of the
public defender is constructed?
Money takes on a central importance in this culture. It is not simply a
matter of "getting what you pay for" (which presumes a sellers market),348
but it is also a matter of "paying what one thinks things are worth." When
public defenders are offered salaries that are thirty percent less 349 than those
offered to state's attorneys, obviously this signifies a belief that the services of
public defenders are worth less than those provided by prosecutors. Accord-
ing to a commission charged by President Johnson to investigate the adminis-
tration of justice in the nation's courts, low wages
unavoidably impose a stigma of inferiority on the defense of the accused.
If the status of the defense bar is to be upgraded and if able lawyers are to
be attracted to criminal practice, it is undesirable to perpetuate a system in
which representation for the poor seems to be obtained at a discount.
3 5 0
The lessened importance that the public attaches to providing defense
services to indigents can be measured by the fact that over three times as
much is spent to support prosecution agencies than is spent on all forms of
indigent defense.35 ' If the prosecution and the defense were truly seen as
evenly matched counterparts of one another, then the nation would not be
spending a fraction of what it spends to prosecute crimes on the defense of crimes.
Nothing underscores this point more than the disparity in facilities and
physical plant that is often a feature of public defender offices. The objective
needs of the prosecution and the defense are pretty similar in respect to
facilities. They both need offices with sufficient space for filing and support
services to allow the attorneys to ply their trade with a sufficient amount of
dignity. There is no particular reason why prosecutors would need larger or
more modern offices or facilities that are more pleasing to the eye. Yet, in
virtually every jurisdiction, there are readily observable differences in the
quality of the work spaces afforded the prosecution and those afforded the
defense.35 The commentary to the A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice
348. See MCINTYRE, supra note 320, at 65.
349. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11-582(B) (1964) (only requiring salary of public defenders
to be at least 70% of that of prosecutors).
350. TASK FORCE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTiCE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 61 (1967), cited in
LEFSTEIN, supra note 313, at 18.
351. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
352. In Washington, D.C. the prosecutor occupies a gleaming new office building, while the public
defender is housed in the basement of a 19th century building, in space that ironically was once the
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points out why this discrepancy is harmful:
It is essential to the efficient operation of the defender program that
facilities be provided in which clients can be interviewed in privacy.
Without offices and facilities befitting the nature of a lawyer's profes-
sional calling, the accused may very well lack confidence in the defender
and, ultimately in the system of justice itself. Appropriate facilities are
also necessary to attract and retain career personnel.
353
Where appropriate facilities are not provided, is this not an indication that
society does not view public defenders as entitled to display "the dignity of
the legal profession"? 354 The fact that public defender offices are almost
uniformly less desirable than prosecution buildings and workspaces may be
taken as clear evidence of the public defender's lower prestige and authority.
The differences in salaries and work facilities that exist between defenders
and prosecutors cannot be explained by differences in either the market
conditions355 or the required functions of each job. Instead, these disparities
are clearly representative of the opinion that the majority of society holds
about the type of work that is done by public defenders and prosecutors.
Whether public defenders can be conclusively shown to be less effective than
other attorneys or not, "it is clear that those that represent the poor are not
generally held in high esteem, either within the legal profession or outside of
it." '3 5 6 It is a commonplace observation that "a lack of respect and influence is
a common characteristic of public defenders. Within the courthouse, public
defenders are at the end of the pecking order., 357 The truth of this observa-
District jail. In Alachua County, Florida, the public defender literally operates out of a storefront. See
LEFSTEIN, supra note 313, at 33 (finding facilities at one public defender office "so inadequate and
appalling that probably no significant improvement in the overall quality of the program is possible").
353. A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE-PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 59 (3d. ed. 1992)
(commentary to Standard 5-4.3).
354. Id.
355. If anything, market conditions would militate toward paying public defenders more since the
job is held in such low esteem.
356. DASH COMM. REPORT, supra note 313, at 37; see also Jonathan D. Casper, Did You Have a
Lawyer When You Went to Court? No, I Had a Public Defender, 1 YALE REV. L. & SOC. ACTION 4 (1971)
(majority of criminal defendants interviewed did not believe public defender provided adequate
defense nor that public defender was on their side); Flemming, supra note 303, at 408-09 ("Public
defenders are not 'real' lawyers in the eyes of their clients and others."); Michael McConville,
Dilemmas in New Models for Indigent Defense, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 179, 181 (1986)
("Lawyers for the poor are generally held in low esteem. They are regarded as poor lawyers, and it is
believed that their ineptness is exacerbated by the institution of plea bargaining."); Joyce C. Sterling,
Retained Counsel Versus the Public Defender. The Impact of Type of Counsel on Charge Bargaining, in
THE DEFENSE COUNSEL 151, 166 (W. McDonald ed., 1983) ("The general suspicion is that equal
justice is not available to rich and poor alike. Rather, it is believed that indigents receive a lower
quality of legal service, which results in their being more likely to suffer harsh penalties than similarly
situated defendants who can afford to buy good legal talent.").
357. Flemming, supra note 303, at 413.
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tion may be emphasized by the following comments made by a public
defender in Chicago:
We are the gophers [sic], we run for things. Whenever there's something
the judge needs done, if there is not a clerk available, the judge gives it to
the public defender and has him do it. They would never think of having a
state's attorney do it. But public defenders have to do this silly stuff.
35 8
The problem runs deeper than is demonstrated by the treatment public
defenders may receive at the hands of autocratic judges. Public defenders are
not perceived as "real" lawyers by the public, their peers, or by their
clients.359 The professional life of public defenders is characterized by their
attempts to cope with the deep stigma attached to the work that they do.36°
Yet, the stigma is hard to escape. Even in Washington, D.C., which is
serviced by what is arguably the country's best public defender organization,
defendants often pass up representation by the public defender in favor of
less-experienced and much more costly private defense lawyers.36 Trained
professionals, who ought to know better, offer no greater support for public
defender organizations. As the A.B.A. Special Committee on Criminal
Justice in a Free Society concluded in its 1988 report, "[t]he criminal justice
system is shunned by the mainstream bar, and it will never be able to attract
funds and public support if it cannot even garner the respect and support of
the bar.",362
Considerations such as these have led many to conclude that "the pivotal
concern" that led to the establishment of the public defender was not justice,
but "judicial economy," or "[e]fficiency, particularly as it affected the smooth
flow of guilty pleas ... .""' Also, as Lisa McIntyre has pointed out, public
defenders increase judicial legitimacy by encouraging public confidence in
the administration of justice.364 Yet, neither of these rationales for the
establishment of defender programs necessarily calls for a viable, well-
functioning and adversarial enterprise. All that is needed to account for
358. MCINTYRE, supra note 320, at 88 (emphasis in original).
359. Flemming, supra note 303, at 408.
360. McIntyre argues that in reaction to the stigma attached to their jobs, public defenders develop
a sense of "daring-do," seeing themselves as mavericks who thrive with little training or supervision.
MCINTYRE, supra note 320, at 121.
361. See DASH COMM. REPORT, supra note 313, at 7-8 (noting "status of the practice of criminal law
suffers" from absence of private, "influential lawyers"); MCINTYRE, supra note 320, at 63 (arguing
that "stigma of ineptitude" attached to public defenders is undeserved); NARDULLI ET AL., supra note
328, at 193 (noting stigma attached to public defenders as opposed to private counsel).
362. DASH COMM. REPORT, supra note 313, at 37.
363. Flemming, supra note 303, at 408.
364. McINTYRE, supra note 320, at 49-53; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)
(holding that right of indigent defendants in criminal trials to assistance of counsel is fundamental
and essential to fair trial).
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judicial economy and legitimacy is a public defender who appears competent,
no matter how rough an appearance it may be. If the motivation for the
creation of a public defender organization is anything less than supplying
equal justice under law for its own sake, then a "paper tiger" public defender
may be just as good as the real thing.
It is certainly true that if public defenders were more successful and "won
consistently and often, their successes would undermine the legitimacy of the
courts and ultimately jeopardize support for them." '365 Indeed, the entire
criminal justice system is premised on the expectation that defendants will be
proven guilty and locked away. There is no room for the proposition that an
adequately functioning criminal justice system might result in the release,
without sanction, of a majority of those who have been charged with crime.366
Of course, such a state of affairs might suggest that something is terribly
wrong with the criminal justice system, something overlooked in the midst of
the commonly heard anti-crime rhetoric. Such a situation might demonstrate
that the state is intervening in the lives of too many of its citizens via
unjustifiable arrests and prosecutions. However, this possibility is never
seriously considered. It is easier, both politically and economically, to simply
validate what the police and courts are doing by gutting the ability of the
public defender to defend his or her client. In a society that excludes
"criminals" from the consensus, and that, in fact, uses crime to shape the
consensus, the inadequacies of public defenders appear normal.
VII. OF RIGHTS AND REMEDIES: A PROPOSAL FOR A FEDERAL
DEFENDER GENERAL
A. Rights, Remedies and the Importance of Reform
I have attempted to demonstrate that the mere identification of formal
rights for criminal defendants does little to ensure a fair trial. Instead, as I
have explained, the difficulty is external to the legal system and lies, rather, in
the way that the community at large seeks to define crime and the type of
justice to which criminal defendants are entitled. Because the disparity in the
criminal justice system is culturally based, one could argue that it presents an
unsolvable problem.367 The difficulty is that any attempts at reform are likely
to be subverted by the very cultural processes that led to the imbalance in the
adversary system in the first place. But this is a point of view that can lead to
paralysis. Notwithstanding my broad critique of the criminal justice system, I
365. Flemming, supra note 303, at 408.
366. Thus, the truth in Lisa McIntyre's claim that public defenders are "social anomalies."
MCINTYRE, supra note 320, at 1.
367. If not unsolvable, then it is the type of problem not subject to correction in the absence of
broad and radical social change, a transformation that is unlikely in the present political climate.
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feel compelled to offer something in the way of a concrete and pragmatic
solution. 68
A factor favoring reform is that the process of signification is, in a sense,
democratic; that is, the state or dominant social groups cannot monopolize
the production of meaning. There is always room for alternative interpreta-
tions and resistant readings and recodings of texts. It is possible that, through
disciplined and rigorous cultural work and the raising of consciousness, the
allegorical meaning of the criminal trial could be changed, or at least
contested.369
Admittedly, the ostracism of the criminal (and the subsequent failure to
take the rights of criminal defendants seriously) is a deep and pervasive
problem that is not subject to easy, instrumental solutions.370 However, the
government can still be expected to do what it can to improve the adversarial
process and, at the very least, prevented from taking actions that aggravate
the situation. If the state were to take the role that the public defender plays
in the adversarial process seriously, then perhaps the public would too. The
first step, then, to improve the adversarial criminal trial process is to infuse
the criminal defendant's right to counsel with new meaning.
Having argued that the problem lies outside of the formal legal structure
and its collection of rights, it would seem to make little sense to retreat into
the rhetoric of rights in order to resolve it. Yet, that is what I propose to do
here. While the designation of something as a "right" does not necessarily
ensure justice,37 ' greater importance can be attached to how a "right" is
368. Cf ARNOLD, supra note 90, at 6 (criticizing realists for handwringing and "merely making the
world look unpleasant"); Owen Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982)
(criticizing critical legal studies for leading to nihilism).
369. In some trials, in fact, public defenders and other defense counsel are able to cast their clients
in the role of ordinary citizens who have been unjustly accused of crimes. But this happens all too
rarely. Ideally, the trial should become a neutral ground of contention where the counternarrative of
the defendant could be argued and heard as readily as is the "law and order" narrative of the state.
370. See supra Part II.
371. Proponents of critical legal studies ("CLS") advocate the abandonment of the rhetoric of
rights because the rights model is excessively individualistic and "allows for the manipulation of legal
rules to perpetuate and legitimate existing inequitable distributions of power and opportunity."
Monica J. Evans, Stealing Away: Black Women, Outlaw Culture and the Rhetoric of Rights, 28 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 263, 290 (1993). For examples of works espousing this view, see MARK KELMAN, A
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES (1987); ROBERTO MANGABIERA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL
STUDIES MOVEMENT 36-40 (1986); THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed.,
1982); Critical Legal Studies Symposium, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of
Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276 (1984); Peter Gabel, Reification in Legal
Reasoning, 3 RES. L. & Soc. 25 (1980); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363
(1984). The "strong" version of the CLS rights critique argues that "the long-term ideological
consequences of winning victories in courts are almost certainly going to be adverse to progressive
social change." Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23, 26 (1993).
This strong articulation of the CLS rights critique has been vigorously attacked by several scholars
identified with Critical Race Theory and feminist legal scholarship. While differing in their ap-
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interpreted, both by courts and by the broader culture. The creation of rights
and their subsequent treatment by the state can play a significant role in the
shaping of the consensus, 372 and this in turn can play a role in constructing
the meaning that is attached to rights.
B. Beyond Asymmetry: Acknowledging the State's Dual Role in the Quest for
Criminal Justice
As I see it, the core of the problem with the adversarial system is the
current imbalance in the degree of attention the government pays to the act
of prosecution as opposed to its obligation to provide for the defense of
citizens whom it accuses of crime. While it cannot be argued that prosecuting
crime is one of the central concerns of government, there is no legitimate
reason for the current excessive focus on prosecution at the expense of
individual rights (other than illegitimate reasons of social control).373 If there
is to be balance in the adversarial process, there must be balance in the role
that the state plays within that system.
374
proaches, these scholars invariably point out that the disempowered, lacking the ability to impose
limits on the powerful, might just as well take advantage of the limits that the powerful have imposed
on themselves through the granting of rights. See, e.g., Anthony E. Cook, Beyond Critical Legal Studies:
The Reconstructive Theology of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 103 HARV. L. REV. 985 (1990); Kimberle
Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimi-
nation Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Richard Delgado, The Etheral Scholar: Does Critical Legal
Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301 (1987); Evans, supra; Mari J.
Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations,
22 HARV. C.L.-C.R. L. REV. 323 (1987); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 617 (1990); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstruct-
ing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987).
Probably in response to this intense, but generally friendly criticism, at least one CLS writer, Mark
Tushnet, has proposed a "weak" version of the rights critique. The "weak" version acknowledges that
there are contexts where rights rhetoric may be helpful and merely cautions that "there is no
necessary connection between winning legal victories and advancing political goals." Tushnet, supra,
at 23. To the extent that the CLS rights critique is interpreted to mean that rights imply complicated
ideological consequences and that by invoking rights discourse one may endanger as well as advance
one's political program, I concur.
372. See Tushnet, supra note 371, at 23 (describing how Supreme Court's treatment of right to
abortion can be enlisted to advance political goals of both pro-choice and anti-abortion advocates).
373. The Constitution does not support this governmental orientation. In fact, the Constitution
would seem to support just the opposite-a regime of tough safeguards aimed at protecting individual
rights at the expense of the ability of the government to control crime. See Potter Stewart, The Road to
Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in
Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1393 (1983) ("inevitable result" of the Fourth
Amendment's guarantees "is that police officers who obey its strictures will catch fewer criminals").
Perhaps the Framers knew that crime would never be as great a threat to freedom as it would be an
excuse for state usurpation of the rights of the people.
374. This double aspect of the state's role in the criminal justice process is what motivates the right
to counsel cases, see, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (indigent defendants in
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The state's commitment to prosecution is institutionalized in the office of
the attorney general. At both the federal and state level, the attorney general
is a high government official responsible for supervising the state apparatus
for the prosecution of crimes, in addition to rendering formal legal opinions
and advising government agencies.375 The attorney general also has an
important political role and may have significant input in the formation of
national or state policy.376 The federal Attorney General, often referred to as
"the nation's chief law enforcement officer," 377 has the greatest symbolic
importance. The Attorney General for the United States heads the Depart-
ment of Justice and is the fourth ranking member of the President's Cabi-
net.378 The U.S. Attorney General provides legal advice to the President and
the various executive and military departments of the U.S. government.
Moreover, the Attorney General "has overall responsibility... for represent-
ing the United States in all state and federal courts., 379 The duties of the
Attorney General include the "supervision of United States Attorneys and
other government counsel' 31 in, inter alia, the investigation and prosecution
of crimes against the United States.38' In addition to these criminal litigation
functions, the U.S. Attorney General is also charged with investigative
authority, chiefly through the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Drug
Enforcement Administration.3 82
criminal trials have fundamental right to assistance of counsel, because poor defendant would
otherwise not be assured fair trial, in light of government's large expenditures for prosecution);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (right to counsel for criminal defendants in capital cases),
and those cases that forbid prosecutorial vindictiveness. See, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28
(1974) (misdemeanant "entitled to pursue. . . statutory right to a trial de novo without apprehension
that the State will retaliate ...."). This vision of the state's dual responsibility is made especially
clear in Justice Sutherland's well known opinion in Berger v. United States:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling
as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall
not escape or innocence suffer.
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (emphasis added).
375. NAT'L Ass'N OF STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL, POWERS, DUTIES AND OPERATIONS OF STATE
ATrORNEYS GENERAL (1977).
376. Id.
377. See, e.g., Paul Anderson, Under Fire, Reno Takes Heat With Skill, DET. FREE PRESS, Apr. 21,
1993, at 8A.
378. Luther A. Huston, History of the Office of Attorney General, in ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 1, 7 (1968).
379. DANIEL J. MEADOR, THE PRESIDENT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, AND THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE 15 (1980).
380. Id.
381. 28 U.S.C. § 533 (1), (3) (1988).
382. MEADOR, supra note 379, at 21-24.
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While the commitment to the act of prosecution is institutionalized, the
commitment to defense is haphazard. There is no defense counterpart to the
Attorney General. Perhaps there should be. In addition to prosecuting
crimes, the government also has an overriding duty to provide for the general
public welfare.383 In theory, this duty would require the government to
expend as much effort on preventing erroneous convictions as it does on
obtaining justified ones. Certainly, the governmental undercommitment to
the defense function has deep symbolic import. What the public sees
stamped with the authority of the state is the act of prosecution-this is what
has allegorical power, and this is what skews the defendant's ability to obtain
a fair trial in an adversarial context.
C. Conceptualizing a Federal Defender General
In order to balance the government's symbolic relationship to the criminal
justice system, I would propose the creation of a "Defender General" at the
federal level. Like the Attorney General, the federal Defender General
would also be a high government official, although not necessarily a member
of the President's Cabinet.384 However, there are many differences in the way
that cases are prosecuted and the way they are defended that would call for
the Defender General's Office to be structured somewhat differently from
that of the Attorney General. First, there is no uniform system for the
provision of defense services comparable to the network of U.S. Attorneys
and local state prosecutors.3 85 Secondly, although assuring that criminal
383. Jacques-Pierre Brissot, an early disciple of Beccaria's, believed that the defense of the
accused was based on "expectations stemming from the social contract." Leonore Loft, Toward a
More Just Criminal Code in Pre-Revolutionary France: J. -P. Brissot (1754-1793), 20J. CRIM. JUSTICE 121,
124 (1992). For more modern and more general theories supporting fundamental minimal entitle-
ments, see generally Thomas C. Grey, Property and Need: The Welfare State and Theories of Distributive
Justice, 28 STAN. L. REV. 877 (1976); Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit of Constitutional Welfare Rights:
One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973); William H. Simon, The Invention
and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD. L. REV. 1 (1985).
384. While Cabinet level officials clearly have greater prestige, the Defender General may be
subject to an excessive degree of political influence if he or she were to be a member of the President's
Cabinet. See MEADOR, supra note 379, at 48 (describing Cabinet membership as problematic for
'Attorney General as it "contributes to the appearance ... that he is simply another political
appointee"); Jeremy Rabkin, At the President's Side: The Role of the White House Counsel in
Constitutional Policy 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 76 (1993) (describing "built-in tension" between
Attorney General's political and quasi-judicial functions).
385. It should be noted, however, that there is much diversity among prosecuting agencies, LAFAVE
& ISRAEL, supra note 10, at 6, and that, on the whole, U.S. Attorneys exercise considerable
independence from the Attorney General. Arthur Selwyn Miller, The Attorney General As the
President's Lawyer, in ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 41, 66 (1968).
However, prosecuting agencies are not nearly as varied as the providers of defense services. See
LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 10, at 7; SPANGENBERG ET AL., supra note 304, at 9-11 (survey of types
and characteristics of indigent defense systems).
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defendant's receive the effective assistance of counsel is a governmental
concern, the actual representation of criminal defendants is not primarily
accomplished through the state's employees.386 Third, and most important,
while all prosecutors theoretically represent the state, each defense counsel
represents the unique interests of his or her own client.
387
Perhaps the Surgeon General388 would provide a better model for a
Defender General than would the Attorney General as that office is pres-
ently conceived. The delivery of medical services is, quite possibly, even more
fragmented and diversified than is the delivery of defense services.389 Al-
though the Surgeon General does provide some direct medical care through
the Public Health Service and its Commissioned Corps of doctors,39 most
Americans receive their medical treatment from private physicians.3 9' And,
while government plays a substantial role in paying for the health care of
many people, doctors, like defense lawyers, consider their primary duty to be
to their patients, not the government.392
Prior to the reorganization of the Executive Branch in 1966, 393 the Surgeon
386. Defense services may be provided by privately retained counsel and court appointed private
counsel, as well as by public or private defenders. SPANGENBERG ET AL., supra note 304, at 9-10.
387. See A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE-THE DEFENSE FUNCTION Standard 4-1.6
(1979) (client interests paramount); A.B.A. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 15 (1967)
(attorney must be devoted to interest of the client); see also Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321
(1981) ("[A] public defender works under canons of professional responsibility that mandate his
exercise of independent judgment on the behalf of the client."); see generally Developments in the
Law-Conflicts of Interest in the Legal Profession, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1244, 1292-1315 (1981) (describing
ethical obligations of attorney engaging in simultaneous representation of more than one client).
388. The term "Surgeon General" refers to the Surgeon General of the Public Health Service and
is not to be confused with the Surgeon General of either the Army, Navy or Air Force, who is the chief
ranking medical officer of his or her respective military service.
389. See CLEMENT BEZOLD ET AL., THE FUTURE OF WORK AND HEALTH (1986) (discussing
diversification of health care systems).
390. For a concise description of the Public Health Service and its role, see Robert G. Carey, Public
Health Service, in 7 THE GREENWOOD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS: GOVERNMENT
AGENCIES 450-58 (Donald R. Whitnah ed., 1986). A more comprehensive, if somewhat dated history
maybe found in RALPH CHESTER WILLIAMS, THE UNITED STATES PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, 1798-1950 (1951).
391. See BEZOLD ET AL., supra note 389.
392. The "Physician's Oath" adopted by the World Medical Association requires doctors to pledge
that "the health of my patient will be my first consideration" and that "I will not permit consider-
ations of religion, nationality, race, party politics or social standing to intervene between my duty and
my patient." The World MedicalAssociation Declaration of Geneva, reprinted in TOM L. BEAUCHAMP &
JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 330-31 (2d ed. 1983); see also American
Medical Association Principles of Medical Ethics, reprinted in BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra, at 331
(physician should provide "medical service with compassion and respect for human dignity" and
"seek changes in [those laws] which are contrary to the best interests of the patient"); BEAUCHAMP &
CHILDRESS, supra, at 241 ("physicians have a primary responsibility to the patient, even if a third party
establishes initial contact" or is responsible for payment); PAUL RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON: ExPLORA-
TIONS IN MEDICAL ETHICS 1-40 (1970) (describing the ethics of informed consent as "a canon of loyalty").
393. Pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1966, all functions of the Surgeon General were
transferred to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare. Reorg. Plan No. 3 of 1966, 3 C.F.R.
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General was responsible for the administration of the Public Health Ser-
vice394 and the promulgation of "regulations necessary to the administration
of the Service., 395 In addition, the Surgeon General was required by statute
to "encourage, cooperate with, and render assistance to other appropriate
public authorities, scientific institutions, and scientists in the conduct of,...
research,.., and studies relating to the causes, diagnosis, treatment, control,
and prevention of physical and mental diseases ....396
In carrying out this responsibility, the Surgeon General was given broad
authority, including the ability to issue publications, provide research facili-
ties, maintain research fellowships, and "[m]ake grants in aid to universities,
hospitals, laboratories, and other public or private institutions." 397 Even
though the Surgeon General no longer exercises the same authority, he is still
recognized as the symbolic leader of the medical profession and, when it
comes to health matters, continues to exert great influence.398
A Defender General patterned after the Surgeon General (as the office
was originally envisioned in the Public Health Act) could serve as the
symbolic leader of the criminal defense bar and enable criminal defense
lawyers to claim more prestige vis-a-vis the prosecution. The Defender
General could also serve as a source for necessary training and as a catalyst
for improving the delivery of defense services. By committing its resources to
the establishment of a viable and vital Defender General Office, the govern-
ment would be signaling the importance and significance of the right to
counsel. By improving the ability of criminal defendants to compete for the
hearts and minds of jurors, the government would increase the chances that
those accused of crime would receive a fair trial.
191 (1966), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.S. § 202 (Law. Co-op. 1978). The Public Health Service became part
of the Department of Health Education and Welfare in 1953. Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1953, 3 C.F.R. 131
(1953), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.S. § 202 (Law. Co-op. 1978). In 1979, the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare was reorganized as the Department of Health and Human Services.
Department of Education Organization Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 509, 93 Stat. 668, 695 (1979)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 3508 (1991)). The functions formerly performed by the Surgeon General are
now performed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. See Exec. Order No. 11,140, 29 Fed.
Reg. 1637 (1964), as amended by Exec. Order No. 12,608, 3 C.F.R. 245 (1987), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.S.
§ 202 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994). The principal advisor on health matters to the Secretary of Health
and Human Services is the Assistant Secretary for Health, who also now directs the Public Health
Service. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE TODAY 1 (Pamphlet, PHS Fact Sheet,
1988). According to a government publication, "[tihe Assistant Secretary is assisted in the planning
and administration of PHS programs and activities by the Surgeon General of the Public Health
Service .... Id.
394. Public Health Service Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-410, § 201, 58 Stat. 682, 683 (1944).
395. Id. § 215 (b).
396. Id. § 301.
397. Id. §§ 301(a)-301(d).
398. See C. Everett Koop and Harold M. Ginzburg, The Revitalization of the Public Health Service
Commissioned Corps, 104 PUB. HEALTH REP. 105, 109-10 (1989) (describing changes made by Surgeon
General to revitalize Corps program).
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Thus, the federal Defender General I propose would have the following
responsibilities: (1) give leadership and direction to the nation's criminal
defense programs and practitioners; (2) contribute to the advancement of
criminal defense techniques through research and clinical programs; (3)
disseminate that knowledge to legal professionals and the general public; (4)
assure the adequate training and personnel development of criminal defense
practitioners; and (5) improve the organization and delivery of defense
services in the communities.39 9 In order to carry out these responsibilities,
the Defender General would be empowered to make grants in aid to public
defender organizations, law schools, universities and other public or private
institutions; offer fellowships to promising or renowned defense attorneys;
offer scholarships to deserving students in exchange for a commitment to
practice criminal defense for an appropriate time; retain experts, scholars
and consultants; issue publications; and provide technical advice and assis-
tance to appropriate public and other nonprofit organizations and institu-
tions."'
Obviously, many details remain to be worked out before a federal De-
fender General could ever become a reality-such as whether the Defender
General should be a part of the Justice Department, the Department of
Health and Human Services, or an independent agency in the judicial
branch.40 1 But what is important about the concept of the Defender General
is the idea of committing the state to the provision of defense services in a
way that parallels the government's commitment to the act of prosecution.4"2
399. Cf. Carey, supra note 390, at 451 (describing duties of Public Health Service).
400. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 241(a) (describing public health related powers of the Secretary of Health and
Human Services).
401. Advantages and disadvantages attend each option. The Department of Justice is that part of
the executive with the greatest responsibility and expertise for addressing criminal justice issues.
However, the Department of Justice has a long institutional commitment to investigating and
prosecuting crime. It would be very difficult for the Attorney General to adequately serve two masters.
Were the Justice Department to become responsible for both prosecuting crimes and defending
citizens accused of crime, it is very likely that the defense would continue to receive the short end of
the political and financial stick. Because the provision of defense services can be characterized as a
type of welfare, the Department of Health and Human Services must be considered as a potential
home for a proposed Defender General. Placing the Defender General in the Department of Health
and Human Services, instead of the Justice Department, might insulate the Defender General from
becoming an institutional stepchild. On the other hand, a Defender General located in the
Department of Health and Human Services might be seen as less prestigious than the Attorney
General because the Defender General would not be a cabinet level officer and the Department of
Health and Human Services does not otherwise deal with judicial matters. A Defender General
organized as an independent agency in the judicial branch would eliminate the status problems that
would be created if the office was placed in the Department of Health and Human Services, but it
might not resolve the autonomy issues that placing the Defender General under the Attorney General
would raise. This is because the federal judiciary may also display a bias in favor of the prosecution.
See supra note 248 and accompanying text.
402. One proposal to encourage a greater governmental commitment to the idea of indigent
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By committing the government to the defense of accused persons in such a
concrete and substantial way, the Defender General would make an impor-
tant symbolic statement. It would teach respect for individual rights and
infuse the presumption of innocence with real meaning. A Defender General
would help make the right to a fair trial and the right to adequate counsel
more than just empty promises. As a result, this country would go a long way
toward making the myth of criminal justice a reality.
CONCLUSION
The functioning of the adversarial criminal trial cannot be determined
solely by reference to the ideals that are set forth in the Constitution, the
mandates found in statutes, or the guarantees that are promised in court
opinions. The adversarial trial takes its real meaning from the culture from
which it springs, after it has been worked and reworked by the play of
semiotic processes. The adversary system has been socially constructed so
that its requirements may be easily met by the provision of an overburdened
and undertrained public defender, who has a scant chance of providing his or
defense has already been put forward. In 1992, an ad hoc committee, appointed by Chief Justice
Rehnquist to review the Criminal Justice Act (known as the "Prado Committee"), proposed the
creation of an independent "Center for Federal Criminal Defense Services." Judicial Conference of
the United States, Committee to Review the Criminal Justice Act, Interim Report (July 28, 1992),
reprinted in 51 CRIM. L. REP. 2335, 2342 (August 19, 1992). As proposed, "[tlhe Center would be
located within the judicial branch as an independent body, endowed with a broad mandate to lead,
administer and speak for defender services in the federal criminal justice system." Id.
The Prado Committee's recommendation was opposed for two reasons: (1) it was thought that the
centralization of defense services would create an unnecessary bureaucracy; and (2) many judges and
defenders felt that an independent appropriation for a center pledged to indigent defense would be
more politically vulnerable than monies obtained through the current method, as part of the
judiciary's appropriation request. Judicial Conference of the United States, Report on the Federal
Defender Program (Mar. 1993), reprinted in 63 CRIM. L. REP. 2003, 2010 (Apr. 14, 1993). Ultimately,
the Judicial Conference refused to adopt the recommendation of the Prado Committee for the
establishment of a defense services center. Id. at 2011.
The proposal I present here differs from the Prado Committee recommendation in three important
respects. First, the Defender General I propose is not limited in its authority to federal public
defenders organized under the Criminal Justice Act. See Judicial Conference of the United States,
Report of the Committee to Review the Criminal Justice Act (Jan. 29, 1993), reprinted in 52 CRIM. L. REP.
2265, 2299-300 (Mar. 10, 1993). Second, the Defender General would not create the type of
centralized bureaucracy that was envisioned under the Prado Committee proposal. Id. (Center would
be appointing authority for federal public defenders and be responsible for the processing of
vouchers, payroll, space acquisition, personnel and accounting). Third, the main mission of the
federal Defender General I contemplate would be to provide education, training and support for
existing defender agencies and private defense counsel.
As an independent agency, the Defender General I propose would also be vulnerable to funding
cuts. If the Defender General is weak and underfunded, however, then it cannot serve to balance the
government's commitment to the adversarial process and its existence can have no effect on societal
attitudes toward public defenders and their clients. There is no way to avoid this issue. Either the
government takes public defense seriously or it does not.
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her client with a fair trial. If the trial is to be made more than a simple way
station on the road to a sure conviction, then public defenders must be given
the ability to contest the government's case from a position of equality. To
facilitate the task of re-envisioning and reconstructing the allegory of the
criminal trial, the state must afford the defense the same dignity and
resources that it affords the prosecution.
